

THE UNSUNG HEROES

ZAINUDDIN MAIDIN



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*I salute
all the heroes of
the nation*

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I would like to express my deepest appreciation and gratitude to everyone who was involved in the production of the book "The Unsung Heroes".

My special thanks go to the members of the Special Unit of the Police Force who have helped me tremendously in strengthening the credibility of this book.

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Thank you.
Zam

PROLOGUE

This book revisits historical events which are already known to the public but which have been written from the perspective of the writer who had the opportunity to witness for himself the enactment of various events and in some instances, was directly involved in them.

The writer has attempted to share with readers the emotions he felt at those moments – sometimes anxiety, sometimes disappointment, and sometimes pride.

The core of this book is Chapter 21 “The Unsung Heroes” which discusses the behind-the-scene roles of security personnel especially the Special Branch Department of the Royal Malaysia Police in their efforts to work out peace with the Malayan Communist Party (MCP).

This chapter is based on interviews with the officers of the Special Branch as well as the writer’s own observations. It is of utmost importance to the writer because of the dramatic meeting between the Chief Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra with leaders of the Malayan Communist Party led by Chin Peng on 28th and 29th December 1955 which triggered the writer’s interest in journalism when he was barely 16 years old.

As Allah Subhanahu Wata’ala would have it, more than 30 years later, as a journalist, the writer would personally witness and cover the signing ceremony of the peace treaty between the MCP, and the Malaysian and Thai Governments on 2nd December 1989 in Hadyai which marked the end of the communist struggle in Malaysia.

As such, the last chapter “What Tunku Started, Mahathir Ended” was written with full conviction and understanding.

On the whole, the book shows that national independence was achieved because of the strong belief, from the very beginning, in realistic and

pragmatic policies, in a diverse society, as well as in the rejection of narrow nationalist sentiments, communism, chauvinism, extremism and fanaticism.

The main objective of writing this book is to inform the younger generation of the successful formula for nation building which has made us a proud race.

It is also hoped that this book will help to save the younger generation from being swayed by non-objective narrations and writings of history which have been influenced by ideological and political sentiments.

It is important that there be a true understanding of history so as to create a society which is sensitive to the elements which can either make or break a nation.

From time to time, the country will be faced with threats which may appear in sophisticated forms which may be difficult to detect if we have not understood history.

A new danger which has appeared is globalisation which is western by its very nature. Heroes of democracy whom we used to support and hold in awe have turned into intruders and new-age colonialists.

At the same time, the failed struggle of the Malay Archipelago has transformed into the Dauliah Islamiah Nusantara whose nature is violent and cruel.

Will Malaysia be safe in the struggle against these two simultaneous threats?

What will save us is the continued faith in our true values, which are the belief in a multi-racial society, in tolerance, and in the rejection of extremism. All these, we can learn from this book.

Zainuddin Maidin

November 2003

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*A bloodless
struggle does
not mean it is
without honour.*



More than ten years after the emergency officially ended in this country, the communist husband-and-wife team, Yahya bin Ahmad and Cik Embong binti Che Noh, surrendered to security forces in Air Lanas, Kelantan, on 28th April 1970.

1

PRIDE WITHOUT THE BLOODSHED

Malaya attained independence on 31st August 1957 through a Constitution, and through the unity of multi-racial political parties, UMNO, MCA, and MIC which formed the Alliance Party under the leadership of the late Tunku Abdul Rahman.

This independence did not have the blessings of everyone in Malaya. To other Malay parties like PAS, led by Dr. Burhanuddin Hilmi, and Parti Rakyat (People's Party) under Ahmad Boestamam and Ishak Hj. Mohamad which was leftist and pro-Indonesia in nature, this independence was empty and meaningless. Ahmad Boestamam was a supporter of Indonesia Raya and felt that a revolution was the way to independence. His motto was Independence through Bloodshed.

Their feelings were based on the fact that even though Malaya was independent, there were British army bases in the country, foreign-owned property had not been seized and there were foreigners still in the police force and administrative bodies.¹

Tunku Abdul Rahman was criticised as a stool pigeon of the British and a puppet of the colonial masters.

Meanwhile, in the jungles, the Malayan Communist Party led by Chin Peng continued its struggles to destroy what it considered to be the remnants of colonialism which had been inherited by the Alliance government. It was joined by several Malay leftists such as Rashid Maidin, Musa Ahmad, Samsiah Fakeh and Siti Norkiah Mahmud Baginda.

Prior to independence, Tunku had given these terrorists the opportunity to surrender but they wanted the Malayan Communist Party to be acknow-

¹ *Political Awakening* by Tunku Abdul Rahman, published by Pelandak Publications (1986) page 10: "... some intellectuals felt that the British had not relinquished their hold on Malaya, but rather established themselves even more firmly in the country with the help of the rulers and right wing Malays."

ledged. The Tunku refused them because he knew that a majority of the members were the Chinese who maintained ties with the Chinese Communist Party in the People's Republic of China.

In the talks held with the MCP in Baling on 28th December 1955, Tunku offered them amnesty on condition that the communists lay down their arms and returned to China.²

He understood the worries of the Malays and realised the importance of retaining the British army in Malaya until such time when the states could take over key positions in defence and security. He also believed in introducing gradual changes in the administration of the country.

Tunku chose not to seek independence in the same way Indonesia and other Asian as well as some African countries got theirs because he was convinced by the success of the Malays when they peacefully protested against the formation of the Malayan Union which the British wanted to establish in Malaya in 1946.

On 1st March 1946, 38 Malay parties from throughout Malaya and Singapore gathered at the Sultan Sulaiman Club to protest against the Malayan Union which sought to retain Malaya as a colony of the British and to abolish the power of the Malay rulers.

Following that, UMNO was established on 11th May 1946 at the Istana Besar Johor Bahru and Dato' Onn elected as its first president to demand the formation of the Federation Government.

Resulting from the cooperation between UMNO and the Malay rulers, the Federation Government was formed on 21st January 1948, and its constitution signed by the Malay rulers to replace the Malayan Union. UMNO became more confident of its peaceful and constitutional struggle.

This was also how Malaya achieved independence in 1957, but Indonesia and its agents in Malaya were cynical of it as they were proud of their revolution which had caused much bloodshed.

However, more than 40 years after independence, it has been proved to the world and the big powers that Malaysia is now more stable and respected than other countries in Southeast Asia and Africa.

This is obvious when the foreign and economic policies are considered. The strategy of the United States of America to ensure that Southeast Asia continued to remain dependent on it through the 1997 assault on the shares and capital markets by camouflaging it in the IMF rescue measures did not

Looking Back, by Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, published by Astaka Antara, Kuala Lumpur (1977) page 12: "I made another offer to the Communists - those who wished to give up the struggle now and would agree to go to China would not be subjected to any discomfort or the 'disgrace' of being interrogated."

succeed in Malaysia because of the latter's ability to stand firm through its own financial and economic strategies.

Malaysia's defence strategy shocked the world and incurred the wrath of the Western world, especially the American media.

However, in the end, Malaysia's actions were acknowledged as a smart and effective measure. At the same time, when the attacks took place, the Malaysian Government successfully crippled the agents of the international superpowers which hid behind political reformation movements which were actually a continuation of foreign intervention in this country, beginning with the international communist movement, Islamic extremists, Malaysian Malaysia (Chinese racism) and globalisation.

It has now been clearly shown that a struggle does not necessarily have to be bloody in order to be honourable.

*Seeing that they had common enemies,
Dato' Onn and Tan Cheng Lock
started the UMNO-MCA
cooperation.*



During the emergency period (1948-1960), the "bedok" (a sounding instrument) was placed in control huts and sounded by members of the Home Guard to inform villagers in black areas of the infiltration and attacks by communist terrorists.

2

A COMMON ENEMY

The opposition towards UMNO from various parties began when UMNO, with the support of the majority of the Malays, foiled the efforts of the British's Malayan Union government, resulting in the formation of the Malayan Federation Government on 1st February 1948.

This opposition came from the All Malaya Council of Joint Action (AMCJA) or the Majlis Bergerak Serentak Tanah Melayu which included the Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API) headed by Ahmad Boestamam and the Chinese community represented by Tan Cheng Lock and several other Malay parties.

According to the first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, in his book *Political Awakening*, this opposition group was unhappy because it was unrepresented in the new government.

Meanwhile, the Malayan Communist Party with its strong sentiments of Chinese racism, had increased its violent activities, causing a state of emergency to be declared in the Federation on 12th January 1948.

Thousands of Malays and UMNO supporters joined the army. The Special Constable (SC) and Home Guard were formed to combat the communist terrorists who butchered civilians, rubber tappers, vegetable farmers and villagers who did not support them.

Because race relations, especially between the Chinese and the Malays, were not good at that time, at the end of December 1948, UMNO President Dato' Onn called for a meeting between the leaders of the races but this meeting failed to achieve much.

Subsequently, in January 1949, the British High Commissioner, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, called another meeting between the leaders of the Malays and the Chinese and they agreed to form the Communities Liaison Committee.³

³ *Political Awakening*, page 11

Following that, on 27th February 1949, a Chinese activist who was a member of AMCJA, Tan Cheng Lock, who opposed the Malayan Federation Constitution, formed the MCA and was elected its president, with the support of Leong Yew Koh and T.H. Tan.

UMNO was an obstacle to the leftist groups who wanted to form a government along the lines of Indonesia, and MCA was seen by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) as an obstacle to its ambition to form a communist state in Malaya. Seeing that they had common enemies, Dato' Onn and Tan Cheng Lock started the MCA-UMNO cooperation.

In 1949, the MCP clearly demonstrated its opposition to MCA by throwing hand bombs into the Perak MCA Hall, injuring Tan Cheng Lock and four others.

*Malays who were leftists and
pro-Indonesia did not criticise
the violent and cruel acts of the
Malayan Communist Party.*



Malay women also joined the Home Guard when the country was faced with the threat from communist terrorists.

3

A NEW HISTORY

Tunku Abdul Rahman declared that UMNO's success in blocking the Malayan Union would forever be etched in the minds of the people and marked a new beginning in the history of the country.⁴

He said UMNO's reputation improved because of its success in blocking the Malayan Union and, as a Malay party, it had achieved a major victory. The Malays rejected the leadership of leftist leaders.

The communists ignored the support of the people for UMNO. Instead, they continued with the efforts to oppose the British through defiance and violence. Tunku was of the opinion that violence was in direct contrast to the ideology of peace. The MCP could not be legitimised and validated because of its destructive actions towards the people and nation.⁵

Many Malays, men and women, joined the security forces to fight against the MCP. The Malays had become more convinced of the effort to obtain independence peacefully from the colonialists.

In 1950, the communist terrorists increased their violent activities and launched an attack on the police station in Bukit Kepong.

Tunku wrote in his book, *Political Revival*, that 1950 was the most tragic year in the history of the Federation of Malaya.

The communists attacked the police station in Bukit Kepong, in Singapore riots broke out over the Natrah controversy, and Dato' Onn Jaafar clashed with UMNO.

The attack on Bukit Serangan met with the heroism of members of the police force who fought till their dying breath. All the police officers, their wives and children were killed that day.

On 24th and 25th February 1950, the UMNO meeting decided that all

⁴ *Political Awakening*, page 6

⁵ Article by Tunku in *The Star*, 30th December 1974

branches and divisions would hold special prayers for the heroes who perished that day. It also launched a special charity drive to collect money to be given to the surviving members of the families as a token of sympathy.⁶

However, the pro-Indonesian leftist Malays did not condemn the cruel and vicious actions of the Malayan Communist Party.

⁶ *Political Awakening*, page 21

*The road to independence
was clear when Tunku became more
confident about destroying the
Malayan Communist Party because the
people clearly supported a government
which had been selected through
a general election.*



The people of Malaya, both in the villages as well as in the towns, excitedly waited for the first general elections to be held in the country on 27th July 1955. The guidelines for the voting process were placed in many places and the people were informed of them by government officials. The symbol of the sailing ship at the top of the notice board was the symbol of the Alliance Party, which was a merger of UMNO, MCA and MIC. This symbol was later changed to the weighing scale when the Alliance became the Barisan Nasional with the inclusion of more political parties.

4

POLITICAL REVIVAL

Tunku's views of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP)'s struggle were clear. Unlike most of the leftist nationalists, he was not influenced by the party's anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism propaganda.

Tunku saw the MCP's efforts in Malaya as attempts to establish a Chinese government controlled by the Chinese Communist Party in the People's Republic of China.

As such, he was determined to obliterate the MCP movement which was supported by the Chinese who were disappointed with the British for not handing them the country after the Japanese forces were defeated in World War Two. The Chinese had helped in the fight against the Japanese because of the promise of the British.

Tunku realised the aspirations of the Malayan Communist Party, but several leftist Malay leaders who had been influenced by the anti-colonialist sentiments and had been inflamed by Indonesia's struggle for independence had joined the communists in the jungle to fight the British.

The ultra-nationalist group which had been rejected by the people continued with its efforts to oppose the self-ruling government under the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman, set up with the support of the people after Malaya's first general elections held on 27th July 1955. The Alliance Party comprising UMNO, MCA and MIC had won 51 of the 52 seats which were contested.

The general elections were the result of the Alliance Party's efforts towards self-governance prior to independence. The people's movement demanded that elections be held in the beginning of 1954.

In his book, *Political Revival*, Tunku wrote that public demonstrations sponsored by the Alliance were held throughout the country. The people carried banners demanding self-government and later, independence. UMNO members also wore armbands.

With the road towards independence open, Tunku became confident of abolishing the Malayan Communist Party because it was clear that the people supported a government which had been chosen through a general election.

The British government did not reject the demands of the people for independence through a constitution.

Prior to the elections held on 27th July 1955, UMNO and MCA had already swept the local government and local council seats throughout the country in the general election held a year before.

This made Tunku confident of the Alliance's victory in the 1955 general elections which would show the British that the people were united.

Before this, Tunku had formed an UMNO and MCA council, with 15 representatives from each party.

This council was called the Round Table Council. Tunku was the chairman. He was willing to give up his seat to Tan Cheng Lock, but the latter refused and insisted that he (Tunku) continue to hold the position.

The MIC only joined the alliance of UMNO and MCA after the two parties won the local government and council elections in 1954.

In his book, *Political Revival*, Tunku wrote that with the participation of MIC, for the first time, the Malays, Chinese and Indians were united towards a common goal and swore to stand strong to fight for independence.

The Round Table Council passed a resolution to work towards self-government and independence in Malaya, while upholding the rights and sovereignty of the rulers, ensuring the right to form associations, to work towards unity among the people of Malaya, and to ensure the social, economic and political development of the people.

The Council was also given the responsibility of preparing a manifesto for the first general elections in Malaya to be held on 27th July 1955.

*Seeing the break-up of the Malays in
the 1999 general elections, the
Chinese extremists were revived to
break the social contract between the
Malays and the non-Malays.*



Members of the GPMS protest the demands of Suqiu in Kuala Lumpur on 14th December 2000.

5

THE THREAT OF EXTREMISTS

After the Alliance's victory in the 1955 elections, self-government was established with Tunku Abdul Rahman as the first Prime Minister.

On 31st July 1955, the British High Commissioner offered the Alliance 10 cabinet seats and 10 more for officers in the civil service.

However, the British Government offered houses to only the cabinet ministers while giving preferential treatment to the senior civil servants, menteri besar, judges and Attorney General. They received cars and chauffeurs as well as houses.

Tunku said he and the other ministers were treated like intruders and unwelcomed underlings.⁷

Tunku was given a house, No. 1, Horse Road, the former home of the Selangor Menteri Besar, Tun Raja Uda. He had earlier been given the two-bedroom home of a clerk in Federation Hill, but he refused to accept it.

However, several days after staying in the house, one night while they were sleeping, he and his wife were drenched in rain because of a leaking roof.

Tunku said he and his wife pushed the bed to a corner but by then, it was already wet and they ended up sleeping on the wooden floor.

Tunku said he could not sleep the whole night and swore that he would get the British out of the country as soon as possible.

The road to independence was not plain sailing as Chinese and Malay extremist groups posed a major threat.

Even though the Alliance which was made up of UMNO, MCA and MIC was ready to face the first general elections of the Federated Malay States Legislative Council on 27th July 1955, out of the blue, the Chinese

⁷ *Political Awakening*, page 56

extremist groups made a demand which threatened the relations between the Malays and the Chinese.

The Federation of Chinese School Teachers demanded that the Chinese language be made one of the official languages of the country.

Tunku said this demand, made during the final stages of the preparations for the general elections, threatened the Alliance and could lead to disunity among the people, thus affecting the Alliance's chances for victory in the general elections. Tunku had hoped that this victory would force the British to keep their word to grant self-government to the Malays even earlier.

According to Tunku, the threat of the Chinese extremists was the result of influence from certain quarters who were against the Alliance.

Subsequently, Tunku held talks with representatives of the Chinese teachers at the home of the MCA leader, Datuk Tan Cheng Lock.

Tunku told them that the position of the Malay and English languages as the official languages had been agreed upon by MCA and UMNO and had been included in the Alliance manifesto for the 1955 general elections.

Although Tunku was known for his liberal attitude towards the non-Malays, he saw the need for the government to provide special rights to the Malays, the position of the Malay rulers, and Islam. This was because when we fought against the Malayan Union, other people did not participate because they considered it to be a problem of the Malays and not theirs ...

"The Non-Malays had also proved their loyalty to their motherland and opposed the Barnes Report which wanted to make Bahasa Melayu the national language."⁸

Even so, the Alliance manifesto gave an assurance to provide aid to Chinese and Tamil schools. Tunku felt this was appropriate and just since they had contributed to Malaya's prosperity.

He warned the Chinese extremist groups that if the Alliance failed to obtain self-government from the British, he would blame this failure on the Chinese who had made the unreasonable demand.

After two hours of discussion, the Chinese extremists finally relented, and as Tunku said in his book *Political Revival*, "they felt guilty."

The general elections of the Federation Legislative Council saw the Alliance winning 51 of the 52 seats which were contested.

However, more than 40 years after independence, extremist groups seem to have forgotten history.

⁸ *Political Awakening*, page 31

Seeing that the Malays were disunited in the 1999 general elections, Chinese extremists once again attempted to break the social contract between the Malays and the non-Malays which had been the basis for unity and independence in this country.

Socialist groups which had several times been rejected by the public during general elections also tried to work with religious extremists and revolutionary groups which had been dropped by UMNO for destroying the traditional institutions which had been laid down by the late Tunku Abdul Rahman.



*Chin Peng did not keep his word
when Malaya gained independence
on 31st August 1957. The Malayan Communist
Party continued its struggles in the jungle.*



A huge public rally held to demand that the leader of the Malayan Communist Party, Chin Peng, keep his word to stop its violent actions when Malaya gained independence.

Tunku was at the head of the rally which had banners carrying the words "Chin Peng, keep your word. Malaya has been independent since 31.8.57."

6

THE PROMISE OF THE COMMUNISTS

Following the outstanding victory of the Alliance in the first general elections in 1955, the people demanded that the communist terrorists lay down their arms and surrender.

The British Government agreed to grant these terrorists amnesty. At that time, Malaya was at the stage of self-government but had not yet attained independence. The British was still in charge of internal and external security.

As such, the granting of amnesty for the communists was to be signed by Lt. Gen. Borne, the Director of Federal Operations, but was cancelled when the people asked Tunku as the Prime Minister to offer the amnesty himself on behalf of the Government.

After Tunku signed the order for amnesty, people all over the country held demonstrations, carrying banners and slogans calling for the communists to surrender and end the state of emergency.

Several Malay communist terrorists from Pahang and Kelantan responded to this call and left the jungle to surrender. The leader of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), Chin Peng, asked to meet Tunku.

In a speech aired over the radio on 7th October 1955, Tunku said he had received a letter from the MCP base which expressed the desire to meet him.

Tunku described this offer of a meeting from Chin Peng as "a gift from heaven" which had to be quickly grabbed to save the Malays from being taken over by others.⁹

⁹ Tunku wrote in *The Star*, 30th December 1974: *I recall very vividly what happened in Palestine. There, the Jews fought the British and the Arabs remained neutral, but when the British were hard-pressed, they made terms with the Jews, giving the whole of Palestine to the Israelis. This might easily happen in the Malayan Emergency, if the fortunes of the war were to go against the British. No colonial power would bother to take into account the feeling of the "natives" if the result were against their interest or likely to endanger the lives of their people. The offer from Chin Peng to meet, therefore, came as a gift from heaven and I immediately seized the opportunity.*"

On 28th December 1955, accompanied by Dato' Sir Tan Cheng Lock, David Marshall, Too Joo Hing, T.H. Tan and Tunku's Private Secretary, Shafie Abdullah, Tunku met Chin Peng in Baling, Kedah.

Chin Peng himself was accompanied by Rashid Maidin and Chen Tien. English was used as the language for discussion.

However, during the talks, Chin Peng rejected the offer to surrender, lay down arms and return to society. This was because he did not believe the British would give Malaya its independence.¹⁰

Instead, he assured Tunku that when he (Tunku) returned from his talks with the British and declared independence, the Malayan Communist Party would end its activities.

Tunku quickly announced to the nation that Chin Peng would continue his struggle to create a communist state in Malaya. He did not believe the promise of the communists.¹¹ He did not see any reason for the communists to continue with their struggle as the self-government he headed was based on the popular choice of the people.

When Malaya was declared independent on 31st August 1957, Chin Peng did not keep his promise. The MCP continued its terrorist activities in the jungle. Its elements infiltrated the Parti Rakyat Malaya (People's Party of Malaya) and the Parti Rakyat (Labour Party) in Malaya and Singapore.

It considered Malaya's independence empty.

¹⁰ *Political Awakening*, page 67

¹¹ *Political Awakening*, page 67

*Following the crisis between
UMNO and MCA, in 1959, Tunku resigned
from his post as Prime Minister, and
threatened never to return as PM,
sending out the message that Tun Razak
would take over from him.*



The close ties between the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman and the Minister of Finance, Tun Tan Siew Sin, is clearly seen in this photograph taken at Tunku's 63rd birthday celebration held in Sri Taman in February 1966.

In a letter to Tunku, Tun Tan said the generosity of the UMNO leaders on the issue of citizenship had left a deep impact on him and he considered Tunku a friend for life.

7

THE ALLIANCE IS TESTED

After independence, Malaya had many problems to resolve—the poverty of the people in the rural areas, the racial problems of the Chinese and the Malays, and the communist terrorist threat in the jungles.

The communist terrorists used the People's Party of Malaya and the Labour Party which had joined with the Malayan People's Socialist Front as their frontline in the urban areas.

The threat to the Alliance started in 1959 when the younger members in the MCA, under the leadership of Dr. Lim Chong Eu, wanted to end what they saw as UMNO dominance in the Alliance.¹²

They also demanded that the Chinese language be made the official language of the country. These were the same demands made by the Chinese school teachers before independence.

The UMNO President, Tunku Abdul Rahman, was angry because the demands had been leaked to the press even before they were handed to him.

Dr. Lim Chong Eu gave an ultimatum to Tunku Abdul Rahman, making him even angrier. Tunku rejected these demands and his actions were supported by the Special UMNO General Assembly on 12th July 1959.

Subsequently, the MCA suffered a split and Tun Tan Siew Sin became its new president.

In his book *Political Revival*, Tunku said the problem was not caused by all the members of MCA, but only a few leaders and their followers who wanted to see Chinese power in Malaya.

On the other hand, said Tunku, "many Chinese were comfortable with the Alliance and wanted the Malays and the Chinese to continue being

¹² *Political Awakening*, page 70

united and cooperate for the good of Malaya. Among these people were Tun Tan Siew Sin, Tun Ong Yok Lin, T.H. Tan and others.¹³

Following the crisis, Tunku rejected the post of Prime Minister and handed the leadership of the country to Tun Razak. Tunku focused his energy on the election campaign.

He wanted to ensure the victory of the new MCA which was led by Tun Tan Siew Sin and threatened by the old MCA guard which was now contesting under an independent ticket.

According to Tunku, if the MCA led by Tun Tan Siew Sin lost, he would not return as the Prime Minister and Tun Abdul Razak would take over his post.

The 1959 election campaign also saw a bitter war of words between PAS and UMNO, to the point that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and the other rulers had to issue an order that they refrained from doing so as it was feared that it would all lead to riots. Among others, PAS demanded that the Chinese be sent back to China. Its campaign also included other communal issues.

The Alliance finally won 74 of the 103 contested seats, while the old guard of the MCA won only one.

Dr. Lim Chong Eu finally conceded defeat to Tunku because he had been influenced by the Federation of Chinese School Teachers which had infiltrated the MCA.

After this major test, the relationship between Tunku and Tun Tan Siew Sin became closer and the ties between UMNO and MCA in the Alliance grew stronger.

In actual fact, in the beginning, Tun Tan Siew Sin had not believed in UMNO, especially when its founder Dato' Onn Jaafar left the party after his suggestion in 1951 that UMNO's membership be opened to all races was rejected.

However, Tun Tan Siew Sin later became an important leader in the Alliance (comprising UMNO, MCA and MIC). He also grew to respect and uphold UMNO under the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra.

Tunku once asked Tun Tan Siew Sin about his change of heart and he sent his reply in a long letter which Tunku published in his column in *The Star* on 9th June 1975 under the heading "Tan Siew Sin: A historic decision why he became a staunch leader of The Alliance". Among others, it said:

"The Malay leadership had compromised on the issue of citizenship

¹³ *Looking Back* by Tunku Abdul Rahman, page 175

even though they knew I was alone in fighting for it as the MCA was already tied to an earlier agreement which did not satisfy the non-Malays.

"I must say that the generosity and understanding of the UMNO leaders had left a deep impact in my heart. In truth, this issue was important to them but they showed understanding, consideration and far-sightedness in a situation full of emotion and tension.

"As such, I have decided to support you till my dying breath and to fully support UMNO because you and your friends have clearly shown your sincerity without bias in facing a painful challenge. Tunku has proved this by his actions. We should not ask for more."

In the end, the Government was forced to break up the strike and UMNO took over Utusan Melayu but did not run it as a voice piece of the party, but placed importance on journalistic ethics and professionalism even though it appeared to be pro-Government.



Leftist or rightist, supporters of Utusan Melayu were proud of their contributions towards the growth of Utusan Melayu as a brave voice of the people.

The former editor of Utusan Melayu, Said Zahari, who led the strike in 1961, represented the National Press Club to present a souvenir to former Group Editor of Utusan Melayu, Zainuddin Maidin, in a ceremony held in conjunction with the latter's appointment as Senator on 28th March 1998 at a hotel in Kuala Lumpur.

8

A HIDDEN THREAT

In the early years of independence, UMNO was pressured not by the Chinese, but by the Malay extremists who continued their struggles in the Parti Rakyat and PAS.

After the 1959 general elections, the Malaysian Parliament became more tense with the presence of an increasing number of opposition party members.

The President of PAS, Dr. Burhanuddin Hilmi, often criticised UMNO of selling the country to others. He often said "kera di hutan disusui, ayam di kepuk mati kelaparan, menang sorak kampung tergadai" (meaning others were looked after while your own was neglected). The leaders of Parti Rakyat (People's Party) and Parti Buruh (Labour Party) accused Tunku Abdul Rahman of being a stool pigeon of the British. PAS inflamed the communal sentiments of the Chinese. They wanted Chinese property to be confiscated and given to the Malays.

The *Utusan Melayu* newspaper which was run by several pro-Indonesia and pro-Soekarno Malay nationalists was used by this extremist group.

This angered the majority of the Malays who supported UMNO and were the major share-holders of the newspaper. They boycotted *Utusan Melayu*, causing its shares to plummet and its management had difficulties paying the salaries of the employees every month.

UMNO had to save the newspaper. When, in mid-1961, steps were taken towards this, the employees, including journalists, decided to strike. This decision was led by a journalist from Singapore, Said Zahari, who was known for his pro-socialist and pro-Soekarno leftist leanings.

In a special book to commemorate *Utusan Melayu's* anniversary, *50 Tahun di Sebalik Jendela Utusan* (50 Years through Utusan Eyes), Said Zahari claimed that the strike was aimed at protecting the freedom of the press, but it was later found that at that time *Utusan Melayu* was pro-

socialist and pro-Soekarno, and wanted to make Malaya a colony of Indonesia.

UMNO supporters felt that the newspaper was no longer independent and no longer the voice of the people but instead projected its own views. Each day, its editorials and snippets hit out at the Government. In fact, the main columnists in the *Mingguan Utusan Zaman* comprised socialist personalities.

The newspaper also supported people who were illegal settlers and ignored the Government's efforts to open up thousands of acres of land under the Felda scheme which had helped thousands of poor, landless people. In the end, the Government was forced to break up the strike and take over *Utusan Melayu*.

From the very beginning, there were many enlightened *Utusan Melayu* employees in the production and editorial departments who distanced themselves from the strike.

When *Utusan Melayu* was out of circulation for several days, they worked outside the main office to produce the newspaper each day.

Melan Abdullah, a Malay nationalist who before this was just a sub-editor in the *Utusan Melayu* editorial department, was at the forefront in breaking up the strike. Very courageously, he led the employees away from the strike.

Melan was close to the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and realised that behind the claim for freedom, *Utusan Melayu* was actually under the control of a group of pro-Indonesia, pro-socialist and communist journalists who held senior posts in the Parti Rakyat Malaya (Malayan People's Party).

After the *Utusan Melayu* workers' strike was crippled, Melan restored the newspaper's image and share-market standing. He did not project it as a voice of a party, rather as a daily newspaper which placed importance on journalistic ethics and professionalism even though it appeared to be pro-Government.

The newspaper went on to create a name for itself, employing journalists with calibre.

Its shares continued to rise, an indication of the people's support for UMNO and its leaders. Today, *Utusan* is a newspaper respected by friends and foes.

The status of the newspaper is reflected in the writer's prologue in "Di Sebalik Jendela Utusan" which was published on *Utusan Melayu's* 50th anniversary.

"*Utusan Melayu* is held up by noble, courageous people. The sons of *Utusan Melayu* are brave, dedicated and committed to the newspaper. *Utusan Melayu* was born out of poverty and a realisation ... In truth, *Utusan Melayu* is the legacy of a noble race which continues to expect loyalty, honesty, professionalism, dedication, and at times, major sacrifices from its own people, as were done by those before them."

Said Zahari, the Editor of *Utusan Melayu* who gave this writer a job in the late 1950s, also included this prologue in his memoirs *Meniti Lautan Gelora*.



*“Our policy was to give priority to food
and not bullets, housing and not barracks,
clothes and not uniforms.”*

– Tunku Abdul Rahman



The Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, had given the portfolio of Minister of Rural and National Development to his deputy, Tan Abdul Razak, who visited all corners of the country to plan and carry out development projects.

9

THE TUNKU'S PHILOSOPHY

Compared to other Asian and African countries, which after gaining independence, continued to fight against capitalism and imperialism, Malaya declared that its main struggle was to develop the people, especially those living in rural areas.

The Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, put forth a policy and philosophy which was easy to understand: "our policy places importance on food, not bullets, housing not barracks, clothes not uniforms."

In the meantime, in many newly independent African and Asian countries, property owned by foreigners such as farms, factories and businesses were confiscated and became the property of the state, but this action was pointless because the state was not able to manage them.

When he was challenged by the opposition, especially leftist groups, to emulate these African and Asian countries, Tunku gave a simple answer: "Where will this country sell rubber if we seize the rubber plantations belonging to the foreigners? Most of the importers of rubber are the developed nations in the West. If we seize their property, they will not buy from us," he said.

Malaya had a clear strategy—to first train its own people to manage the estates and industries left behind and in the management and administration of the country.

While the other Asian countries were occupied with demonstrations opposing what they saw as the remnants of colonialism, the poor in Malaya were busy transforming the jungle into cultivated lands.

Through a planned and organised system, thousands of people throughout the country were given land.

Each received 10 acres for an orchard and to build a house, as well as another six acres to plant rubber.

At the same time, the people were also given money to tide them over while they waited for the land to provide yield.

In a major effort to combat illiteracy in the country, special classes for adults were also organised in the villages. The countryside was abuzz with economic and educational development.

The communists in the jungle, supported by their people in the towns, were not successful in their efforts to see that the people's development programmes failed.

The Parti Rakyat (People's Party) and the Parti Buruh (Labour Party) combined into the Socialist Front and claimed to represent the poor farmers and fishermen but did not get the support of the rural people.

In the 1959 Parliamentary elections, of the 104 seats which were contested, the Alliance won 74, PAS 13, Socialist Party eight, the People's Progressive Party four, National Party and the Malayan Party one each, and three went to independents.

The communists could not continue with their struggle because the people valued the independence which had so quickly got them development and filled them with hope.

The morale of the communists who were led by Chin Peng dropped further when 118 communist terrorists surrendered in south Perak on 9th July 1958.

Even though the communists still operated in small groups and tried to make their presence felt by organising the occasional ambush, the Government was becoming more confident that the communist movement would be crippled.

With this confidence, 12 years after being in a state of emergency, on 31st July 1960, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong declared the end of emergency in Malaya.

Of the declaration, the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, noted in his book *Looking Back* that, "With the will of Allah, we are now safe from the communists. Malaya is not only independent but also free from violence."

Following that, Tunku who announced his policy was to "provide food, not bullets housing and not barracks, and clothes not uniforms," directed his Deputy, Tun Razak, to launch a social development programme, with the Government paying for the clearing up of land.

Tunku said Tun Razak performed this job with much zeal. He had very carefully and meticulously drawn up the "Buku Merah" (Red Book) for rural development, complete with maps, details, and integrated targets in

every district in every state in Malaya.

"The jungle will be fenced up, canals dug, roads built to link one district to another, maps will be transformed with the opening of highways, provision of water, electricity and other amenities in the villages."

Tunku also said a lot of money would be spent, and machinery and equipment imported to develop the rural areas.

Malaya's independence was becoming real. The people felt it. At the same time, in Indonesia and other countries in Asia and Africa, the people were fed inflammatory speeches by their leaders while the army was expanded and bullets became more important than food. There were non-stop demonstrations and riots because colonialism by the foreign powers had now been replaced by colonialism by their own people.



Actually, the people who led this illegal clearing of land were tricksters who collected money from people who did not own land by promising them that they would own government land.



The Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, studying the plans for rural development in the Operations Room in Alor Setar while on a visit to Kedah in March 1966.

On his right is the first Menteri Besar of Kedah who was from the Alliance, Datuk Syed Omar Sahabbuddin.

10

LIKE FIGHTING THE COMMUNISTS

Not long after independence, the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, gave his Deputy, Tun Abdul Razak, the responsibility of developing rural areas.

In December 1959, the Ministry of National and Rural Development was set up but Tun had to concentrate on his responsibilities as Minister of Defence and Minister of Home Affairs to fight against the communists who were still active in the jungles.

On 26th December 1959, in his speech aired over Radio Malaya, Tun Abdul Razak said, "With the improved situation concerning the state of emergency, the Alliance Government has decided to give priority to steps to improve the status of the rural people.

"To ensure that this objective is attained as quickly as possible, the Government will utilise all available resources with the same determination and strength as the effort to free the nation from the communist violence."

After the emergency ended on 31st July 1960, Tun accepted the responsibility of developing the rural areas.

He continued the war on poverty with the same zeal as he had the communist threat in the jungle.

The book on the network of facilities to be provided in every district and village was called The Red Book because "red" was to remind people of the emergency. "Red" also implied urgency and "red" referred to the dangers that had to be eradicated.

Within this network, roads, halls, midwifery centres and clinics were built in every corner of the country for the benefit of the people.

They were built simultaneously: jungle areas were cleared and given free to landless farmers to build their homes.

Under the land development plans of the Federal Land Development Authority, the rural people began a new life which was systematic and

structured. They were given loans to help them when the land was being cleared and while they waited for the fruit and rubber trees to provide yield. At the same time, adult literacy classes were held in public halls. Within 10 years from 1960 to 1970, more than three million illiterate adults in the rural areas, especially women, were educated.

Even so, not everybody supported the plans of the Government or the efforts of Tun Abdul Razak. *Utusan Melayu* claimed to represent the Malays, but was actually controlled by nationalist and socialist extremists who were more concerned with highlighting the plight of a small group of villagers who did not own lands but lived illegally on government land.

The police took action on the squatters because they did not want the problem to worsen, cheating people who were landless. Their leaders were actually tricksters who collected money from people who did not own land by promising them that they would get the land, but later, they would be taken to stay illegally on government land.

Tun Abdul Razak was also labelled as a chauvinist because his efforts were focused on the rural areas where the majority of the people were Malays.

In 1959, Tunku declared himself the happiest prime minister in the world. He was more confident of the road to independence chosen by Malaya and wanted to share this experience with other countries which had the same thinking and philosophy.



In 1959, Tunku Abdul Rahman declared himself the happiest prime minister in the world because of the many successes enjoyed by Malaya.

11

A SILVER LINING

Following the many achievements made in less than two years after independence, in 1959, the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, declared that he was the happiest prime minister in the world.

"I declare myself the happiest prime minister in the world," he said in his book *Political Awakening*.

He said that "1959 was the best and happiest year in the history of Malaya. Everything seemed to be going well for the country."

Tunku had good reason to be happy because "money was coming into the country, businesses were expanding, new industries were opening up and the country was peaceful and harmonious."

In an article published in *The Star* on 24th February 1976, Tunku said: "Commercial activities were thriving until they created the problem of rural people migrating to the federal capital. Petaling Jaya which had been opened up by General Templer as a resettlement area, suddenly came to life, grew into the biggest and most important residential and industrial area, and amazingly, there were no major crimes.

"The country prospered, we developed new ties and we became so well-known that our neighbours like Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei told us that they wanted to join the Malay Federation."

Tunku said, "They felt that it was better to join Malaya because of the similarity in background, which was the British administrative system."

Malaya's stability and achievements under his leadership attained within a short period of time and the desire of the neighbouring countries to join Malaya encouraged Tunku to aspire higher.

Despite his confidence and happiness, Tunku realised the bigger threat facing Malaya and Singapore even though the communist threat in these countries had been crippled.

At that time, Indonesia after being independent for more than 10 years

and having a population of almost 200 million, was still in a state of turmoil. The people were still poor and a rebellion had broken out in Aceh. President Soekarno had split Indonesia into two groups – the communist block and the Western block.

He could only appease the people and make them forget their hunger and suffering with his inflammatory speeches.

Tunku was more convinced of the independence route taken by Malaya and he shared this with the countries which had the same philosophy and thinking.

He began taking more effective measures.

*The Sultan of Brunei told Tunku
that Brunei would be the first nation
to join Malaysia.*



Major Benny Moerdani, a senior officer in the Indonesian army, performed two important roles in the relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia in the early 1960s.

Initially, during the era of President Soekarno, his duties were to infiltrate Malaysia and carry out sabotage activities, but later, when President Suharto took over, these duties became those of a peace mission.

Here, he is seen being interviewed by the writer, together with veteran journalist Datuk Mazlan Nordin, in Jakarta on 12th June 1996 for the book Tun Abdul Razak: Jejak Bertapak Seorang Patriot.

12

NOT QUITE SIMILAR

At a time when the country was still full of confidence, Tunku made an announcement which came as a surprise not just to the nation but also to the whole world.

On 27th May 1961, in his speech at a lunch held by the Foreign Press Association in Singapore, Tunku said that Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei should join Malaya.

He said, "I did not realise that what I said would get worldwide coverage."¹⁴

Subsequently, on 3rd June 1961, the Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, declared his support for Tunku's proposal.

In October 1961, the Parliament of Malaya unanimously passed its support for the proposal.

This was followed by the agreement from UMNO, made in its meeting held in Kuala Lumpur on 4th November 1961 which named the proposal Melayu Raya.

Because these other states, including Singapore, were still not yet independent, Tunku flew to London to meet with the British Prime Minister who expressed his support for the establishment of Malaysia.

However, the British suggested that the agreement of the people of Sabah, Sarawak, Singapore and Brunei be obtained first.

The British and Malayan Governments set up a commission under Lord Cobbold to review the opinions and wishes of the people in these places on the proposal to join Malaysia.

The Sultan of Brunei flew to Kuala Lumpur to inform Tunku that Brunei would be the first country to join Malaysia.

¹⁴ *Political Awakening*, page 73

On 21st July 1962, the Sultan of Brunei announced that the Brunei State Legislative Assembly accepted the concept of Malaysia.

However, the process of establishing Malaysia which had started out smooth and easy began to face protests and threats.

Even though the Sultan of Brunei had already announced his decision to join Malaysia, the Parti Rakyat Brunei (Brunei People's Party), under the leadership of A.M. Azahari bin Sheikh Mahmud who was pro-Indonesia, protested against it.

Azahari suggested a separate entity comprising Brunei, Sarawak and Sabah.

It is believed that, upon instructions from Indonesia, at 2 a.m., on 8th December 1962, Azahari, through his subversive army, the Tentera Nasional Kalimantan Utara (TNKU) or North Kalimantan National Army, launched a revolution against the Brunei Government but failed to gain the support of the British army, the Malayan Police Force and the Gurkha Battalion. A.M. Azahari and his assistant, Hj. Zaini bin Awang Hj. Ahmad, were not in Brunei when the revolution was launched. Instead, they were in Manila where, on the same day, they announced the formation of the TNKU army and Brunei's independence at the Filifinas Hotel.

Several days later, in a state banquet in honour of the Deputy President of Yugoslavia, Eduard Kandelji's visit to Jakarta, Indonesian President Soekarno announced his country's support for the revolution.

In the Malayan Federation, this support came from PAS, Parti Rakyat Malaya (Malayan People's Party), and the Parti Progresif Rakyat (People's Progressive Party), while in Singapore, it came from the Parti Rakyat Singapura (Singapore People's Party) and the Barisan Sosialis Singapura (Singapore Socialist Front).

Subsequently, in February 1963, Brunei revised its decision to join Malaysia because the conditions did not benefit it, especially the rotation of the throne of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.

President Soekarno and President Macapagal of the Philippines protested against the establishment of Malaysia. Soekarno considered it an imperialistic idea of the British and called it New Colonialism.

In order to resolve the matter, on 7th June 1963, a meeting was held between the foreign ministers of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. This resulted in a decision that a representative of the United Nations look at the wishes of the people of Sabah and Sarawak. However, when the results of this referendum later showed support for the establishment of Malaysia, President Soekarno announced a confrontation to destroy Malaysia.

Soekarno set up the Fifth Columnist in Kuala Lumpur comprising leaders of the Parti Rakyat and PAS as well as several Malay nationalists who were pro-Soekarno.

In his book *Political Awakening*, Tunku said that Soekarno promised these people important positions if Malaysia fell to Indonesia.

Soekarno, who was supported by the PKI (Parti Komunis Indonesia) or the Indonesian Communist Party in his plans to take Malaya, was overthrown by the Indonesian army under the leadership of Lt. Gen. Suharto and the PKI was disbanded when it launched the 1965 revolution called the Gestapo revolution.

When Suharto took over the leadership of Indonesia from Soekarno on 11th March 1966, he quickly outlawed the KOGAM ("konfrontasi ganyang Malaysia" or the confrontation to destroy Malaysia) and offered his hand in friendship to Malaysia.

In the biography *Benny Moerdani, Profil Prajurit Negarawan*, the high-ranking Indonesia army officer who was involved in the peace efforts between Indonesia and Malaysia, it was noted that "when Suharto came to power, the plans of Bung Karno were no longer factors to be considered. He was just an old man who had to be respected."¹⁵

¹⁵ Benny Moerdani, *Profil Prajurit Negarawan* by Julius Pour, Sudirman Warriors Struggle Foundation, Jakarta 1993, page 323.



Soekarno felt insulted because a nation which had been, in his eyes, non-existent, became a pain in his side when it became a member of the Security Council of the United Nations.



Indonesian guerilla fighters sent to infiltrate into the areas around the Malaysia-Indonesia border near Tebedu, Sarawak in June 1964. They were barefooted and looked pathetic in their army uniform.

13

INDONESIA'S FAILURE

*F*or the first time in its history since independence, an attempt was made to take Malaysia. With the support of the Parti Komunis Indonesia (PKI) or Indonesian Communist Party, starting from 1964 until September 1965, President Soekarno of Indonesia sent the army and guerillas to Malaysia for sabotage purposes.

However, Indonesia's plans failed because for the first time since independence, Malaysians showed great solidarity and unity in combating a common enemy.

The people supported the Government's actions in detaining under the ISA several leaders of PAS and Parti Rakyat for supporting Indonesia.

The people demonstrated great patriotism by giving their full support to the Alliance Party during the 1964 elections, when Indonesia increased confrontation actions against Malaysia.

In the general elections, the Alliance won 89 of the 104 seats, an increase of 15 seats from its victory in the 1959 general elections.

People who were descendants of Indonesians themselves provided information on the positions of the Indonesian army and volunteers in Labis and Pontian who were later defeated and caught.

Indonesian refugees who did not agree with Soekarno and who now resided here also gave their support to Malaysia.

In fact, a noted Indonesian composer, Saiful Bahari, wrote the patriotic song *Barisan Kita* for the Malaysian forces and to boost the spirit of the Malaysians against Indonesia's confrontation.

BARISAN KITA

*Inilah barisan kita
Yang ikhlas berjuang*

*Siap sedia berkorban
Untuk ibu pertiwi
Sebelum kita berjaya
Jangan harap kami pulang
Inilah sumpah pendekar kita
Menuju medan bakti*

*Andai kata kami gugur semua
Taburlah bunga di atas pusara
Kami mohon doa
Malaysia berjaya*

*Semboyan telah berbunyi
Menuju medan bakti*

In early 1965, when Malaysia became a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, President Soekarno felt insulted.

In his biography, *Benny Moerdani, Profil Prajurit Negarawan*, a high-ranking Indonesian army officer who led the aggression against Malaysia, Julius Pour wrote that:

“Soekarno felt insulted because a nation which to his eyes was a pain in his side was now a member of the Security Council.”¹⁶

Feeling angry and insulted, President Soekarno then announced Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations.

Benny said that Indonesia's tactics in giving freedom to West Irian failed when used against Malaysia.

Malaysia was lucky it did not fall to Indonesia. If not, Malaysians would today be in the same state of turmoil and suffering that the people of Indonesia are.

¹⁶ *Mejor Benny Moerdani, Profil Prajurit Negarawan*, page 294

*Compared to other countries which shot
dead and hanged traitors, Malaysia only
arrested them under the ISA, and even gave
them jobs and respect when they were
later released.*



Chairman of the Malaysian People's Action Front who was also the Group Editor of Utusan Melayu, Melan Abdullah, speaking at a public rally against Indonesia's confrontation, held at the Sultan Sulaiman Club Field in Kampung Baru, Kuala Lumpur, on 28th September 1963. Similar rallies were organised throughout the country and photographs of Soekarno, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Subandrio, and the Indonesian Communist Party leader, Aidid, were burnt.

14

THE AMBITIONS OF MAJAPAHIT

How easy it is for some people to say that Malaysia's independence was achieved without bloodshed. They have forgotten the many warriors who died defending the country from the Malayan Communist Party which was supported by the People's Republic of China and during the confrontation by Indonesia which was influenced by the Indonesian Communist Party.

Chin Peng was used by Malay leftist nationalists who were against the British colonialists and who portrayed him as a nationalist fighter. Some Malays joined him in the jungle. Among them were Rashid Maidin, Musa Ahmad, Shamsiah Fakeh, Abdullah C.D. and Siti Norkiah Mahmud Baginda.

Abdullah C.D. became the chairman of the Malayan Communist Party. He and Rashid led the Malayan Communist Party's 10th Regiment whose members were mostly Malays.

The Malayan Communist Party and its supporters outside the jungle called the armed forces and the police who protected British lands and property, senior British officers and interests, names like dogs of the British. A majority of the police force, home guard and the armed forces were Malays.

At that time, without the help of the British, the Malays could probably not have defended Malaya from falling to the Malayan Communist Party which was dominated by the Chinese and had the support of mainland China.

After the formation of Malaysia, the leftist Malay fighters who supported the Malayan Communist Party became agents and the fifth wing of the President Soekarno regime which had launched a confrontation against Malaysia due to pressure from the Indonesian Communist Party.

A White Paper by the Malaysian Government entitled *Indonesia's Intentions towards Malaysia* which was signed by the Home Affairs Minister, Dato' Dr. Ismail Dato' Abdul Rahman, and dated 23rd April 1964 stated that Indonesia's confrontation was a decision which was the result of its long-term plans based on the Majapahit empire. (See Appendix III.)

The PAS leader, Dr. Burhanuddin, the leader of Parti Rakyat, Ahmad Boestamam, and the leader of Barisan Sosialis Rakyat Malaya, Ishak Hj. Mohammad (Pak Sako), were arrested soon after Indonesia launched the confrontation against Malaysia. This was followed by the arrest of four Indonesians in Malaysia on 26th January 1965 who were involved in recruiting Malaysians and sending them to Indonesia to undergo military training in Sukabumi, West Java, Indonesia.

According to newspaper reports published on 26th May 1965, among those arrested was Husin Yaakob who at that time was a journalist in *Utusan Melayu*.

Today, Husin Yaakob is a writer with the official PAS publication, *Harakah*, writing under a pseudonym as well as his own name.

Three others who were arrested were the PAS elections director, Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah, and Dato' Kampo Rajo, the secretary general of the Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front), and a leader of the National Assembly Party which was led by Aziz Ishak, a former Minister of Agriculture. They had planned to form a Malaysian exile government in Pakistan.

Another person was the former chairman of the Sungai Lembing, Pahang, branch of the Mining Workers Union, Rais Anuar.

The four had been given special duties by the Soekarno regime to form bases and to aid the entry and landing of Indonesian volunteers and army into Malaysia.

One day before they were arrested, five people who were due to be sent to Sukabumi were caught, as well as two others in Selangor and three in Negeri Sembilan.

According to a statement issued by the Malaysian Government, the four were involved in gathering Malaysians and sending them for guerilla training and service in Sukabumi, Indonesia.

Several attempts by Indonesian volunteers to land in Labis and Pontian failed. Some were shot dead while others surrendered.

In December 1963, a tragedy befell the Malaysian army when eight soldiers were killed in an attack by Indonesian volunteers in Kelabakan, Tawau, Sabah while they were getting ready for the Isyak prayers.

Those who died were company commander Mejar Zainal Abidin, Lans

Korporal Abdul Rahman, Prebet Abdul Aziz bin Ghani, Prebet Ismail bin Mansor, Prebet Ismail bin Mat, Prebet Mohammad Zain bin Yasin, Prebet Shamsuddin bin Yasin and Prebet Yusoff bin Sulong.

They were members of the Platoon Infantry and two sections of the "C" Company, of the Third Battalion, Royal Malay Regiment.

In his book, *Looking Back*, the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, said that these soldiers were attacked with hand bombs and machine guns while they were about to perform the Isyak prayers at 8.55 p.m.

Other than military threats and invasions by the Indonesian guerillas and army in Sabah, Sarawak and Johore, the daily lives of Malaysians went on as usual.

Tunku Abdul Rahman would sometimes go for morning walks at the Lake Gardens. In fact, he created problems for the security forces because he would often inform journalists of his schedule for visits to what were considered "black" areas during the confrontation years. All these showed the confidence of the leaders and the people in facing the threats from overseas.

It was also during confrontation that the Barisan Bertindak Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People's Action Front) was formed, headed by the *Utusan Melayu* Group Editor, Melan Abdullah, which organised public rallies throughout the country to show support for Tunku Abdul Rahman and to oppose President Soekarno, the leader of the Indonesian Communist Party, Aidid, and the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Subandrio.

At these rallies, the photos of Indonesian leaders were burnt but in their speeches, the nation's leaders emphasised that they wanted the friendship with the Indonesian people to continue.

During the confrontation years, many locals died defending Malaya and Malaysia against a small, traitorous group of people.

Compared to other countries where traitors are shot and hanged, Malaysia only arrested them under the ISA, and even gave them jobs and respect when they were later released.



The Education Minister then, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, urged the students to provide the names of those who were said to have died of starvation in Baling. The Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, described these stories as lies.



Even in 1971, students in University of Malaya were influenced by extremist, pro-communist and socialist elements.

In conjunction with the visit of the Thai Prime Minister to Malaysia, on 14th June 1971, a student demonstration was held in front of the National Mosque to show support for the Pattani separatist movement from Thailand.

15

LIES IN BALING

*B*aling, a district in Kedah, seemed destined to be the place where historical events happened.

Prior to independence, Baling got the attention of the people of Malaya and the whole world when it was the site where peace talks between the Malayan Communist Party and the Malayan Government under the leadership of the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, were held.

Even though the talks failed, they are forever etched in history as a dramatic event in the history of the country. The lives of the people here were always in the limelight.

At the end of 1974, students of several tertiary institutions in Kuala Lumpur held large-scale demonstrations as a show of sympathy for the poor people of Baling.

The demonstrations were held at the Sultan Sulaiman Club field in Kampung Baru as well as in the compounds of the National Mosque in Kuala Lumpur.

The student leaders were successful in arousing the anger of the students on the issue of poverty, especially when it was alleged that people had starved to death in Baling.

The Education Minister then, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, urged them to provide the Government with the names of those who had died of starvation. The Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, described those stories as lies.

Not only did the students believe those stories, but so did the university lecturers who issued a press statement backing those claims.

During the demonstrations, the students called the police names like dogs and pimps of the Government. The police had to detain several of them, including Idris Jusi and Anwar Ibrahim.

On 14th December 1974, a statement issued by the Government said

that the arrest of Anwar Ibrahim under the ISA was not because he was the president of ABIM, but because he had instigated the students to demonstrate.

In a series of reports based on the investigations of its reporters, *Utusan Melayu* and *Utusan Malaysia* dated 5th, 6th and 7th January 1975, exposed that nobody had died of starvation in Baling.

In the course of their investigations, *Utusan* met with the senior government officers, police and medical personnel, and also with the people in the remote areas of Baling right up to Kampung Weng Dalam and Tanjung Pari.

The Baling District Assistant Medical Officer, Dr. Tan Ah Hock, admitted that there was poverty in Baling, but nobody had died of starvation.

"To die of starvation takes several months. No report has been received about this," he said.

A resident of Batu 8 (Eighth Mile), Weng also said "if a person was going to die of starvation, it is impossible that we could not have given him food."

The student uprising in 1974 not only convinced several lecturers but also the communist terrorists who were still active in the jungle.

Not long after the demonstrations in Baling, 20 uniformed and armed communist terrorists entered the Kampung Batu 8 Weng to distribute medicines to the residents as well as to distribute anti-government pamphlets.

The daring of these terrorists 10 years after the emergency period had been declared ended in this country had been instigated by the student uprising which the MCP said had the support of the people.

They met up with the Weng villagers where the riots started after instigation from the students.

This was how the route to the nation's independence was haunted by revolutionary, extremist, fanatical and chauvinistic elements.

Mahathir saw Singapore's insult as a challenge which must be met by the Malaysian leadership with steps towards competitive economic development carried out professionally, efficiently and healthily.



The Prime Minister of Malaysia, Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad, with Lee Kuan Yew at a dinner in Singapore on 10th September 2001.

16

SINGAPORE'S INSULT

Even though communal sentiments did exist among the people in Malaya, it had never been exposed or discussed so openly as during the entry of Singapore into Malaysia. Singapore joined Malaysia on 16th September 1963.

The policy of a Malaysian Malaysia which was introduced by the Singaporean Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, and which was based on equal rights and emphasised meritocracy increased the political tensions and threatened Malaysia's security when it was facing the confrontation from Indonesia.

Singapore played up the communal issues well. In its protests against the special rights of the Malays, it focused on the unfairness of this policy to the Malays.

The Malays were inflamed with insults from history, which were not said outright by Lee Kuan Yew but by his close associates such as Alex Jossey, an English journalist in Singapore.

In his article published in the *Australian Bulletin* on 19th October 1963, while he praised Lee Kuan Yew as being a descendant of an ancient Chinese civilisation, Jossey wrote that the Malays were descendants of pirates.

He provided some evidence of this, adding that the Malays were incapable, had no literature and no history other than being the descendants of pirates.

This article angered the Malays in Singapore and Malaysia. Throughout the country, *Utusan Melayu* played a key role in the protests against this insult.

Lee Kuan Yew's sentiments about the word "Melayu" (Malay) was obvious. In his biography *The Singapore Story*, he described the speech made by Michale Buma from the Sarawak Machinda Party which touched on the Malays at the Malaysian Solidarity Convention on 6th June 1965 as brilliant, tremendous and devastating.

Part of the speech read, "He said that every time he listened to a radio broadcast from Malaya, the announcer gave the time as Waktu Tanah Melayu – the time of the Land of Malays. Why was it not Waktu Tanah Malaysia? So, too, Malayan Railway was known as Kereta Api Tanah Melayu – Railway of the Land of the Malays. Again why? Simply but effectively, he highlighted the racism."¹⁷

In his last speech in the Malaysian Parliament in May 1965, Lee Kuan Yew said "the special rights of the Malays and the Malay language as the national language is not the answer to the economic problem of the Malays."

Dr. Mahathir Mohamad who was then the Member of Parliament for Kota Setar Selatan saw Lee Kuan Yew's actions as indicating that he did not accept the rule of the Malays.

In his speech in Parliament, Mahathir said, "They are not used to the rule of the Malays and are distressed with the thought that the very people who used to be under them could now be ruling them."¹⁸

Mahathir's words were right on target because Lee Kuan Yew himself in Chapter 29 of *The Singapore Story* gave the views of the British whom he said saw "Kuala Lumpur's way of ruling over the Chinese could not be carried out in Singapore. They have never been ruled by the Malays and the arm-twisting tactics will surely be met with harsh protests."

Lee Kuan Yew described Mahathir's words as the culmination of UMNO's attacks on him.

Mahathir saw Singapore's insult as a challenge which must be met by the Malaysian leadership through professional, efficient and healthy economic development.

The clear challenge at its own doorstep had a psychological effect on the Malays who would feel inferior and insulted if Singapore enjoyed greater progress.

Confident that national financial resources would continue to improve the capabilities of Port Klang, Mahathir built the Tanjung Pelepas Port in Johor, and a sophisticated airport, and developed the Putrajaya and Cyberjaya cities.

Other than that, Mahathir built the tallest buildings in the world – the Petronas Towers, as a symbol of the confidence of a race which descended from pirates but which is now as capable as anyone else of achieving development and success at the highest level.

¹⁷ *The Singapore Story*, by Lee Kuan Yew, page 617

¹⁸ *Ibid*, page 610

Lee Kuan Yew was of the view that no major race in Malaysia, Chinese, Malay or Indian, could claim to be more native residents than others.



Mr. Lim Kit Siang, the leader of the Democratic Action Party (DAP), a successor of the Singaporean People's Action Party, taking his oath as a Member of Parliament after winning in the 1978 general elections.

17

PAP'S LEGACY

Although Singapore's entry into Malaysia was shortlived, it created a long crisis. In fact, until today, it has left its legacy in this country – the DAP and a Malaysian Malaysia.

The DAP was formed by the supporters of the PAP after Singapore was sacked from Malaysia.

The DAP still fights for a Malaysian Malaysia, although not as brazenly as when it was part of Singapore's PAP (People's Action Party) or the Parti Tindakan Rakyat Singapura.

In *The Singapore Story*, the leader of the PAP who was also the Prime Minister of Singapore said that he had set up the Malaysian Malaysia Solidarity Convention which had the participation of some Malaysian parties to pressure the Alliance Government in Kuala Lumpur to have a "Malaysian Malaysia" and not a "Malay Malaysia".

In his book, *Looking Back*, Tunku Abdul Rahman described this as Lee Kuan Yew's protests against the Constitutional rights of the Malays.

Tunku said, "This contradicted his word to uphold the constitution. Instead, he instigated that it was illogical for the rights of the Malays to be embedded in the constitution.

"He had departed far from it with his 'Malaysian Malaysia' slogan, which demanded the abolition of all special rights.

"It created additional problems for Malaysia which was at that time facing the confrontation problem as well as the Philippines' claims on Sabah."

Lee Kuan Yew's speech angered even the Dewan Rakyat which was normally tolerant but was now angry when in May 1965, he suggested amendments to the resolution of thanks to the speech by the Seri Paduka Baginda Yang di-Pertuan Agong.

In his speech, Lee said, "There is no bigger race in Malaysia than the

Chinese. The Malays and the Indians can claim they are more 'original' settlers than others because their ancestors came to Malaysia more than 1000 years ago."

According to Lee Kuan Yew, the Malays arrived in this country only 700 years ago, and 39% were new arrivals, including the secretary general of UMNO, Tan Sri Syed Jaafar Albar.

Tunku was angry with Lee Kuan Yew's claims and in his article in *The Star* published on 7th April 1979, Tunku said his own ancestors came from Mongol, India and settled in Langkawi 1200 years ago when their ship broke.

According to him, Merong Maha Wangsa laid the foundations for the rulers whose descendants are the Kedah Sultanate today.

The amendments suggested by Lee Kuan Yew were rejected by a large majority of the parliament including the Chinese and Indian members of the Alliance who criticised him.

But Lee Kuan Yew continued with his Malaysian Malaysia struggle.

*A prime minister who was
in fear of the communist threat then,
and aware of the threat of the Indonesian
confrontation, lost his rational thinking
because he was driven by his hatred
for Malay rule.*



In August 1962, Lee Kuan Yew accompanied Tunku Abdul Rahman to Kuala Lumpur, after Tunku's successful talks with the British in London on the establishment of Malaysia.

18

ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

After his attempts in the May 1965 Parliamentary sessions to deny the Malays their rights failed, Lee Kuan Yew intensified his campaign in the country and overseas.

He shocked the nation with a speech made at the Delta People's Hall in Singapore when he suggested the Alternative Arrangements.

In the speech which was published by the *Straits Times* on 1st June 1965, Lee said that if unconstitutional measures were taken to prevent the Malaysian Malaysia, then Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak, Malacca and Penang would jointly decide if there would be a Malaysian Malaysia.

This was a threat to split Malaysia into two.

He declared that when it joined Malaysia, Singapore never agreed to the rule of the Malays.

What was agreed was the rule of Malaysia. "Anyone who thinks that the people agreed to be ruled by the Malays when they joined Malaysia is making a big mistake," he said in his memoirs, *The Singapore Story*.

This proved true the perceptions of the Member of Parliament for Kota Setar Selatan, Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad, who said that "the Chinese of Singapore who have always considered the Malays to be under their control, cannot bear to accept the rule of the Malays".

Lee Kuan Yew's "Alternative Arrangements" were not accepted by Sabah, Sarawak, Malacca and Penang. In his article in *The Star* published on 7th April 1975, Tunku said he found out that Lee Kuan Yew was alone in his vision of the arrangements.

Initially, Lee thought these states would support him because the majority of their populations were non-Malays, and the Chinese were the mainstay of the country's economy.

In June 1965, immediately after the Parliamentary sessions, Tunku left for London to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, but

had to be hospitalised because of an attack of shingles, which he said was very painful. In order to take his mind off the pain, Tunku tried to focus his thoughts on Lee Kuan Yew's speech.

However, in his book *Looking Back*, Tunku said, "Thinking about Lee Kuan Yew's speech made the pain worse."

As a prime minister who was in fear of the communist threat then, and who was aware of the threat of the Indonesian confrontation, Lee Kuan Yew lost his rational thinking because he was driven by his hatred for Malay rule.

Tunku said the more pain he felt, the more he focused his anger on Lee Kuan Yew.

It was in this state that Tunku made the decision to cut Singapore totally from the rest of Malaysia.

"I could not help but come to one conclusion—and that was to cut Singapore adrift from the rest of Malaysia," he said.¹⁹

However, the separation did not end the communal sentiments that Lee Kuan Yew had sown. They infiltrated into the different races, grew and fanned the panic and suspicion between the races through the Malaysian Malaysia movement continued by the DAP. The climax was the racial riots that occurred in Malaysia on 13th May 1969. This bitter bit of history caused the relations between Malaysia and Singapore to remain suspicious and even though the leaders of both countries constantly met and interacted, as the Malay proverb goes "mata berpandangan, budi kedapatan".

¹⁹ *Looking Back*, page 122

*After carefully considering the matter,
Tunku made the decision to sack Singapore
for the sake of a better future for both these
countries as well as for Southeast Asia.*



The Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, announcing the separation of Singapore from Malaysia at a press conference in Kuala Lumpur on 9th August 1965.

19

SEPARATING TO REMAIN FRIENDS

When Tunku announced his decision to separate Singapore from Malaysia on 9th August 1965, the Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, broke down and cried for 20 minutes in front of a group of journalists in Singapore.

Chinese men do not cry in public as it shows that they are weak. Lee Kuan Yew requested his press officer to inform the media not to publish the photograph of him crying.

However, in his book *The Singapore Story*, Lee Kuan Yew said his press officer, Raman, did not agree with his instructions, saying, "The media will still report on the matter, using worse photographs".

The report on Lee Kuan Yew not being able to control his emotions was carried by Radio dan Televisyen Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur.

Lee was disappointed because his dreams of a Malaysian Malaysia were crushed. This was what had brought tears to his eyes.

He said, "I felt I had disappointed the hopes of millions of people in Malaysia—the Chinese, Indians, Eurasians and a small number of Malays.

"I had built up their hopes and they joined the people of Singapore in opposing Malay rule."

He added that he was ashamed that he had to leave behind his supporters to continue the struggle on their own.

The decision to sack Singapore was so dramatic, it shocked Malaysia and the world.

The resolution on the Singapore Amendment, 1965 Act of the Malaysian Constitution, was tabled by the Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, in the Malaysian Parliament and at 10 a.m. on Monday morning, Tunku made his first speech. The debate ended at 10.30 p.m. and at 4.30 p.m., it was sent to the Senate to be passed.

On the same day, Seri Paduka Baginda Yang di-Pertuan Agong gave his consent, and with that, Singapore was out of Malaysia.

Even so, there was a group of what Lee Kuan Yew described as "ultra Malays" in Malaysia who were not happy with the sacking of Singapore.

They wanted Tunku to arrest Lee Kuan Yew, suspend the Constitution of Singapore and Kuala Lumpur to rule Singapore until the crisis was resolved.

The secretary general of UMNO, Tan Sri Syed Jaafar Albar, who was Lee Kuan Yew's biggest adversary, resigned his post as a show of protest.

In *Looking Back*, Tunku wrote after thinking about it, the decision to sack Singapore was the best policy because in the future, the countries could work together in the spirit of friendship and solidarity for the good of Southeast Asia.

Tunku said the decision he made in a hospital bed in London remained relevant.

*They wanted to whitewash their past
as recorded during the times when the
country faced the threat of communism,
a Malaysian Malaysia, the May 13
incident, Indonesia's confrontation and the
shameful scandal of a leader.*



Tun Abd. Razak wearing the UMNO songkok at UMNO's 20th anniversary celebrations held in Segamat, Johore, on 2nd July 1966.

20

DATO' ONN'S LEGACY

The history of independence is coloured white and black. An independence effort which began as empty words proved true. It was filled with political, social and economic policies and philosophies which made this country a stable entity in Southeast Asia today.

UMNO chose evolution over revolution, moderation over extremism and militancy, democracy and free trade over socialism and communism.

The founder of UMNO, Dato' Onn, had successfully taken the Malays out of the tide of revolutionary struggles when it was proved to them that the colonialists could be defeated through constitutional pressure and talks.

The Malays continued to reject the leftist, pro-Indonesia leadership and totally embraced UMNO when their unity was successful in defeating the Malayan Union, the British entity created in 1946 to destroy Malay rule in this country.

Since then, the struggles of leftist, extremist and militant fighters and their leaders had continued to be rejected by the people. Some of these joined the Malayan Communist Party.

However, the leftist nationalists and religious extremists could not accept this. They split into communist, socialist and religious movements to continue their struggles.

Dato' Onn was considered an agent of the British and Tunku Abdul Rahman who chose the road of free economy was considered pro-West.

Seeing the state of the African and Asian countries which were in turmoil after gaining independence made Tunku Abdul Rahman, who had taken over UMNO'S leadership from Dato' Onn, more confident to announce independence by "providing food and not bullets, housing, and not barracks, cloths and not uniforms".

Today, Dato' Onn, Tunku, Tun Abdul Razak and Tun Hussein Onn have long passed away.

Not all of them were with UMNO until their last days. Dato' Onn left UMNO and formed a new party; Tunku and Hussein Onn joined the opposition, but the spirit of their struggles: their moderate and logical policies are why they are still remembered as UMNO leaders today.

Dato' Onn left behind an important struggle, Tunku gave us independence, Tun Razak gave us development in the rural and urban areas, and Mahathir continued the unfinished struggle of upholding a race's might and honour.

The development and prosperity of the nation aside, the problem faced by Dr. Mahathir was the same as the one which had been firmly and ably handled by UMNO leaders before him, which was the extremists who continued to challenge the nation through religious and communal issues, as well as the foreign elements. Their leaders had been held under the ISA, convicted as foreign agents, betrayers and traitors of the nation.

However, the problems that Mahathir faced were worse because these people had successfully infiltrated UMNO and were hiding behind a religious front.

Dr. Mahathir felt sure that by bringing them into UMNO in 1982, he could prevent them from joining PAS. But obviously these people were not driven by the same sense of struggle and had since returned to their own kind.

At the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st, the nation saw a unification of all the religious, socialist and communist extremist groups as well puppets of foreign powers to challenge democracy in this country.

This proved true the prediction of the head of the Malay-Malaysia Department of Psychological Operations and Psychological Warfare (1956-1983), the late Tan Sri C.C. Too who said that in the future, through infiltration and subversive means, a "new revolution situation" would exist in this country, aggravated by an economic crisis.²⁰


Similarities in political values and a common history had made their unification possible. They wanted to whitewash their past as recorded during the times when the country faced the threat of communism, a Malaysian Malaysia, the 13th May incident, Indonesia's confrontation and the shameful scandal of a leader.

²⁰ *The Communist Party of Malaya, The Inside Story 1994* by Aloysius Chin, page 248:

"He warned that the Communist Party of Malaya was merely temporarily suspending its armed struggle, but through infiltration and subversions with the help of communist surrogates would create a "new revolutionary situation" which would be expediated and aggravated by any future economic recession in the country."

They claimed that most of these events were fictitious and dramatisations, but the truth of these events have actually been proved.

Mahathir and the people continued the struggles despite all odds and eventually it became clear that victory would be on the side of the good.



Rahim firmly rejected the demand by the MCP to demolish the National Memorial and for the former communist guerrillas to be absorbed into the Malaysian police and military forces.



After listening to the outline of the "Special Project" on the peace accord with the Malayan Communist Party, the Prime Minister, Dato' Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad, gave his blessing to the Director of the Police Special Branch, Abdul Rahim Noor, and his Deputy SAC II Yau Kong Yew, to begin their major assignment.

The Director of Police Special Branch, Abdul Rahim Noor and Deputy Director of Police Special Branch (Special Projects), Yau, took a photograph with the Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir, to prove to the MCP leaders that they had the authority to negotiate with them.

21

THE UNSUNG HEROES

It all looked so easy when the peace accord between Malaysia, Thailand and the Malayan Communist Party was signed at the Lee Gardens Hotel in Haadyai, on 2nd December 1989.

However, the truth is that it was the culmination of long and secret behind-the-scene talks which took more than a year between the three parties, with the Special Branch Police playing a key role.

The accord ended more than 40 years of the MCP's bloody struggle, based on international communistic aspirations, but in the context of Malaya and Malaysia, it reeked of Chinese nationalism and chauvinism.

Communism in Malaya was the result of the infiltration of the communist virus into a small group of Chinese in Malaysia, orchestrated by the agents of the Chinese Communist Party which was under the Comintern (Far East International Bureau) controlled by Soviet Union Communist Party Politburo.²¹

Even the participation and support of several Malay and religious nationalists who were at the forefront of this struggle and in the jungle could not hide the fact that the MCP was led by the Chinese Communist Party, which meant that if it had succeeded, the Federation of Malaya would have fallen under the rule of the Chinese.

This became more obvious when, after 12 years in the jungles of Malaysia and Thailand, in January 1961, the secretary general of the MCP, Chin Peng, returned to the People's Republic of China and ran the operations of the MCP from there.

The crippling of international communism involving the communist nations of the People's Republic of China, Soviet Union and East Europe,

²¹ *The Communist Party of Malaya: The Inside Story*, page 8

beginning from the mid-1980s, affected the MCP. However, its 10th and 12th Regiments which operated along the borders of Malaysia and Thailand did not want to admit defeat. To them, ending more than 40 years of bloody fighting by admitting defeat was not an honourable thing to do. The Royal Malaysia Police, especially the Special Branch, and the Malaysian Armed Forces felt that whether they surrendered or not, the MCP, whose idealism and struggles had never been accepted by the people of Malaya and Malaysia, would surely be destroyed and buried.

At the same time that this conviction was gaining strength in Malaysia, in 1986, the Berlin Wall which had separated the illusion of communism from the reality of communism, fell, destroyed by the communist people themselves.

The rapid political developments in the international arena made it seem as though the Cold War favoured the free world. Abd Rahim Noor who took over as Director of the Special Branch of the Royal Malaysia Police in February 1986 initiated courageous measures which went against the sentiments of the people, the security forces, the police and the army, as well as his own feelings as he was strongly against communism.

As a graduate of a course in Security and Defence at the Royal College of Defence Studies in London for 12 months in 1983, he fully understood the movements and aspirations of the international communist movement (Comintern) and its strategies in Southeast Asia. However, Rahim felt that the situation warranted a meeting with the MCP.

But the Special Branch's efforts to meet the MCP were not welcomed by many parties, including the Malaysian Armed Forces and the Police Force itself. They did not see the need for discussions with a party which was constantly experiencing defeat.

At that time, the world was witnessing how communism as an ideology, doctrine, and struggle was crumbling. In Malaysia, the reality was that the MCP was no longer a threat since the announcement of the end of the emergency on 31st July 1960. The MCP could only organise the occasional ambush on the security forces to remind the people that it was still continuing its terrorist activities.

This caused several areas in the country to be placed under curfew and designated as black areas. The Government also had to allocate huge sums of money for security and defence.

According to the Special Branch's estimates, it needed no less than one million ringgit to kill one communist terrorist, an amount which covered the cost of espionage and hunting down.

As such, the Inspector General of Police, Haniff Omar, and Rahim Noor were of the opinion that the new international scenario should be exploited to destroy the MCP so as to speed up development in the rural areas. To achieve this, the corporate approach of emphasising optimum usage of time and money had to be applied.

They also needed to take into consideration the fact that the People's Republic of China which supported the MCP was itself undergoing socio-political changes which could make it a major economic political force in the world.

Other than all these factors, Rahim also had to consider the attitude of some of his own officials when he broached the idea of the peace accord with the MCP.

One of them was SAC II Yau Kong Yew who had experience as an interrogator of the communists during the time of the British. To Yau, Rahim was like other police officers who were well qualified but had no experience.

He felt that Rahim's approach departed from the usual ways of fighting the communists. Rahim did not care for Yau's views but realised that Yau, with his vast experience, could contribute to the success of his project. Yau was appointed the Special Branch Deputy Director of Police (Special Projects). His main task was to establish contact with the MCP.

Rahim was convinced that other than the rapid development of the country after independence, the changing world scenario would alter the hardline of the MCP which had made the Baling talks in December 1955 a failure.

Yau was shocked when Rahim told him of his plans and asked him to lay the foundations and plans for the peace accord with the MCP. "Would you dare do this?" he asked Rahim. Once again, he said, "Dato', you yourself will be considered a communist."

These words mirrored the sentiments of a man who understood that the violent history of the MCP's struggle had resulted in the deep and lasting hatred, anger and revenge of the people, especially among the families of the victims of the MCP's terrorism.

After considering all the factors, sentiments of the people as well as the economic and socio-political necessities, Rahim decided to carry on with his project using strategies and methodologies which he was confident would avoid:

- Negative political effects on the nation's leadership which at that time was facing internal threats.

- The sentiments of the Malaysian Armed Forces and the other security forces whose personnel had been killed and injured in the fight against the communist terrorists in the jungle.
- The anger of the families of those who had fallen victim to MCP terrorists.

The Special Branch had detected the possibility that the talks with the MCP could become a political issue which could have a negative impact on the Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir, who at that time was facing problems within UMNO due to opposition led by Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah.

Before starting the talks, at the end of 1987, Rahim and Yau first proposed Dr. Mahathir's, "Special Project" and met the former Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, in his home in Penang to get his views. Among others, Rahim told Tunku of the "peace accord" which, if successful, would forever free the people from the threat of communist militancy.

Tunku's experiences in dealing with Chin Peng in Baling were very useful as a guide towards the necessary steps and strategies.

According to Rahim, Tunku did not show a positive reaction, but he did not stop them from holding the talks with the MCP.

After the outline for the strategies and operations of the "Special Project" was completed, in mid-1988, Rahim and Yau once again met the Prime Minister, Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir, to submit the report.

After several meetings, Rahim drew the attention of Dr. Mahathir to the fact that even though Malaysia had been independent for more than 35 years, owing to security considerations, development projects could not be carried out in several places.

Rahim and Yau took several photographs with Dr. Mahathir but these were not for the album or to be hung as decorative pieces in the home. Rather, they would be proof to the MCP that they were in authoritative positions and had been given the power to negotiate.

After they had obtained the blessing and mandate, the biggest problem they faced was reaching the powers behind the MCP. The Special Branch was aware of the fact that its top leadership was not in Malaysia but since 1961, had actually been operating from the People's Republic of China.

The problem of opposition from within the country was solved by convincing the parties involved in national security that the official abolition of the MCP needed to be done as soon as possible so that the Government could focus its attention, time and money on the total development of the country.

So started an operation which would end the 40-year bloody struggle of

the MCP, using a corporate approach which emphasised the optimum use of time, money and development.

In the mid-1980s, when Malaysia started to take steps towards holding talks with the MCP, the Thai Government, under the leadership of its Prime Minister, Prem Tinsulananda, changed its modus operandi against the Thai Muslim separatists or PULO who cooperated with the MCP's 10th Regiment (which had Malay members) along the Malaysia-Thai border.

With its *Thai Romyen* (Peace in the South) policy, the Thai Government took two approaches, which were to offer amnesty and land for them to settle down and farm, and at the same time, continue pursuing and attacking those who did not surrender.

The political strategy of some top officials in the Thai Army to gain the support of the Muslims in southern Thailand changed the war tactics.

Among the leaders of the Thai Army was General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. They launched a campaign called "Peace in the South". Rahim and his assistant, Yau, learnt about the Thai strategy and held talks with the top brass of the Thai Army and gained their support and cooperation.

With the help of Thai espionage, Yau made the first contact with the second man in the MCP, Chang Lin Yun, who had been a trusted aid of Chin Peng since he started operating from China.

Chang's name was not known, but he played an important role in the MCP terrorist acts in Malaysia and Thailand.

He headed the MCP attack troops which were based along the borders of Malaysia and Thailand as well as Pahang and Perak. The first meeting that Yau had with Chang in August 1988 paved the way for Yau to go to the People's Republic of China to meet the top echelon of the MCP.

Yau described Chang Lin Yun as an intelligent, sharp-thinking man who was a proficient speaker and an expert negotiator. Prior to independence, he was a Chinese school teacher in Malaya.

To convince Chang that he had the power to negotiate on behalf of the Government, Yau showed the photograph he had taken with the Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir.

A month later, Chang flew to Macau to meet Chin Peng and report on his meeting with the representatives of the Thai and Malaysian Governments which convinced him of their sincere efforts for peace. Chin Peng had travelled to Macau using a Philippine passport made out to a false name.

With the help of the Inspector General of Police, Haniff Omar, Rahim and Yau met Robert Kuok, a noted Malaysian millionaire who operated in

Hong Kong and had ties with the leaders of China. Rahim felt that Robert Kuok was someone who had the ears of the top leaders of China and could obtain their views on the matter.

Yau was then introduced by Kuok to a former communist operator in Singapore during the rule of President Soekarno. The first meeting was held in Hong Kong at the end of 1988.

The man informed Yau that the People's Republic of China had nothing to do with the planned talks but they had the blessings of the MCP and "you have taken the right steps". This man was someone who could reach the policy-makers in the People's Republic of China.

Subsequently, he sent a letter to the Special Branch, telling them that the peace talks between the MCP and the Malaysian Government should not be held in China or involve any Chinese citizen or its government.

According to Yau, he travelled to Guangzhou in China disguised as a tourist in order to meet Chin Peng but he did not succeed in doing this. Instead, he met only with Chin Peng's representative, Ah Yen, who used the Malay name Zainon.

Yau travelled between Kuala Lumpur and Guangzhou no fewer than 10 times to negotiate and to build up confidence for the peace talks.

Meanwhile, with the help of a senior army official in southern Thailand, General Kitty Ratanachaya, Rahim and Yau managed to approach the Thai Prime Minister, Prem Tinsulananda. According to Rahim, Prem had the support and trust of the Army, including the espionage unit.

"Prem's humanitarian attitude helped greatly in many matters concerning the talks with the MCP before the actual signing of the accord," Rahim said. One of these was the question of citizenship of the MCP members who included Malaysians who did not want to return to the country. A large number of the MCP veterans wanted to live in Thailand.

Previously, the Thai Government's policy had been not to grant citizenship to any Malaysian member of the MCP, whether he surrendered or was arrested, and not to grant him land. The positive attitude of the Thai Government under Prem's leadership, in line with the "Peace in the South" policy changed this.

During the final stages, there were many other sensitive issues which complicated the talks. These issues needed the agreement of the Thai Government if the talks were to succeed.

Rahim was very cautious about giving in to the MCP because there was a possibility of incurring the wrath of the people, especially the army, ex-army personnel, former members of the security forces, the Home Guard

and the Special Constables, as well as the families of those who had been killed or injured during the fight against the MCP.

These efforts were carried out discreetly so as to condition the minds of the people and the nation's top leaders of the need to quickly end the MCP problem.

As part of an operation to gain the trust and support of the people, Rahim held several secret meetings with group editors of the mainstream media and BERNAMA to inform them of the talks which were underway between the Special Branch and the MCP.

Among them were the Group Editor of *The Star*, V.K. Chin, the Group Editor of the NST, Kadir Jasin, the Group Editor of *Utusan Melayu*, Zainuddin Maidin, and the Group Editor of BERNAMA, Abdul Rahman Sulaiman.

Rahim informed them about the possibility of opposition towards the efforts of the Special Branch, and there might be a need for the mainstream media to play its role in controlling the situation.

Following that, many news items, letters to the editor, leader articles and such like write-ups appeared in the main newspapers, with the aim of convincing the people of the need to end the MCP's struggle through the negotiations.

Rahim's job was made easy because the Inspector General of Police, Haniff Omar, gave him a lot of leverage to negotiate the peace talks. "Haniff gave his total support throughout," Rahim said.

At the lower level, the first meetings between the Special Branch officers with the 10th Regiment of the MCP were held in Haadyai and Penang between early 1988 and October the same year. According to Yau, these meetings were not discussions, rather introductory sessions which succeeded in gaining the confidence of both parties and killed any suspicions on either side.

The first meeting was held on 23rd and 24th May 1988 in a small hotel on the outskirts of Haadyai. This was followed by another meeting in a building in Tanjung Bungah, Penang, on 10th and 11th August. The third meeting was again held in Haadyai on the 21st and 23rd of October 1988.

Yau began to feel that the MCP was now confident of the Special Branch's sincerity and honesty when the meeting with Chin Peng's trusted aide, Chang Lin Yun, was held earlier than expected.

This meeting was held between the months of August and September 1988 when it had already been discovered that Chang had cancer.

Yau told Chang that he should resign, but driven by his desire for peace,

he continued contributing his experience and energy.

Yau had quickly gained Chang's confidence, and Chang promised to inform Chin Peng, who was in China, of the Special Branch's intentions.

Yau offered Chang to seek treatment for his cancer at the Hospital Besar Kuala Lumpur (Kuala Lumpur General Hospital) which had better experts and facilities than the hospital in Haadyai. He agreed.

However, because of his acute condition which did not seem hopeful, Chang was in Kuala Lumpur only a week for treatment. Upon his request, Chang was sent to Guangzhou, China, for treatment, and in May 1989, he died in a military hospital there.

Ah Sek, a member of the MCP Central Committee who was also the Commander of the 12th Regiment of the MCP, took over Chang's duties to continue the negotiations.

At a higher level, talks between the Special Branch and the MCP continued in Phuket with five more meetings held in February, March, May, July and November 1989.

Representatives of the Special Branch at these meetings included the Assistant Controller II of the Special Branch, Henry Chin, Principal Staff Officer E2 Norian Mai; Staff Officer E1 Fong Yee Kai and the representatives of the MCP, Ah Yen, Rashid Maidin and Ah Sek.

At the discussion table, the MCP rejected the offer of surrender and temporary detention when the members returned to Malaysia, as a condition for amnesty even though they were informed it was only a symbolic gesture as a show of respect for the sentiments of the people of Malaysia. They completely rejected any form of detention under the ISA.

The MCP was insistent about this, and in fact wanted the announcement to be made that the issue was resolved through negotiations.

The MCP also repeated its claims to be legitimised, which was one of the reasons for the failure of the Baling talks.

The negotiations were complicated by the demands of a member of the MCP Central Committee, Rashid Maidin, that the National Monument in Kuala Lumpur be demolished because he said it insulted the struggles of the MCP with its depiction of national warriors stepping on defeated communist terrorists. He also wanted all former MCP members who returned to Malaysia to be given 10 acres of land each.

During the early stages of the negotiations, they also demanded that the MCP be accepted into the Government through the creation of a "Coalition Government" and the MCP members be absorbed into the police and military forces. Although in the end, they agreed that the word "disbanding"

be used for the end of the MCP struggle, initially they demanded on the word "demobilisation", implying the temporary termination of the struggle.

Once during the negotiations, Chin Peng's representative, Ah Yen, lost control of her emotions. She thought it was a trap by the Special Branch and wanted it to be cancelled. She also threatened that "it is better for us to return to China than to continue these talks".

However, behind the scenes, Yau and Ah Yen played important roles in ironing out whatever obstacles that hindered the negotiations.

During the meetings, Rahim elaborated on the political risks that could be faced by Dr. Mahathir if all the demands by the MCP were met. In fact, they could arouse the anger of the people and the military. He explained to the MCP that the demolition of the National Memorial required the consent of the Parliament which would surely face fierce opposition and heated political debate which would have a negative effect on the government of Dr. Mahathir. "This will surely delay further the process of negotiations and peace," Rahim said.

On the granting of land to the former MCP members, Rahim wondered how the military, police and security forces personnel who had not received any land, would react. "They will revolt and turn against the Government," Rahim said.

The reasons that Rahim gave softened Rashid Maidin. From Chin Peng's point of view, Rahim's calm attitude and authoritative manner helped greatly in overcoming obstacles in the peace process.

In Rahim's view, generally speaking, the MCP wanted to be acknowledged as having contributed to the independence of the nation, but Rahim told them that this matter would be judged by the historians.²²

Chin Peng insisted that the MCP had no wish to turn the peace process into a hot political process for the government of Dr. Mahathir.

Chin Peng did not take part in all negotiations. Instead, he was represented by Ah Yen. He arrived in Bangkok only on 27th October 1989 and on 3rd November, went on to Phuket, the seaside holiday town in southern Thailand where the negotiations were in the final stages.

In the agreement that was reached, the MCP was outlawed and if its former members wanted to be active in politics, they should first get the permission of the Malaysian Government.

The Government agreed to cancel the arrest warrants issued on the members of the MCP. The Inspector General of Police, Haniff Omar, had to

²² Chin Peng, *My Side of History*, page 504

sign hundreds of arrest warrants which had already been issued.

Under the peace accord, with the cooperation of the Thai Government, the former members of the MCP were given the chance to choose to stay either in Thai territories or return to Malaysia.

Most of the veteran leaders of the MCP like Rashid Maidin and Abdullah C.D. chose to remain in the villages which had been specially designated to them in south Thailand. The Thai Government had given them land to farm and trade.

One of the two well-educated Malays who joined the MCP in south Thailand during the middle of 1975, Syed Hamid Ali, the younger brother of Syed Hussein Ali from the Parti Rakyat (People's Party), chose to return to Malaysia. The other is Abdul Rahman Embong who is now a senior fellow of the Institute of Malaysian and International Studies in UKM (IKMAS). It is believed that while they were in the MCP, they played key roles in the preparation, distribution or publication of MCP propaganda material through the Suara Demokrasi radio and other propaganda channels in southern Thailand.

When the police launched the Ops Mayang to detain students who were involved in demonstrations and rioting against poverty and hunger in Baling in 1974, Syed Hamid Ali and Abdul Rahman Embong ran into the jungle to join the MCP.

At that time Syed Hamid was the secretary of the University of Malaya Students' Union (UMSU). While in the jungle, he married a Chinese girl, the daughter of a commander of the 12th Company Regiment.

Meanwhile, another student activist, Hishamuddin Rais, fled overseas where he started an anti-Malaysia movement and issued harsh statements against the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak.

The signing ceremony for the peace accord between the MCP and the Thai and Malaysian Governments was finally held at the Lee Gardens Hotel in Haadyai on 2nd December 1989, but the ceremony gave no indication of the end of an important event. It was conducted in a haphazard and noisy manner without tight security. In their effort to get good angles, several newspaper photographers perched on flowerpots, causing them to break. They fell, resulting in a chaotic and noisy situation, with some laughter.

The important guests could not witness the ceremony because their view was blocked by the many photographers from the newspapers and the television stations. It was obvious that adequate preparations had not been made. Perhaps the Malaysian and Thailand Governments did not want to give too much meaning to the prolonged but failed struggles of the MCP.

Following the signing ceremony of the peace accord, the armed units of the 10th and 12th Regiments of the MCP were disbanded. The MCP ended its armed struggles and destroyed all its weapons. It also pledged loyalty to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and the country. After that, Chin Peng visited the 10th Regiment for four days for the disbanding and to inform its members that "No party has a clear win in this." But the Inspector General of Police, Haniff Omar, and the Malaysian Chief of Armed Forces, Jeneral Tan Sri Hashim Md. Ali, told a press conference held after the signing ceremony of the peace accord with the MCP, "We have won, the morale of the army has not been compromised but has instead been elevated because we have won. We wanted peace and we got peace."²³

In a statement made after the historical event, Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir said, "The success is the result of the bravery, contributions and sacrifices of many parties, especially the members of the security forces, which are the army and the police. In this context, the contributions of the public during the early years of the emergency through the Home Guard and Special Constable, popularly called the SC, and other parties, are invaluable, but will still be treasured by the nation.

"With the end of the threat to national security from this source, the Government can now focus its efforts and energy on developing the economy and improving the status of the people, especially in certain areas which could not be given adequate attention by the Government because of the armed activities of the MCP.

"The peace accord is the result of the Government's studies and reviews that the present situation and atmosphere were suitable for a peaceful solution to the problem of armed activities by the MCP. It is also the result of the close cooperation which exists between Malaysia and Thailand, especially in security matters."

The first Prime Minister of Malaysia paved the way for talks with the MCP towards the same aim – peace – but he failed and it was his failure which helped him gain independence faster for Malaya.

Tunku's wisdom was obvious to Said Zahari, the former Group Editor of *Utusan Melayu* who had once been detained by the Prime Minister of Singapore for 17 years under the Internal Securities Act, charged with collaborating with the communists in Singapore and Indonesia. In his book, *Meniti Lautan Gelora*, Said wrote:

"Tunku Abdul Rahman really had no intentions of working out a

²³ *Berita Harian*, 3rd December 1989

political solution with Chin Peng because he knew the sentiments of the people, especially the Malays, about the communist ideology and armed combat in Malaya, but Tunku wanted to use the MCP factor as political pressure on the British when he negotiated Malaya's independence with the British Government."

Tunku told Said who covered the failed talks that he was really not keen that the talks be successful.

When Said asked him if he was disappointed over the failure of the peace talks, Tunku gave a reply which surprised Said, "No. I am not, I never wanted it to be a success."

Said added, "It turned out that Tunku Abdul Rahman had his own political agenda when he expressed the wish to meet Chin Peng. When the talks failed, Tunku became more convinced that independence would be gained according to the Alliance Party's plans when he met with representatives of the British Government during the independence talks in London.

"Tunku made the peace talks an issue in UMNO's political agenda to gain independence for Malaya. He wanted to prove a point to the British colonialists and the Malayan Communist Party which was led by Chin Peng."

In Said Zahari's understanding, Tunku's strategy at that time was incorporated in the UMNO-MCA-MIC manifesto during the 27th July 1955 general elections. He promised the voters that if it won, the Alliance Party under his leadership would end the emergency as quickly as possible.²⁴ For this to happen, he had to meet the secretary general of the MCP, Chin Peng.

The campaign got unprecedented response. On the election day of the first general elections, the Alliance Party under the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman gained a huge victory. Not long after that, Chin Peng wrote a letter to Tunku Abdul Rahman inviting him to peace talks. Tunku agreed. Tunku's political strategy was showing signs of success.

This victory enabled Tunku to form a self-government and he became the Prime Minister. Worried that Tunku Abdul Rahman would resign as Prime Minister, the British Government allowed Tunku to meet Chin Peng to discuss the issue of surrender.

At that time, the British still controlled the security forces in the country as well as defence and foreign affairs. It was in this context that Tunku Abdul Rahman conceptualised his own political agenda.

²⁴ *Meniti Larian Gelora*, page 299

During the meeting in Baling, Tunku told Chin Peng, "I come to this negotiation table not as a spokesman of the British and not as a puppet or hunting dog of the colonialists. I am a servant of the people and represent the people who voted me to the highest position and I truly want peace for this nation."²⁵

However, at that time, Chin Peng saw the British as being more powerful than Tunku. But 40 years later, Chin Peng saw Dr. Mahathir as a nationalist and a patriot who continued to fight the colonialists and recognised the new form of colonialism. This was why he told Rahim in Phuket that the peace talks in Haadyai should not compromise Dr. Mahathir's political position.

Following the signing of the peace accord in Haadyai, as the Group Editor of the Utusan Group and as someone who covered the event, this writer penned an article entitled *What Tunku Started, Mahathir Ended* in the *Mingguan Malaysia*, published on 3rd December 1989.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, page 302



In January 1989, the Director of Special Branch Police, Abdul Rahim Noor, and his deputy, Yau Kong Yew, met the first Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman, who was resting in his home in Penang, to obtain his opinion on their plans to reopen talks with the MCP.

Tunku spoke of the failed discussions with the MCP, held in Baling in 1955.



The Director of Special Branch Police, Abdul Rahim Noor, being introduced to MCP leader Chin Peng by Thailand's fourth Army Chief, General Kitty Ratanachaya, at the final talks between the MCP and the Special Branch in Phuket in November 1989.

Chin Peng arrived only during the final stages of the talks.



Director of Special Branch Police, Abdul Rahim Noor and his deputy, Yau, giving their views to Chin Peng's right-hand man, Chang Lin Yun, during the talks with the MCP, held in Phuket, Thailand, in February 1989.



During the talks between the Special Branch and the MCP, Chin Peng's right-hand man, Chang Lin Yun, fell sick due to cancer. He was brought to Kuala Lumpur to undergo special treatment for a week at the Kuala Lumpur General Hospital. Upon his request, Chang was sent for treatment to Guangzhou, China, where he died at the army hospital in May 1989. Here, the Deputy Director of the Special Branch, Yau, and MCP representative, Ah Sek, are seen visiting him at the Kuala Lumpur General Hospital.



Chin Peng's special representative, Ah Yen, who used the Malay name, Zainon, deep in discussion with Abdul Rahim Noor at the talks held in Phuket in November 1989.

Ah Yen was an important aide of Chin Peng who met with the MCP's Deputy Director in Guangzhou to open the way for the peace accord.



The Inspector General of Police, Norian Mai, was also involved in the early stages of the talks with the MCP in Phuket in November 1989.

Norian Mai is seen here discussing with MCP representative Rashid Muidin. At that time, Norian Mai was the Principal Staff Officer E2.



The Deputy Director of Special Branch (Special Projects), Yau Kong Yew (in white shirt) visiting the headquarters of the MCP in the jungle at the border of south Thailand, to ensure the disbandment of the MCP immediately after the signing of the peace accord between the Thai and Malaysian Governments with the MCP.



The leader of the MCP, Chin Peng (seated left), visiting his members at the border areas to inform them that their struggles were over and the MCP would be disbanded after the signing of the peace accord.

The negotiations with the MCP which were started by the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, 35 years earlier were concluded by Dr. Mahathir Mohamad.



The Deputy Director of Internal Security Operations in Thailand, Tan Sri Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, reading out a statement during the peace accord between the MCP and the Thai and Malaysian Governments in Haadyai on 2nd December 1989.

On his left is the secretary general of the Home Affairs Ministry, Datuk Wan Sidik Wan Abdul Rahman, and on his left are Chin Peng and Abdullah C.D.



The Prime Minister of the Malay Federation, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and his party arriving at the talks with the MCP leaders in Baling on 28th December 1955.

From left, front row, are Hamid Jumat and David Marshall from Singapore, Tunku, Tan Cheng Lock, and on extreme right, T.H. Tan.

Behind Tunku is the Malaysian Director General of Information, Yaacob Latif, while Tunku's private secretary, Shaffie Abdullah, is wearing spectacles.

22

WHAT TUNKU STARTED, MAHATHIR ENDED

The exuberance of the people over the disarmament of the Malayan Communist Party yesterday could not match the feelings they had when they witnessed the meeting between the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, and the leader of the MCP, Chin Peng, in Baling 35 years ago in an effort to gain peace.

In general, this lack of enthusiasm is because the public, especially the younger generation, no longer faces the threat of the MCP as did the people in the days before independence.

The generations of people after independence only know the MCP from school textbooks and the occasional communist terrorist actions after independence were not seen as a general threat, rather as robbery. They did not disrupt the everyday lives of the people.

However, the security forces, especially the Special Branch never considered the struggle of the MCP over because its activities were still connected to international communism.

While from the very beginning, the Government which had been chosen by the people saw that independence went hand-in-hand with development strategies, the Home Affairs Ministry continued to keep an eye on the situation, observing and monitoring the situation so that the public could differentiate between true democratic struggles and the frontline communist activities which had been introduced into the political parties in Malaysia.

From time to time, the Special Branch had to take unpopular measures because among those who had to be arrested and detained under the Home Affairs Security Act were noted Malay nationalists who felt that the independence which had been achieved was an empty shell and the Malayan and Malaysian Government was merely a tool of the British who used it to continue its economic and social hold on the Malays.

At that time, the Government of Malaya made up of UMNO, MCA and MIC under the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman strongly believed that only by improving the lives of the people to a better level than what they had during the British era could the Government win their hearts and defeat the communists.

Tunku Abdul Rahman introduced his policy of "providing food and not bullets, housing and not barracks, clothes and not uniforms."

This policy was religiously carried out by his deputy, Tun Abdul Razak, especially where the rural poor were concerned. He converted the jungle into villages, rubber and oil palm plantations. The children of farmers and fishermen were sent to study in local and foreign universities.

The problem of the illegal clearing of lands by some people who did not trust the Government's system was solved by the opening of thousands of acres of land for the public.

The efforts of the communists to convert the poor failed owing to the Government's efforts and the efficiency of the Special Branch in detecting the frontline communists through the sentiments of the people.

After the Baling talks in December 1955 when Chin Peng and his comrades refused to accept the offer of amnesty through surrender and the outlawing of the MCP, they returned to the jungle with the belief that communism would rule the world one day. In Malaysia, they felt that success would be obtained with the support of Malay nationalists who included those who could not accept independence attained through the process of evolution.

Chin Peng's assumptions proved true. In the early days of independence, Malaya faced the problem of leftist political movements especially the Parti Rakyat (People's Party) and Parti Buruh (Labour Party) which combined under the banner of the Barisan Sosialis Rakyat Malaya (Malayan People's Socialist Front) which was clearly pro-China and pro-Indonesia. When the confrontation broke out with Indonesia, it became even clearer that the international communist bodies wanted to destroy the free trade system which was gaining ground in Singapore and Malaysia.

For sure the MCP felt that its struggles were beginning to show fruit, but the efficiency of the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Malaysian security forces resulted in the arrests of the supporters of the Indonesian confrontation who comprised Malay extremists, thus ending the confrontation. The Indonesian Communist Party was destroyed, Idid killed, Soekarno toppled and Indonesia gained a new government which was no longer pro-communist.

However, the end of the confrontation with Indonesia in 1966 did not mean the end of the struggle with the MCP. The communists gained renewed hope when South Vietnam fell to the communists in 1975. Many, not just the communists but also people in the free world, thought the domino effect was coming true. The MCP felt revived and its members became active once again. In fact, they infiltrated the towns in Malaysia. This culminated in the bombing of the National Monument.

I had a meeting with Kasim Ahmad at the Majestic Hotel in Kuala Lumpur. At that time, he was the president of the Parti Sosialis Rakyat Malaya. I asked him how long more it would take for the socialist movement in Malaysia to be successful. With complete confidence, he said, "Five more years."

With the fall of Vietnam to the communists, this theory seemed believable, but many people had forgotten that before Vietnam fell, the largest communist party outside China and Russia, the PKI, had also fallen. America must have taken this into consideration when it retreated from Vietnam.

Following the fall of Vietnam, in June 1974, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak, visited China and shook hands with Mao Tse-tung. About two months after that, the Malaysian Parliament was dissolved. General elections were held which gave victory to the Barisan Nasional under the leadership of Tun Abdul Razak, winning 135 of the 154 Parliamentary seats, and 316 of the 360 State Legislative seats which were contested. This landslide victory revived the morale of the Government after it was challenged by the 13th May incident in 1969, following the loss of the Alliance in the elections.

The victory could also be seen as a moral loss for the MCP which led it to resort to terrorist actions to prove that it still existed and could not accept the Government which was the popular choice of the people even though there had been changes towards modernisation in China.

When Chin Peng was in China and saw for himself the changes that were taking place there, he may have felt alienated, but it is doubtful he passed this information to his members, numbering 1,200, who were still fighting in the jungles of Malaysia and Thailand.

Meanwhile, in 1987, about 600 members of the MCP from the Marxist-Leninist group had surrendered to the Thai Government.

According to sources, it was after that that Chin Peng began to show hopes of ending the MCP struggle. It was then that a series of talks were held with members of the Malaysian Special Branch. Most of these talks

were held in Phuket—a famous seaside holiday town in south Thailand.

It is said that during these meetings, Chin Peng, like the Malay nationalists who were involved in the leftist movement, expressed his desire to contribute to independence.

He also felt that there was no need to dissolve the Malayan Communist Party because it was not registered and legal in Malaysia.

He still had deep feelings for Malaysia, wanted to visit the graves of his parents, and to hug his children and grandchildren. He had left this country in 1961 and since then, had been directing the operations from China. He had left Malaysia for more than 40 years but in the end, he realised that China was not his homeland when he saw that the life that was still dreamt about in China was already a reality in Malaysia and Thailand.

Malaysian history has also shown that its opposers were not badly treated even though they had gone off the path. In fact, they might have been punished, but were still shown appreciation and respect as well as given a place in this country.

This differs from the situation in other countries where the fighters with opposing views are forgotten and even killed.

That Chin Peng felt that he had contributed to the independence of the nation was his own opinion. This acknowledgement is dependent on the acceptance of the people. In a democratic country, truth and acknowledgement is upheld by a general consensus.

The fact that the MCP was not given an opportunity to contest in the general elections in Malaysia can be viewed as it not being given the opportunity to uphold the truth. The communist party had been given the opportunity to uphold autocratically its brand of truth in China and East Europe but as autocratic though it was, communism still failed to suppress the uprising of the people against it. This is seen in all the communist countries today.

The MCP did not surrender but announced that it was laying down arms as a show of protest against the market economy system, as was done by communists all over the world.

Chin Peng chose to do this while the country was under the leadership of Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir. He could have chosen not to do so and let his people continue fighting till their last breaths, but it is said that he wanted to go down in history as the man who also contributed to Malaysian peace.

Chin Peng also saw the earnestness and honesty in Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir to make peace with the MCP for the good of the people. According to a government official who played a key role in the talks with

Chin Peng, after several meetings, Chin Peng told him, "Dr. Mahathir is a problem solver".

Dr. Mahathir did not deal directly with the communist party leaders but surely from time to time, the Special Branch Director Datuk Abd. Rahim Mohd Noor must have reported to him the development of the talks and obtained his views on matters which were problematic.

After the problems had been sorted out, Chin Peng could see the sincerity and earnestness in the efforts of the Government of Dr. Mahathir to make peace with the MCP even though it had the capability to destroy it, especially considering the low morale of the communists after the ideology had collapsed all over the world.

Dr. Mahathir's main objective in ending the armed struggle of the MCP was to keep the nation totally safe and cleansed, so that there would no longer be areas where development could not take place. This was why he felt that when talks with the MCP was going to succeed, he discussed the possibility of development projects being launched in places where curfews could be lifted once peace was guaranteed.

Now, it was clear that talks which Chin Peng had started with the Prime Minister of Malaya, Yang Teramat Mulia Tunku Abdul Rahman, 35 years ago would end with the open attitude of the Prime Minister, Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir.

Beginning yesterday, Malaysia became a nation cleansed of the communist illegal movement, and without the MCP, it will be easier for Thailand to face the armed resistance movement in the south, carried out by the Muslims in what is called the "Separatist Movement".

However, the Thai Government will not be successful in combating this armed resistance purely through warfare. Instead, it all depends on how sincere and earnest it is in launching the "New Hope" movement which is aimed at changing and developing the lives of Muslim Thai communities which have previously been sidelined.

(Zainuddin Maidin, Mingguan Malaysia, 3rd December 1989)



**AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF MALAYSIA
AND
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF MALAYA TO TERMINATE
HOSTILITIES**

The Government of MALAYSIA and the Communist Party of Malaya consistent with their common objective for peace, hereby agree to the following:

ARTICLE 1 - CESSATION OF ARMED ACTIVITIES

Upon the signing of this Agreement, the Government of Malaysia and the Communist Party of Malaya shall cease all armed activities forthwith.

ARTICLE 2 - DISBANDMENT OF ARMED UNITS, DESTRUCTION OF ARMS, AMMUNITION, EXPLOSIVES AND BOOBY-TRAPS

The Communist Party of Malaya shall disband all its armed units, destroy its arms, ammunition, explosives and booby-traps in Malaysia and Thailand.

ARTICLE 3 - RESIDENCE IN MALAYSIA

- 3.1 Members of the Communist Party of Malaya and members of its disbanded armed units, who are of Malaysian origin and who wish to settle down in MALAYSIA, shall be allowed to do so in accordance with the laws of Malaysia.
- 3.2 Members of the Communist Party of Malaya and members of its disbanded armed units, who are not of Malaysian origin, may be allowed to settle down in MALAYSIA in accordance with the laws of MALAYSIA, if they so desire.

ARTICLE 4 - PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE BY THE MALAYSIAN AUTHORITIES

With regard to Article 3, the Malaysian authorities shall assist members of the Communist Party of Malaya and members of its disbanded armed units in order to help them to start their peaceful life afresh.

SIGNED ON 2 DECEMBER 1989 IN HAADYAI, THAILAND

Government of Malaysia

By

Communist Party of Malaya

By

DATO' HJ. WAN SIDEK BIN
HJ. WAN ABDUL RAHMAN
SPSK, DSAP, PNBS, JBN, PJK
Secretary-General,
Ministry of Home Affairs

ONG BOON HUA @ CHIN PENG
Secretary-General

GENERAL TAN SRI HASHIM
BIN MOHD ALI
PGAT, PSM, SPTS, DPMS, DSDK,
JMN, SMS, ABS, FBIM
Chief of Defence Forces

ABDULLAH C.D.
Chairman

TAN SRI MOHD. HANIFF
BIN OMAR
PMN, SPTS, SPMJ, SPMP, KMN,
PPT, BKT
Inspector General,
Royal Malaysia Police

RASHID MAIDIN
Central Committee Member

Witnessed by Representatives of the Government of
the Kingdom of Thailand

GEN. CHAVALIT
YONGCHAIYUDH
Deputy Director
Internal Security Operations
Command

POL. GEN. SAWENG
THERASAWAT
Director-General
Royal Thai Police Department

ANEK SITHIPRASASANA
Permanent Secretary
Ministry of Interior

LT. GEN. YOODHANA
YAMPUNDHI
Director
4th Region Internal Security
Operations Command

JOINT COMMUNIQUE
BY
THE GOVERNMENT OF MALAYSIA,
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF MALAYA

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND, THE GOVERNMENT OF MALAYSIA AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF MALAYA, CONSISTENT WITH THEIR COMMON DESIRE FOR RECONCILIATION AND PEACE, HAVE REACHED TWO MUTUAL AGREEMENTS, ONE BETWEEN THE INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS COMMAND, REGION 4 OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF MALAYA AND THE OTHER BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF MALAYSIA AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF MALAYA TO TERMINATE ALL ARMED ACTIVITIES AND BRING PEACE TO THE ENTIRE THAI-MALAYSIAN BORDER REGION AND MALAYSIA.

2. FORMER MEMBERS OF DISBANDED ARMED UNITS LED BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF MALAYA HAVE GIVEN THEIR PLEDGE TO THAILAND AND MALAYSIA TO RESPECT THE LAWS OF THESE TWO COUNTRIES AND TO PARTICIPATE IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PEOPLE. THAILAND AND MALAYSIA WILL PROVIDE FAIR TREATMENT TO THESE MEMBERS. THE GOVERNMENT OF MALAYSIA WILL IN DUE COURSE ALLOW FORMER MEMBERS OF THE DISBANDED ARMED UNITS LED BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF MALAYA WHO ARE MALAYSIAN CITIZENS TO FREELY PARTICIPATE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND THE LAWS OF MALAYSIA.

3. ALL THREE PARTIES RECOGNISE THAT THIS HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT WILL BRING PROSPERITY, STABILITY AND SECURITY TO THE THAI-MALAYSIAN BORDER REGION AND MALAYSIA.

4. THE GOVERNMENT OF MALAYSIA AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF MALAYA EXTEND THEIR HEARTFELT GRATITUDE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND FOR ITS EFFORT IN PROVIDING FACILITIES FOR THE HOLDING OF THE TRIPARTITE PEACE TALKS AND IN BRINGING ABOUT THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE PEACE TALKS.

APPENDIX II

TAN SRI MELAN ABDULLAH

Recipient of the Wartawan Negara (National Journalist) Award

Chairman of the Malaysian People's Action Front

If history is viewed objectively and sincerely, then it will clearly show that Melan Abdullah who was a journalist for more than 40 years, made great contributions to the development and renewal of Malay nationalism through Malay journalism.

Foremost of all his contributions was the fact that he was an agent of reformation in Malay journalism during the early part of the nation's independence years.

He doggedly and bravely changed the course of Malay nationalism which was focused on Indonesia to a form of Malayan nationalism which was based on an integrated society, free trade and international thought.

It all began in 1961 when Melan Abdullah, together with several other journalists and factory workers, foiled the strike by the employees of the Utusan Melayu which almost destroyed it as the oldest newspaper in the country. The strike was held to protest UMNO control over Utusan Melayu.

From then on, the nation saw how under his leadership, Utusan Melayu bravely championed UMNO nationalism which was pragmatic, anti-socialism and communism, Malay and Chinese chauvinism, and later protested the Brunei revolt, Indonesia's confrontation, a Malaysian Malaysia and the abolition of the usage of the English language.

Considering his background of active participation in the Malay nationalist movement which was championed by leftist nationalists like Ishak Haji Muhammad (Pak Sako), Ibrahim Yaacob and Ahmad Boestamam, and having been a member of the Malayan Malay National Party and the Malayan People's Party, Melan's actions were strongly criticised as a "departure from and a betrayal of" the people's struggle for independence.

He was called an opportunist, a tool of UMNO and a puppet of the British colonialists. Gathered in Utusan Melayu then were Malay journalists who could not accept the "half-baked" independence of 31st August 1957.

Utusan Melayu could not accept the evolutionary process of politics spearheaded by the first UMNO President, the late Datuk Onn bin Jaafar,

later continued by the first Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and by the leaders of UMNO as well as their supporters all over the country.

After independence, more and more *Utusan Melayu* moved away from the path chosen by UMNO and Tunku Abdul Rahman's leadership.

Even though those who opposed UMNO were small in number, because they controlled the world of Malay journalism, especially in the most influential Malay newspaper, *Utusan Melayu*, their voices threatened UMNO and the Alliance Government which had taken over the country from British rule.

Utusan Melayu which had for so long been the brave voice of the people in the struggle for independence, could not accept the continuity of British rule passed on to the Alliance Government which was portrayed as being pro-West in its foreign policies, retaining the British army, allowing the British to own plantations, retaining British expatriate officers and maintaining the status of the English language.

Utusan Melayu opposed all the national policies, from the political policies to those on the economy and social development. *Utusan Melayu* wanted Malaya to go the way of Indonesia which continued its screams of anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism even after independence, and formed ties in the Afro-Asia movement which were pro-Soviet Union and Communist China and against the United States of America.

In a book to commemorate the 50th Anniversary of *Utusan Melayu*, *Di Sebalik Jendela Utusan*, the former Assistant Group Editor, the late Osman Abadi who represented *Utusan Melayu* in Trengganu at that time, gave his perception of the newspaper then.

He said, "In my view, even before the strike, there was no freedom in *Utusan*, because *Utusan Melayu* was tied to a trend of thought which was inclined towards socialism to the point that in several instances, *Utusan Melayu* was no longer the voice of the Malays, but was the voice of the Socialist Front.

"UMNO leaders at that time probably thought the increasing influence of the Socialist Front was more dangerous than any other opposition party because the Front was supported by the Parti Rakyat (People's Party), a Malay party, and backed by the Parti Buruh (Labour Party) which also had many Malay members.

"The UMNO Supreme Council which was resentful of the inclination of the *Utusan* journalists felt that *Utusan's* contents were explosively political and only benefited the Socialist Front.

"UMNO leaders could no longer allow this trend to continue. If it did, it would erode UMNO's political influence and Malay rule could no longer be defended.

"It was within this scenario that UMNO leaders decided to act swiftly to take control of *Utusan Melayu* because it had wide and strong influence over the Malays."

UMNO's act of taking control of *Utusan Melayu* in July 1961 was strongly opposed by its employees with the journalists being at the forefront and led by the Group Editor, Said Zahari, who had rejected a similar move in 1959.

In *Di Sebalik Jendela Utusan*, Said who was from Singapore wrote about the strike, saying, "Tun Razak who was at that time the Deputy Prime Minister told my legal adviser: Tell Said Zahari, don't think he can fight the Alliance Government."

Said described the strike he started as "a brave act by the employees of *Utusan Melayu* for the sake of press freedom and the people of the country in facing the threat by certain individuals in UMNO and the Alliance Government as well as the colonial powers behind them."

The reality was that behind these UMNO individuals were the millions of Malays who supported UMNO.

It was during these anxious moments in the history of *Utusan Melayu* that Melan Abdullah decided to move away from his colleagues to join several other journalists in reviving *Utusan Melayu*.

With the help of several *Utusan Melayu* journalists and some production workers who were brought from Singapore such as the Group Editor, Zainol Abidin Alias (Zabha), News Editor Othman Wok as well as Osman Abadi from Trengganu, the newspaper was reprinted by Print Craft which was owned by an Alliance member, T.H. Tan. For several weeks, only one page of *Utusan Melayu* was published.

Melan Abdullah left the protesting group one day after the strike was launched outside the Utusan Head Office in Jalan Chan Sow Lin, Kuala Lumpur but he only joined the reprinting group one month later when *Utusan* was published again.

In order to start work, Melan and several other journalists and employees were brought into the office in a bus which had to pass through the protesting group which was still picketing and screaming their anger. Right from the very beginning, they had suspected Melan as being against the strike.

When a vote was taken by the Utusan Melayu Branch of the Asso-

ciation of Printing Press Employees, out of the 102 people who attended the meeting, 101 people supported the strike and only one was against it. Melan was suspected to have been that one person who voted against the strike. Why this was the case is not clear, but according to Said Zahari, certain people were unhappy when he brought Melan into *Utusan* in 1959.

The employee strike, the first in *Utusan Melayu* since it started on 29th May 1939, lasted for 93 days—from 21st July to 21st October 1961.

After the strike, even though the editor of *Utusan Melayu* in Singapore, the late Zainal Abidin Haji Alias (Zabha), continued to head *Utusan* publications, it was really Melan Abdullah who was in the forefront of the efforts to image recovery and revival of *Utusan*. Melan Abdullah was its lead feature writer.

The protestors considered the *Utusan Melayu* published after the strike as *Utusan Celup* (Fake *Utusan*).

Truly, *Utusan Melayu* was no longer the same. It had lost its original character, swinging from the left to the right, obviously supporting the policies of UMNO, unpopular with leftist and opposition leaders. But its shares rocketed because it met the tastes of a large majority of the Malays who had been UMNO supporters from before independence.

More than two years after the strike, Melan Abdullah occupied the highest seat in the Editorial Department. He was made Group Editor of the *Utusan Melayu* Group, replacing Zainal Abidin Haji Alias who had retired.

Under him, not only did the public have more respect for *Utusan Melayu*, but in his own way, Melan sowed a sense of pride and honour among the workers and journalists of the newspaper.

Melan gave the employees of *Utusan Melayu* strength and courage. He planted a sense of patriotism not only by mingling with the staff, his emotional articles, and his spirited speeches but also by his role in the world beyond journalism.

His popularity grew not through his articles, but as a former journalist of *Utusan Melayu*, Chamil Wariya, said in his article *Melan Abdullah, Not Just a Journalist* published in the book *Di Sebalik Jendela Utusan* to commemorate the 50th anniversary of *Utusan*, "Throughout his career in the world of journalism, Melan proved that as a journalist, he was not just a witness or reporter of events, but was also a part of the event itself."

Three major events showed Melan Abdullah as a journalist who played an important and historical role in the world beyond journalism. These were:

One: Using his position as a journalist to threaten Tunku Abdul Rahman

into agreeing to succeed Dato' Onn Jaafar as the President of UMNO after the latter resigned his post in 1951.

Two: Becoming the unofficial representative of the Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, in a meeting with the Sultan of Brunei, Haji Omar Ali Saifuddien Saadul Khairi Waddien, and sending a message during the Brunei revolt in 1962.

Three: Becoming the Chairman of the Malaysian People's Action Committee to build up the spirits of the people in the whole country against the Indonesian confrontation launched by Indonesian President Soekarno.

In the first incident, after failing to convince Tunku to accept the post of UMNO President, Melan who accompanied Tun Razak to a meeting with Tunku in Alor Setar, threatened to expose Tunku's vows that he would serve the public after completing his studies in London.

Melan told Tunku he had the press cutting of the vows and he would publish it as proof that Tunku had gone back on his word. Tunku finally agreed to become the President of UMNO, but the truth was that Melan did not have the cutting.

Several years after the *Utusan Melayu* strike, the country was rocked by challenges and pressures from the Malays who were not happy with the Alliance Government's indecision in carrying out the policies which were embedded in the constitution, especially on the national language and the special privileges of the Malays. Tunku's compromising attitude towards the Chinese angered them.

Singapore's entry into Malaysia in 1963, followed by its demands for the abolition of the special rights of the Malays through the Malaysian Malaysia campaign which was based on meritocracy had fanned communal sentiments not seen after independence.

In 1963, with the confrontation from Indonesia and its aim of destroying Malaya, the situation became more tense. All these spread like wildfire into Malaysia's multi-racial society and culminated in the bloody incident of May 13.

During these crucial times, *Utusan Melayu* not only stood in the frontline as a voice of the people, Melan Abdullah also played a key role in not only easing the tensions but sometimes also in unifying the people.

On 8th December 1962, when the Brunei revolt which was supported by Indonesia broke out, *Utusan Melayu* described it as a traitorous act.

On the quiet, Melan Abdullah flew to Brunei as the unofficial representative of the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and obtained an audience with the Sultan of Brunei where he passed a message

from Tunku while at the same time, acted as a reporter and interviewed the Sultan. After that, he sent exclusive reports on the situation in Brunei for the readers of *Utusan Melayu*.

Melan went to Brunei armed with the Tunku's letter. He had earlier been in Singapore where, travelling from the British Air Force Base, he hitched a ride on the British Hercules which was transporting bombs, jeeps and army equipment to Labuan.

From there, through the help of a British officer in the Shell oil company, he travelled to Brunei on the company's plane. The other journalists who wanted to go to Brunei were stranded in London.

In Brunei, other than the Sultan, he met the revolutionaries in the country who had been detained on a tennis court, exposed to the sun and rain.

He asked the British army to give them better treatment, and threatened to report about the way these people were treated. Soon after, the detainees were moved to a theatre.

Utusan Melayu's exclusive reports on the revolt increased the paper's share ratings and the respect of the people who saw it as a credible and brave newspaper which was a leader in the world of news reporting.

Initially, *Utusan Melayu* reported the armed group as rebels, but it later used the word revolutionaries. Then, it changed the word again to "traitors" which changed the perception of the public about the event.

Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore, became *Utusan Melayu's* archenemy when he opposed the special rights of the Malays and through his favourite journalist, Alex Josey, called the Malays descendants of pirates and slaves. Alex Josey was later declared a persona non grata by the Malaysian Government.

Lee Kuan Yew later sued *Utusan Melayu* for defamation over its report that UMNO Secretary General, Tan Sri Syed Jaafar Albar, had accused him of being a communist. Subsequently, *Utusan* published an apology to Lee Kuan Yew on its front page and paid the cost of RM80,000.

The Indonesian confrontation in 1963 showed Melan as the Chairman of the People's Action Front who led the movement in an attack on the Indonesian Embassy in Jalan Ampang, Kuala Lumpur following the attack on the Malaysian Embassy in Jakarta on 16th September at the same time diplomatic links between the two countries were cut.

Subsequently, there were street demonstrations all over the country where effigies of President Soekarno, the Foreign Minister, Subandrio, and the leader of the Indonesian Communist Party, D.N. Aidid, were burnt.

More than 10,000 people took part in these demonstrations.

At times, as the most influential voice of Malaysia, *Utusan Melayu* had to go against the tide, evoking the anger of the Malays on its central character, the Group Editor.

Melan Abdullah was associated with *Utusan Melayu* and the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, when the newspaper supported the Language Enactment which retained the status of the English language as the second language in this country.

On 3rd March 1967, in front of Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, crowds burnt *Utusan Melayu* together with photographs of Tunku Abdul Rahman.

However, clearly Melan did not bear a grudge against his enemies. In fact, when he was Group Editor, he even gave people who opposed him jobs in *Utusan Melayu*.

Among them were the leader of the Malaysian People's Party, Ahmad Boestamam, the chairman of the Malaysian People's Socialist Front, Ishak Haji Muhammad (Pak Sako), and even Zailani Sulaiman who was the acting secretary of the *Utusan Melayu* Branch of the Association of Printing Press Employees which initiated the protest by *Utusan Melayu* in 1961.

These people joined *Utusan* after their release from detention under the Internal Securities Act under suspicion of being supporters of Indonesia's confrontation.

Pak Sako worked with *Utusan Melayu* until Melan retired in 1974, but Ahmad Boestamam and Zailani Sulaiman moved on to other things.

As a journalist, Melan did not leave behind any major literary works. Instead, he left behind his notes and the brave and effective acts which freed the Malay journalism world from the confines of narrow nationalist thinking which was focused on Indonesia, transformed into a form of nationalism based on an integrated Malaysian society which went beyond racial, religious and physical boundaries.

The 1961 *Utusan Melayu* strike has become a turning point for Malay journalism, opening the minds of the Malays to view more positively the pragmatic policies of UMNO in the fields of economy, politics and social issues.

This was why those who participated in the strike and the traditional nationalist groups labelled *Utusan Melayu* under the new leadership as *Utusan Celup* (Fake *Utusan*) because the colours used were totally different from those used before 21st July 1961.

There was a point when his detractors considered Melan Abdullah a traitor who had gone off-track, and a tool of the imperialists, but anyone

who views history objectively and honestly will have to admit that he had continued the voice of the Malays which was almost silenced. Without his brave and determined actions, aided by his friends who were of a similar mind, *Utusan Melayu* (*Utusan Malaysia*) may not even exist today.

Under his leadership, *Utusan Melayu* championed many major issues in the history of the country's development, from the opposition to the left wing groups, Malay and religious extremist groups, to the opposition against a Malaysian Malaysia, the 13th May incident, and the transfer of power from Tunku Abdul Rahman to Tun Abdul Razak.

Melan not only witnessed history being enacted, but at times, he himself helped shape history. As such, his worth did not lie in the stereotyped value of a journalist who had written books and articles of high quality, but in the journalistic role, struggles and leadership qualities in leading a race, not only with the pen and paper, but also through actual physical and emotional involvement in every major episode.

Melan was not just a witness or reporter of events, but was also a part of the event itself.

The former Group Editor of *Utusan Melayu*, Said Zahari, who led *Utusan's* historic strike in 1961 said, "Melan Abdullah's name cannot ever be ignored when we discuss Malay journalism. He made huge contributions to the world of Malay journalism. He was ahead of the rest of us. He was a journalist even before the Japanese occupation period."

When Said was released from detention under the ISA in Singapore in August 1974, Melan was the first Malaysian to telephone him. "I was touched that he cried," Said said, adding that at that moment he could not believe that Melan had really believed all the articles which called him (Said) a communist.

When Said came to Kuala Lumpur, the first person he sought out was Melan. When they met, the first thing that Melan said was, "Said, I really thought you did not believe in God."

To Said, "Melan was like my own brother."

The final episode to this short chapter shows Melan Abdullah as a good-hearted man who had no permanent enemies. He had a soft heart although his voice was harsh.

It was his unusual character which made people who have worked with him accept him as a beloved friend, brother, father and leader.

Melan was a self-made man. Of Javanese ancestry, he was born on 24th April 1919 in Batu Pahat. He first worked as a teacher but later, at the age of 19, became involved in the world of journalism when, in 1929, he worked

in *Warta Malaya* which was published in Singapore.

In 1939, he got a job as a journalist with *Utusan Melayu* in Batu Pahat, and then worked with *Utusan Melayu* in Singapore, Penang and Kedah. He has also worked with the *Majlis* newspaper which was published in Kuala Lumpur, the *Melayu Raya* and *Semenanjung* newspapers in Singapore, and the *Mingguan Pedoman* which was led by Ahmad Boestamam in Kuala Lumpur.

During the 1950 riots in Singapore over the Natrah incident, Melan worked as assistant to the Editor of *Melayu Raya*, Harun Aminurrashid. This newspaper was a strong competitor to *Utusan Melayu* because its reports and articles on the religious riots were brave and sensational. Melan later became the Editor of *Melayu Raya*.

When *Berita Harian* was about to be published in 1957, Melan was one of the journalists who was offered to be in the editorial team but two years later, he returned to *Utusan Melayu* as its chief sub-editor, which was when the *Utusan Melayu* Headquarters was moved from Singapore to Jalan Chan Sow Lin, Kuala Lumpur.

However, when in 1959, there were upheavals in *Utusan Melayu* which ended with the termination of Yusoff Ishak as the Managing Editor and Group Editor, Melan was made Factory Manager because Yusoff Ishak's strong supporter, Yusoff Mahmud, had also resigned.

When the strike was launched, Melan returned to his job as Chief Sub-Editor.

Melan was totally committed to the world of journalism. He had the qualities which were needed in a journalist. He mixed well with others, spoke well, active in the Malayan Journalists' Club and the Peninsular Malay Journalists' Association.

He was well-built, always dressed well, liked to have fun, liked people and women, had a foul mouth, was sharp-witted and at times, emotional and prone to crying.

Even so, most people would remember Melan Abdullah's good points rather than his weaknesses. Anyone who worked with him would remember the good times. Though he was a strict boss, he was also a brave leader, a generous man, and, more than anything else, he cultivated a strong sense of patriotism in the employees of *Utusan Melayu*, from the journalists and the management staff, right down to the printing department.

He became a model of strength, courage and excellence in *Utusan Melayu* who was emulated by the employees of the newspaper.

During his time, the workers of *Utusan Melayu* felt that the company


flag flew proudly even though the newspaper was in a weak financial position.

I am in awe of him because I do not think that I or any of the other leaders in *Utusan Melayu* received what Pak Melan had: the love and everlasting memory of friends and others who worked under him.

(Testimony by Zainuddin Maidin for the nomination of Melan Abdullah for the Anugerah Wartawan Negara–National Journalist Award by the Malaysian Press Institute in 1999. Tan Sri Melan Abdullah died on 22nd February 2002.)



The Group Editor of Utusan Melayu, Melan Abdullah (centre, laughing) with the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and Indonesian President, Soekarno, at the summit conference to resolve the Indonesian protests against the establishment of Malaysia, held in Tokyo on 1st June 1963.



**KERTAS PUTIH KERAJAAN MALAYSIA
1964**



DATO' DR ISMAIL BIN DATO' HAJI ABDUL RAHMAN
Minister of Internal Security, Malaysia

FOREWORD

This document sets out the story of 19 years of Indonesian imperialist intervention in Malaya and her neo-colonial attempts to deny Malaya the fruits of freedom which are her rightful Asian inheritance.

During the Japanese Occupation, Indonesia attempted to use the opportunity to annex Malaya to Greater Indonesia, at a time when the Malayan people had neither the opportunity nor the organisation to use their right of self-determination. With the defeat of the Japanese, Indonesian officials and the Indonesian communists intervened in Malaya's internal policies in an attempt to ensure that the British on their departure would have no alternative but to relinquish power to groups who would put the revived Majapahit Empire of Java in place of the dissolving empire of the British.

This Indonesian policy has never changed. But until a monolithic Government was established in Indonesia, with Soekarno's "guided democracy" and the supremacy of the army after the civil war of 1958, the aims of enforcing this policy did not exist.

Once the Indonesian Government had contained internal opposition, it first took action on the West Irian issue, on which Malaya gave its full support to Indonesia. Yet, as the paper shows, the campaign for the transfer of West Irian, which Indonesia claimed as the successor state to the Netherlands East Indies, was only one aspect of a general policy of establishing Indonesian predominance in Southeast Asia. The recruitment from Malaya of volunteers to fight for Indonesia's claim led to the subversion of these volunteers against Malaysia. They were organised into a group of "fifth column" saboteurs to fight against Malaysia.

Under a screen of diplomatic privilege, Indonesian officials have assisted political parties which were working for the incorporation of

Malaysia into Greater Indonesia. These officials openly and secretly worked for the overthrow of the elected Governments of the Malaysian territories which had been established constitutionally and democratically. They have encouraged the organisation of extremist groups, sworn to the violent overthrow of the legitimate Government of Malaysia and have trained saboteurs, supplying them with arms and explosives. They have also harboured and given aid and encouragement to those in Indonesia who wished to see the destruction of an independent Malaysia. This has been the action of official Indonesian diplomatic representatives acting in the fulfilment of their Government's policy and on direct instructions from their departments in Indonesia. They have been carried out in full agreement, with, and with the full support of the Communist Party of Indonesia and other pro-communist factions. Communists within Malaysia, particularly the Communist Clandestine Organisation in Sarawak, are giving full support to this Indonesian policy, even to the extent of sending supporters to Indonesia for military training and as recruits for the border terrorists.

This Indonesian policy contradicts the spirit and the letter of the law of the United Nations and the spirit of the new nations as expressed in the Pancha Sila.

The essential basis of order in the international community is the mutual recognition of the right to live, and the basic purpose of the United Nations is to help to ensure the right to live without fear. The Afro-Asian Nations, because they are new and hence more vulnerable and because they have a common cause in creating a climate of co-operation, have expressed their code of conduct in the Five Points of the Pancha Sila.

This sets the standard by which Indonesia's "confrontation" against Malaysia must stand judgement before the court of world opinion.

Indonesia's policy towards Malaysia is epitomised in the word "crush", so regularly and relentlessly repeated by President Soekarno. This is Indonesia's unique contribution to the dictionary of diplomacy.

It is tragedy indeed that after defeating communist terrorism in 12 costly years of military campaign, and after constitutionally wresting national independence from Britain, Malaysia should again be required to mobilise to defend herself from the imperial aspirations of Indonesia. On the contrary as fellow Asians, Malaysia should be able to expect a policy of good neighbourliness from Indonesia rather than that of angry overlordship.

It is therefore important that the people of Malaysia should be fully

informed of the intentions and tactics of the Soekarno regime, and what the agents and supporters of this regime have been doing. This will enable our people to defend themselves and their country intelligently and effectively in the face of the threat of military aggression and political subversion from Indonesia.

Let us all sharpen our vigilance and contribute our share to detect and destroy such evil machinations, in order to defend our country and safeguard our freedom, independence and prosperity.

DATO' (DR.) ISMAIL BIN DATO' HAJI ABDUL RAHMAN

Minister of Internal Security, Malaysia

23rd April 1964



A member of the Indonesian parachute team, Lt. Sutikno, was caught by the Malaysian Security Forces when he tried to make a night landing in Labis, Johore.

Seen here in an interview with Suara Malaysia (Radio Malaysia) in October 1965, he spoke about the infiltration efforts into Malaysia.



Two Indonesian guerilla fighters (left) who infiltrated into Pontian, seen here being questioned by the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, during his visit to the Pontian Police Station on 9th January 1965.

BACKGROUND OF INDONESIAN EXPANSIONISM

INDONESIAN ASPIRATIONS

1. When the Japanese Army in Indonesia faced defeat and relaxed their pressures on Southeast Asia, the self-revealing dreams and ambitions of the Indonesian leaders found expression in the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Indonesia's Independence, which was established on 1st March 1945 by the Japanese Military Administration. It met in Djakarta in May and July 1945. Although no representatives from Malaya were present, Malaya was claimed for Indonesia on the grounds that it had been included within the boundaries of past Indonesian Empires, particularly the Java-based Majapahit Empire. The history of past empires was reinforced by Hitler's favourite science of geo-politics. Indonesian aspirations were most precisely defined by the late Professor Mohd. Yamin, the leading exponent of Indonesian expansionism. He had been a close colleague of the communist Tan Malaka in the early days of the Indonesian nationalist movement. In 1957, upon the establishment of the Guided Democracy, Soekarno appointed him Minister of Social and Cultural Affairs, and Chairman of the National Planning Council, and, till his death in 1963, remained a close adviser to President Soekarno. "To separate Malaya from Indonesia," he told the Investigating Committee, "amounts to deliberately weakening from the outset the position of the People's State of Indonesia in her international relations," for, he said, the Malay Peninsula in the past had provided a bridge for powers in Indonesia to cross over to the Asian continent. "The Straits of Malacca provides a passage to our islands while the Malay Peninsula forms the neck of our archipelago. While to unite Malaya to Indonesia will strengthen our position and complete our entity and accord with our (i.e. Indonesian) national aspiration and be consistent with the interests of geo-politics of air, land and sea." For Yamin, these were no

passing thoughts. In Singapore on his way to the Hague Conference in August 1949, he said: "After the fruition of the first Indonesian step in the struggle for independence, Indonesia would then launch her second plan to form an *Ikatan Negara-negara Selatan* comprising Indonesia, Burma, Siam, Malaya and Vietnam and the Philippines." In a speech delivered in 1960 he included Burma, Siam, Vietnam and even Madagascar and the Polynesian Islands in *Melayu Raya*.

2. His views of 1945 were warmly endorsed at the time by Dr. Soekarno who spoke of a pan-Indonesia to include all the present Maphilindo territories. For him too, "Indonesia will not become strong and secure unless the whole Straits of Malacca is in our hands." According to him his dream had divine sanction. For he said: "God has determined that certain parts of the world should form single units. ...when I look at the islands situated between Asia and Australia as between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, I understand that they are meant to form a single entity."

3. It was Mr. Hatta who at the time saw the dangers of the Yamin-primed Soekarno expansionism with its racialist overtones. "This," he said, "is a most dangerous view because we have seen the result of the imperialistic policy pursued by the Germans which sprang from unrestrained passion culminating in the annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia. In the end the Germans suffered for their greed. We must persuade our youth to think realistically, to do away with uncontrolled passion and, instead, to convert their passion to constructive efforts in the development of the nation and in defence of our country." Of Malaya specifically he said: "Let us leave it to the people of Malaya to decide whether they want to stand on their own feet or join with Indonesia, but let us not claim it for ourselves." He concluded: "Let us live within our own country – let us not encourage our youth towards imperialism." The expansionist views were further aired at the KRIS (*Kesatuan Rakyat Istimewa Semenanjung – Peninsula Special People's Union*) Conference in Taiping in August 1945 attended by Soekarno and Hatta. The dreams of the dawn of nationalism were never forgotten. And the return in 1957 to the Constitution of 1945 is not only a confession of internal failure, but a decision which puts the power of 1964 behind the ambitions of 1945.

4. The communists too, with their keen eye for the inheritance of Western imperialism in Southeast Asia, saw in the pan-Indonesian dream a

means of establishing their power in the focal centre of Southeast Asia. Indonesian communists established the Malay Nationalist Party (MNP) in Ipoh in October 1945. Alimin, the Moscow-trained Indonesian communist of twenty years' standing, nominated Surarto as leader of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) after the war and Sutan Jenain, who first came to Malaya in 1910 and remained till he was banished in 1949, played an important role in the events leading up to the communist-inspired and instigated emergency. Early in 1946 Alimin gave courses of political instruction to MNP leaders. Tan Malaka who moved freely between Malaya and Indonesia in 1945-46, turned the abilities of those like Ahmad Boestamam and Ibrahim Haji Yaacob who had worked with the Japanese, to their own version of communist co-prosperity. Spheres of operations of their respective totalitarian monopolies were divided between the PKI and the MCP, but only because the Chinese, while still immigrant and communal-minded, seemed then the best vehicle for communist ideas.

5. In the confusion of Indonesian politics after the Japanese surrender there were many party and individual ambitions. Until effective unity and power were established in Indonesia there was not – and could not be – any co-ordinated plan to woo Malays and Indonesians in Malaya and rally them to the support of Indonesia. At the same time Malayan nationalists were seeking their own political self-expression parallel with the struggle of the Indonesians, and no Malayan national movement had crystallised. In both States the pattern of politics beyond colonialism, and of the methods of fighting colonialism could not yet be drawn for the fact that nationalism was not yet established in either country: Indonesian and Communist expansionists seized the opportunities of exploiting the confusions of the situation.

INDONESIA'S FIRST RELATIONS WITH MALAYA – 1946 to 1948

6. In 1946-48, rival groups within the resident Indonesian community in Malaya competed for recognition of their importance by the newly created Indonesian Republic, and for the political and economic opportunities recognition would bring. Moreover, the many political groups and economic interests in Indonesia sought to use Singapore as a lever of political power, a source of economic wealth and a centre of diplomatic activity. As

the Dutch, on the other hand, brought pressure on the colony's government to deny these advantages to the Indonesian groups and to turn them to their own use, the Indonesians camouflaged their activities by forming double-purpose organisations, one above ground and one underground. By October 1946, Indonesian groups were turning their attention to the possibilities of trade with Malaya as a source of income, in the absence of any effective fiscal system for raising funds. The products of the Republic were exchanged for other "goods" which might assist in the struggle against the Dutch, including armaments, and improve the financial standing of the political groups or individuals participating. Sumatra took the lead. The trading companies of Namsoco, Noesantara, Sharikat Negara, the Indonesia Importing and Exporting Company were set up in Singapore to trade with Sumatra, whilst the Indonesian Import and Export Company of 80 Robinson Road, Singapore, traded with Java. Most of them had official connections, either in finance or managerial control, and were formed with the object of doing political work without attracting attention. A provisional Indonesian "Republic" office was set up in Singapore in September 1946 under S. Darvesman. But Tengku Hassan, Governor of Sumatra in 1946, also sent five agents of his own to Singapore under the leadership of Tahir Karim Loebis, who set up his own cover company, the Kantoer Perhoeboengan Propensi, in Change Alley. He reported direct to the Indonesian Army authorities (Tentera Republic Indonesia) and carried out extensive propaganda as well as spying.

7. The quarrel of these Sumatran groups led Dr. Sutan Sjahrir in March 1947 to send the Javanese secretary general in the Foreign Ministry, Dr. Octoyo, to act as Indonesia's first diplomatic representative and open the Indonesian office in Singapore to curb the activities of these unwanted trading corporations and co-ordinate the political activities of all Indonesian associations in Malaya without arousing any suspicion of interfering in Malayan internal affairs. He laid the groundwork of formal organisations for Indonesian intelligence, information and cultural identification in Malaya. He sought to establish the authority of his office in Malaya beyond challenge to curtail the activities of rivals from Indonesia to gather intelligence through agents and to penetrate Malay and Indonesian organisations with the object of spreading the doctrine of a Greater Indonesia within which Malaya would find its "freedom". He encouraged illegal immigration from Indonesia and stood surety for any illegal immigrants who were arrested. He financed Bizar Ahmad, the Indonesian vice-pres-

ident of the communist-dominated Singapore Federation of Trade Unions. He also sought commercial cover for purposes other than those generally undertaken by a consul. Although his consular office was at 3C Raffles Place, he worked through the merchant firm of Namsoco at 4B Raffles Place, and another Banking Trade Corporation, for the purchase of arms. The direction of intelligence activities was to change with the needs of the Indonesian Republican leaders. At first when Indonesia was struggling for survival, action was defensive. Intelligence was sought on the activities, political, diplomatic, economic and military, of dissident Indonesian groups and on black market and smuggling activities which drained the economic energy from the new Republic. Once the Republic became strong, intelligence was sought about political activities within the Malaysia-to-be territories, either of groups of Indonesians, which were not amenable to Indonesian pressure or blandishment or, on the other hand, groups in which Indonesian officials could play the role of back-seat driver to Indonesia's interest.

8. No less important was the aim to turn public opinion in Malaya to an Indonesian direction. Attention was concentrated on the fringe of Malay extremist groups on racial grounds; on youth groups whose enthusiasm and frustrations could be worked on, who could be mobilised for training, and who would take the risks of subversive actions; on communist groups because of their anti-colonial policy, and on groups of Indonesian-born, or Malaya-born groups of Indonesian origin, who, like the Boyanese, kept close links with their island of origin, who could be brought to respond to the appeal of Indonesia Raya, and who could influence local-born Malays by the appeal of identity of culture, race and religion. The arguments were at times anti-colonial and anti-European, at other times anti-Chinese, always with the suggestion that Indonesia had shown the way to power and wealth for the Malays. For instance, Dr. Octoyo in April 1948, while on a visit to Penang to prepare the way for the opening of an Indonesian Consulate there the following month, said, "I hope Indonesians living in Malaya will regard Malays as people of Indonesia, because this is one way to attract them to the Republic's cause. Malaya is part of the Republic." On 7th May 1954, Dr. Razif, consul-general in Singapore, in a farewell speech in Kuala Lumpur, then within his jurisdiction, said that Indonesian subjects in Malaya should play a big part in politics to help the Malays and not only the Indonesians residing in Malaya. But they must always bring information to the Indonesian consulate-general. Similar advice was given by

President Soekarno himself when he visited Singapore on 18th July 1955, on his way to Mecca. "Stay here permanently," he said, "as long as your hearts are with Indonesia ... We shall help every nation struggling for independence." But his wish that Indonesians should remain abroad was based on the narrow interests of Indonesia which was evident from the different advice given to Indonesians he met in Mecca not to remain there, but "to return to their homeland for the rehabilitation of Indonesia."

9. To encourage Indonesian nationalism, to safeguard Indonesian prestige and interest, and to form centres of attraction for Malays, Indonesian groups were organised or re-organised. In 1947 the Kesatuan Pemuda Indonesia (Indonesian Youth Association) was formed from four Indonesian underground movements existing in Singapore, the Kumpulan Pemuda Indonesia (Indonesian Youth Group), the Badan Pemberontak Indonesia Blakang Mati (Indonesian Rebel Movement of Blakang Mati), the Badan Pemberontak Kalimantan (Kalimantan Rebel Movement), and the Rukun Agawi Santoso (Disciples of Agawi Santoso). In September 1947 the President and three other members were arrested for possession of arms. The Ikatan Bangsa Indonesia (Indonesian National Unity), also an amalgamation of other societies, was formed in 1948 to train its members in unarmed combat in support of the interests of the Indonesian Republic. An Indonesian intelligence agent sat on its committee. The Persatuan Bawean Singapura (the Boyanese Association of Singapore) was formed in 1945 as an unexceptionable association of people from the same birth-place, but it naturally attracted those who wished to exploit it for ideological or patriotic purposes, and the Indonesian consular officials kept in close touch with its activities. The Indonesian Club was established at 70 Goodman Road in 1951 under the auspices of the Indonesian consulate-general and Indonesian consular officials. It moved to 51 Sultan Gate in January 1956 and appeared to have lapsed till a meeting was held in the Indonesian consulate-general in July 1959 to revive it in its new premises at 135 Bukit Timah Road.

10. Other associations were formed for religious purposes such as the Nahdatul Ulama Singapore, a branch of one of the four major political parties in Indonesia. The Muhamadiyah movement founded by an Indonesian agent and religious teacher was the channel by which many Muslim leaders from Indonesia came to Singapore. Finally there were the groups formed to influence internal politics. In 1948 the Indonesian Consulate

assisted in the formation of the Persatuan Indonesia Merdeka in Kuala Lumpur to extend Indonesian influence and oppose UMNO. The Batu Pahat Indonesia Association was formed in 1951.

11. The chief instrument for collecting political information and intervening in Malayan politics was GERAM (Gerakan Angkatan Muda) which had been established in 1946 by Thaharuddin Ahmad whom Dr. Octoyo appointed head of his Information Office. Ahmad was in close touch with the Malay Nationalist Party, the Malayan Communist Party and the Indonesian Communist Party. Then, as now, Indonesian agents offered to Malays the opportunity to visit Indonesia for training in political and military activity to be used in Malaya, and financial support during their training. He infiltrated Indonesian agents into Malaya. He co-operated with the Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action in establishing an Indonesian Aid Committee. He was engaged in the smuggling of arms to Indonesia. GERAM applied for registration as a political party in January 1948, but, with the onset of the emergency, this was refused and the organisation lapsed.

INDONESIAN ALLIES IN MALAYA

12. There was also constant contact with individual Malay extremists and efforts to get them to influence their respective organisations towards a policy favourable to Indonesia. In the years 1945-48, the group which urged most strongly the idea of Indonesia Raya was the Malay Nationalist Party (MNP) established with Indonesian funds in October 1945 by Moktaruddin bin Lasso, an Indonesian communist and member of the communist-organised Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). Dr. Burhanuddin was vice president (becoming president on Moktaruddin's return to Indonesia early in 1946) and Ahmad Boestamam was the secretary. Boestamam who was born in Malaya shared the views of Ibrahim bin Haji Yaacob with whom he had worked as a journalist and as a member of the KMM (Kesatuan Melayu Muda) founded in 1940 and of the Japanese propaganda organisations. Boestamam supported Indonesia Raya and violence as the means of achieving it. "Merdeka dengan Darah" – Freedom through Blood – was its motto. The MNP showed its Indonesian heart by flying the Indonesian flag, adopting the Indonesian national anthem and acknowledging Soekarno as its leader. A pamphlet issued on 15th May

1946, declaimed: "All the 72 million people who are Malays and Indonesians shall be under the Red and White flag. ...The flag shall be made by the Indonesians and the national anthem has been decided by Dr. Soekarno. Malaya is Indonesia." The MNP defined its objective as "Dominion Status within the Greater Indonesian Empire". Boestamam formed the API (Angkatan Pemuda Insaf) as a strong-arm Inner Group of MNP. In a Kelantan celebration in 1947 of the Indonesian Independence Day, the local API leader declared, "API will fight and sacrifice blood for the complete independence of Indonesia which includes the Malay Peninsula, northwards to the isthmus of Kra." Ishak Haji Mohammed, one of the pro-communist leaders in the MNP, said that the initials of API stood for Angkatan Pembantu Indonesia (Group for the Aid of Indonesia). The MNP accepted the necessity for a period of outright rule by Indonesia. At this time Dr. Burhanuddin was in touch with the military authorities in Sumatra, and had his own trading organisation with Sumatra to finance his activities; and in October 1948 when the emergency brought difficulties for the MNP with the arrest of officials such as Boestamam he successfully appealed for funds to the governor of Sumatra. In 1950 the MNP lapsed when it failed to apply to the Government for a renewal of its registration.

13. Its work was however taken over in Indonesia by Ibrahim bin Haji Yaacob who had led the KMM in Malaya before 1942, and had worked closely with the Japanese during the occupation. There he established close relations with the PKI. In 1950 he formed the Malayan Independence Union and kept close and constant contact with extremist parties and individuals in Malaya. He was also supported by two groups of Malays in Indonesia: the Perjuang Kemerdekaan Melayu (Malay Independence Struggle Group) under Mustaza, a friend of Dr. Burhanuddin, who fled to Indonesia with Ibrahim bin Yaacob, and the Malayan Overseas Youth Group (Perikatan Pemuda Melayu di luar Tanah Ayer). No action has ever been taken in Indonesia against these groups. Ibrahim bin Haji Yaacob (IBHY his political name) has now been appointed the representative for the Rhio Islands on the present Indonesian People's General Assembly in order to keep him physically as well as politically near the Malaysia he has continuously plotted to subvert. Meanwhile in Malaya there continued to be a fringe of small groups of militant, extremist, Malay groups, communal in ambition, violent in method, and looking to Indonesia for inspiration, and to the Indonesian consulate-general in Singapore for active help. One such was the Malay Social Club in which the dominant

influence was that of Bong Kahar, who was later to organise the extremist Malay Hang Tuah and ARTIS movements in Singapore and to be the chief recruiting agent through Parti Ra'ayat for Indonesian courses in subversion in 1963.

14. In 1950-54 during the crucial years of the emergency, political activity in Malaya was quiescent. But with the MCP in retreat in the emergency and the rising strength of UMNO in the Federation of Malaya, with the political activity in Singapore centred on the 1955 election and the emergence of the communist left in politics and in the trade union field under Lim Chin Siong, and in the climate of the Bandoeng Conference in 1955, political problems again became dominant in Malaya as the final stage of the road to independence was opened up. Dr. Burhanuddin re-entered politics with the All-Malay Youth Conference in Kuala Lumpur in April 1955. He attended the Bandoeng Conference. His expenses were paid by the Indonesian Consulate, and during his visit to Indonesia, he discussed his political plans with Ibrahim bin Haji Yaacob. On his return, he co-founded the Parti Ra'ayat in 1955 with a constitution based on that of President Soekarno's Parti Nasional Indonesia. Azahari attended the inaugural meeting. Ahmad Boestamam, then recently released from detention, was elected chairman. Dr. Burhanuddin was appointed only as an adviser. The following year, however, he became president of the PMIP in which capacity he continued his support for Indonesia Raya. The PMU (Peninsula Malay Union) was founded in Kuala Lumpur in 1950: but its impact was less than that of the Party Ra'ayat and the PMIP and gave little scope to the Indonesian officials till 1963. The Indonesian consul-general in Singapore and later the Embassy in Kuala Lumpur were to give every encouragement to the pro-Indonesia and anti-UMNO policies of these parties.

PREPARATION FOR AGGRESSION

THE INDONESIAN ARMY TAKES OVER (1958)

15. Until 1958 Indonesian intelligence activities in Singapore and Malaya lacked direction, organisation, continuity and consistency, and reflected the conflicting interests, personal, political and economic, of the different political groups represented among the members of the Indonesian consulate-general staff in Singapore, and of personal rivalries among the staff.

16. The atmosphere changed with the arrival of Brigadier Gudi Pengeran Harco Djatikusumo in Singapore on 13th November 1958, as consul-general for the Republic of Indonesia. The personnel change coincided with a political change. Both Indonesia and Malaya are now independent and unencumbered nations with the withdrawal of the colonial powers and with the mastering by each of internal opposition. Djatikusumo was a military officer, the first to be appointed as the Indonesian representative in Singapore and in Kuala Lumpur in 1961, and he had fought in the Sumatra campaign. Col Soegih Arto, another military officer who had been engaged in the Sumatra campaign, was to succeed him in Singapore. Djatikusumo represented both the Javanese centralism called Guided Democracy, established by President Soekarno in 1957, and the Army which had quickly quelled the military opposition of the Pemerintah Revolusionere Republic Indonesia (PRRI) in Sumatra and the Outer Islands in mid-1958. He saw his task as one of actively, and with military directness rather than diplomatic tact, continuing to combat any sympathy, active or passive, for the PRRI or its political attitudes or hostility to Indonesian purpose. His attitude in independent Malaya was the same as in colonial Singapore. One of his first acts as consulate-general in Singapore was to dismiss all Sumatran members of his staff. He represented the first active assertion of Indonesian political and military power in Southeast Asia, in a centre of strong strategic and commercial interest for Indonesia, and moved from defensive to aggressive domineering intervention in Malayan politics.

17. The Federation of Malaya had broken the communist challenge and achieved independence in 1957. In Kuala Lumpur and not in London now lay the responsibility for external relations. Similarly, from 1959, Singapore had full internal self-government, and its government, in matters of politics and external trade, was expressing an independent point of view. The Indonesian Government considered it legitimate to attempt to shape the policies, now a matter of independent choice by her nearest neighbours, to her own conception of a Malayan relationship with her.

18. It was not the novelty of the instruments used which changed with the coming of Djatikusumo but the strength and openness of their use. The new policy was expressed in the new personal style Brigadier Djatikusumo brought to his aggressive salesmanship and representation. He maintained close contact with the press, openly visited Malay and Indonesian groups to give his views on Malayan affairs and to collect information, announced a

policy of student exchange and proposed a series of lectures throughout Malaya on Indonesian subjects. He issued instructions to his staff for the collection of information about the strength of the Armed Forces in Singapore. All members of the Consulate staff were required to report direct to him daily and the intelligence organisation was tightened up within the consulate-general, both in Singapore and the Federation. Although an Indonesian Embassy was opened in Kuala Lumpur in September 1957, Singapore remained the centre of Indonesian intelligence activity. He moved quickly. Three months after Djatikusumo's arrival an Indonesian agent was arrested for spying on military establishments. His equipment included a miniature camera, wristwatch, microphone, mini tape recorder and cine-camera, supplied by the consulate-general. This arrest led to the temporary closing down of the formal intelligence organisation but on the instruction of the Attorney-General's office in Djakarta, its premises were held vacant ready for re-occupation when suitable staff could be found. It was reopened in August 1961.

19. By the time of Brigadier Djatikusumo's departure from Singapore in 1959 the intelligence activities were reorganised into three sections – the military under Major Soetopo, the Navy under Major Pardjono assisted by Lt. Bambang Partono, and the civil under the vice-consul, Wongsodidjojo Koesto. Reports from the Rhio Islands on the trading activities of Singapore merchants were brought to Singapore by women agents escorted by "husbands" who were not allowed in hotel rooms while reports were being written. The agents sought information on the PRRI rebels, on commercial and currency deals, on Singapore political leaders considered opposed to Indonesia, on Special Branch officers and on infiltration of Indonesian sponsored societies, on military and police information about Singapore, and on corruption in their own Consulate. In addition to the resident organisation in Singapore, special missions were periodically sent from Djakarta, under cover of membership of ship crews or commercial organisations, or as plain illegal immigrants.

NON- INTERVENTION IN INDONESIAN PRACTICE

20. The activities of the Indonesian diplomatic staff at this time are best illustrated by Raden Koesto Wongsodidjojo, who was in charge of

political intelligence and was one of the most active intelligence officers. Even while a vice-consul in Singapore, he took precedence and responsibilities far beyond his nominal rank and in 1960-63 he moved from the rank of Vice-Consul to that of Dy Consul General. He had served in the Dutch, Japanese and Indonesian armies before joining the Indonesian Foreign Service which had posted him to London and Tokyo before he came to Singapore. He played the conventional game of the agent with two number plates for his car, one to be used with the "C.C." of the Consular Corps, the other to be used when on political or commercial investigations.

21. In October 1960, Koesto called a meeting of the Boyanese Association in Singapore to urge its members to join the Indonesian Club and mix more with the consular officials. In November 1960 he spent fourteen days in Brunei and North Borneo, mostly in the villages. It was he who speedily recruited the West Irian Volunteers in April 1962 and despatched them to Djakarta within two weeks of registration.

22. In April 1962 he was transferred from the post of Head of the Secretariat to Head of the Intelligence Service, inheriting the directorship of the "cover" company of Tunas Ltd. Later in the year, following the speech of the Federation Prime Minister in an UMNO seminar in Morib, protesting against the Indonesian opposition to Malaysia, Koesto and four of his agents visited villages in Singapore to assess their reaction to the speech. He later arranged for Rudy Gontha, the Information Officer, to meet Boyanese and other Indonesian leaders twice a week to win their hearts and maintain their support in order to accomplish Indonesia's aims. He himself addressed them and put the blame on them for the worsening Indonesia-Malaya relations on the Federation's Prime Minister. After the defeat of the Barisan Sosialis in the Singapore Referendum in September 1962, Said Zahari, Lim Chin Siong and Mahadeva were in close and regular touch with him and he was urging them to stronger action over the Brunei rebellion. He arranged for Said Zahari and Mahadeva to visit Indonesia in February 1963 for a conference of the Indonesian Writers' Association. The degree of importance the consulate-general attached to this visit was shown by the fact that Colonel Soegih Arto himself along with Koesto and other officials of the consulate-general went to the airport to see them off, though it was only to find they had been arrested for Communist United Front activities by the Singapore Police that morning.

23. Koesto was M. Azahari's link with the Indonesian consulate-general. It was he who attempted to get representatives of the anti-Malaysia Parties in Singapore and the Federation to attend the mass anti-Malaysia Rally in Medan, Sumatra, on 31st August 1963, and it was he too who contacted the Barisan Sosialis, the United Democratic Party and certain unions during the Manila Conference to persuade them to send telegrams to President Macapagal saying they would not accept Malaysia without a referendum in the Borneo Territories. It is no wonder that he accepted the transfer in August 1963, because he feared that his credentials would be withdrawn as those of Major Moenarajo, the vice-consul in Jesselton was withdrawn the previous June. Yet five days before his compulsory departure on 24th September 1963, with the other members of the staff of the consulate-general he told the President of the PMU in Johore that the task of the PMU was to "unite Malays and local Indonesians in a revolution to overthrow the Tengku's Government".

24. As the number of the staff of the Indonesian consulate-general in Singapore had grown to 50 officials from Djakarta and 150 local recruits, their means of influencing others and of gathering information were extensive. Local Malays and Indonesians were brought in to help to organise the Indonesian National Day celebration. At the social gatherings at the spacious residence of Melati, the Indonesian consul-general moved for prestige and entertainment, in which opportunities were provided for agents to meet each other and meet consular officials for the first – but not the last – time. A new office block complete with a cultural and information display centre was put under construction in Orchard Road early in 1963. Plans were approved in January 1963 for an Indonesian School in Singapore. In 1961 teams of Indonesian Scouts and Girl Guides (Pandu Indonesia) and Wolf Cubs were organised for Singapore Malays on the suggestion of Col. Soegih Arto. They were organised by Sarjono, the Indonesian Information Officer, and led by one of his staff. They met for the first at the time in the Indonesian Association (Persatuan Indonesia) and then in Col. Soegih Arto's house in Grange Road. The patrol leaders and Scouts were drawn from the Malay School in Singapore.

ESPIONAGE

25. It is the acknowledged function of all diplomatic agencies overseas to study political trends, seek economic opportunities, and assess the military

strength of the countries to which they are accredited, and underground methods, though deplored, are not denied. The Indonesian officials as we have seen had their own groups of agents to supplement their own activities in collecting material for them. Early in 1961, the military Governor of West Java, Brigadier General Masodi, during a transit visit to Singapore took photographs of the Singapore Harbour Board, the RAF station at Changi and the Singapore Military Force camp at Ulu Pandan. Indonesian agents were encouraged by consular officials to find jobs in the Service establishments. In 1961 Major Soetopo, in charge of military intelligence, issued instructions to his agents to collect military information, to find out beaches where it was safe for Indonesian ships to land, and to recruit agents to supply security information about Singapore. Early in 1963, Lt. Partono tried to infiltrate the West Irian volunteers into Services establishments in Singapore.

RELATIONS WITH POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS IN SINGAPORE AND MALAYA

26. The existence in Malaysia of political parties which for communal and communist reasons sought either Indonesian domination or assistance in pursuit of their partisan ambitions as against national interests, gave Indonesian officials the opportunity they sought to exploit internal differences in Malaysia to their own ultimate advantage. As they had assisted the Malay Nationalist Party before the emergency, so now they assisted the PMU and the Party Ra'ayat increasingly, as power was transferred to the people of Malaya with independence under a democratic constitution. Officials of the PMU and Party Ra'ayat were assisted (and financed) by the Indonesian consulate-general in Singapore to attend the PKI and pro-Communist Partindo Conferences in Java. Not only was help given to recognise political parties, but underground activities were encouraged and condoned. At the time of the ARTIS conspiracy organised early in 1961 by the few Malay extremists in Singapore to foment anti-Chinese rioting there Major, Soetopo, the Military Attache of the Indonesian consulate-general, offered to help the Malays, Javanese and Boyanese involved. Eight of the fugitive conspirators were officially welcomed on arrival at Tanjong Pinang, the administrative centre of the Rhio Islands, and given political asylum. An official of the Singapore Consulate was later sent to Djakarta to look into their welfare. A West Irian volunteer wrote from Djakarta in 14th September 1962 after meeting the

ARTIS refugees: "They are free to expand their ARTIS movement here ... Such is the honour shown by the Indonesian Government towards them."

27. The most active Malayan proponent of Indonesia Raya has been Ahmad Boestamam who has worked hand in glove with Indonesians, official and unofficial, for its achievement. His close relationship with the Indonesian consulate-general in Singapore dates from 1956 when his report on Darul Islam supporters in Kuala Lumpur won their warm appreciation. In 1957 he was in regular touch with Dr. Razif, the Indonesian ambassador in Kuala Lumpur. In 1956 he appointed Ibrahim bin Haji Yaacob as the representative of the Parti Ra'ayat of Malaya in Indonesia. In September 1960 Boestamam and Ishak bin Haji Mohamed, chairman of the Socialist Front, supported the formation of the Gerakan Pemuda Malaya Raya whose aim was the "restoration of the national Sovereignty of Melayu Raya". An official of the Indonesian consulate-general attended the opening meeting of the Singapore branch of the Parti Ra'ayat in March 1962. Four cadres were sent for training. In 1962 when he planned the APRM (the Parti Ra'ayat Youth Movement) intended to be the strong arm youth group of the Parti Ra'ayat (as API was to the MNP) he was in touch with Indonesian Army representatives in Singapore for assistance.

28. His support for Indonesia has been unqualified. "Politically speaking," he said, "I am an Indonesian. Although I was born in Malaya, my allegiance is with the Republic of Indonesia." In a statement on 13th February 1963, after his arrest, he wrote: "My long-term political objective plan is the unification of Indonesia, the Philippines, the Borneo Territories, south Thailand, Malaya and Singapore into a greater Malaysian State. I regard an armed revolution as legal, if constitutional means are not available." His theories have been put into practice in his support of Azahari. When Boestamam visited Brunei in July 1961 and later in August 1962 he met Azahari and visited one of his training camps. He helped the Brunei Parti Ra'ayat in its election campaign. After the rebellion broke out, he was in touch with the rebels through the Partindo office in Medan with which and through which he planned an escape route from Malaya to Indonesia.

WEST IRIAN VOLUNTEERS

29. The recruitment of volunteers for the West Irian campaign proved to be the most effective camouflage for the active propaganda and mobilisation to

help for Indonesian purposes. President Soekarno made his first appeal for volunteers for West Irian on 22nd December 1961. Action was taken within a fortnight by the Indonesian officials with the full and prompt support of Parti Ra'ayat, the Labour Party of Malaya and the Barisan Sosialis. On 6th January 1962, a mass meeting of 2,000 brought in 18 buses and 23 lorries to the consul-general's house in Singapore set up the West Irian Liberatio Relief Committee (Panitia Pembantu Pembebasan Irian Barat) under the patronage of Col. Soegih Arto, the consul-general and the chairmanship of Sukaimi of the Indonesian Information Office. Nine Indonesian officials were members of the committee. A Chinese Section was formed, and without waiting for registration, 13 branches had been formed in Singapore (including significantly Changi, Seletar and Sembawang among workers in the RAF and naval bases) and \$65,000 had been raised. On Parti Ra'ayat instigation 300 groups were invited to attend a mass rally in support of the committee on 4th February, but only 13 groups sent representatives. As a result of a direct approach by Barisan Sosialis leaders to Col. Soegih Arto, a Chinese Section was established on 14th January, and one week later the Barisan Sosialis organised a mass rally near a cinema in Changi Road. Meetings, film shows and Malay classes were organised for them at the Indonesian Association premises. But as they spoke in Chinese, and kept to themselves, the Malay classes were stopped and the group was denied the use of the premises. The group organised a celebration of the Communist Women's Day on 8th March. Many of the committee members were communist sympathisers and became West Irian volunteers in 1962, and returned to Indonesia for sabotage training in 1963.

30. The fullest use was made of the Boyanese Association and the Indonesian Association in its new premises in 135 Bukit Timah Road, Singapore. Col. Soegih Arto visited groups of Indonesians in Rengam, Batu Pahat and Johor Bahru. A meeting of consular officials decided to try to arrange for the Boyanese community in Johor Bahru to visit Col. Soegih Arto as a demonstration of solidarity with the Indonesian Government over West Irian. In 1961 Col. Soegih Arto visited Rengam to meet the Indonesian Association officials. In November 1962, under the guise of a 'safety drive', Col. Soegih Arto, four officials and others visited Batu Pahat where there were many Indonesians and where the beaches were convenient landing places from Sumatra. In May 1962 the Indonesian Association in Kuala Lumpur asked Isa Zain, a former member of MNP and PMU and a close Indonesian agent, to form a similar relief committee in Kuala Lumpur.

Three hundred volunteers for West Irian were registered in Singapore from 5th to 9th April. Fifty were finally selected after thorough interviews which probed into their connections with political parties and leaders.

31. The 35 Singapore citizens – 25 Malays and ten Chinese – began training at the Indonesian consulate-general's house on 15th April and on 20th April flew to Djakarta. The other fifteen being Federal citizens remained behind and received further military training from Lt. Bambang Partono. They were joined on 2nd July by the 73 selected from the 4,700 volunteers in the Federation, mainly from Negeri Sembilan and Johore. The total of 88 left for Djakarta on 15th July. Their initial training in an army camp in Jalan Bidara China, Djakarta, lasted four months. After a total of 70 hours of military drill, this was followed by six weeks of handling of weapons including the rifle, Bren and Sten guns, hand grenades, cannon and mortar.

32. Political indoctrination was an essential part of the training. They were given lectures on Guided Democracy, Panchasila, Malay and Indonesian History and on the "Greater Indonesian Oath". Among the lecturers was Ruslan Abdul Ghani, the Indonesian Minister of Information. A lecturer, Col. Johartono, told them, "When you return to Malaya, don't be idle. Struggle on against Tunku's Government. If you can't get the head, catch the tail. Indonesia will be ready to help you." Each was presented with 30 books, the nature of which was to alarm the Indonesian officials in Singapore when they heard some had been found by the police in the possession of volunteers returning to Singapore. The drift of the private conversations with their instructors was that Soekarno was the national leader of the world's third strongest military power, while Tunku Abdul Rahman was a "colonial stooge" in a small country.

33. As the training began in July 1962 and the West Irian issue was resolved with the agreement between Indonesian and the Dutch for the transfer of West Irian the following May, their training had no relevance to West Irian and their indoctrination concerned itself the moved with Malaysia. Most significant of all in this context was the establishment of APREMA (Angkatan Pemuda Revolusioner Malaya) among the volunteers. It was a clandestine organisation for the revolutionary overthrow of the Malayan Government and its replacement by a pro-Indonesian Government. They were left in no doubt of their transfer of support to Indonesia.

Their role was – “kamu diibaratkan sebagai atom di mana kamu dijatuhkan, di sana kamu meletup”. (Like atom bombs, wherever you may land, there you will explode.) They were told to live among the civilian population to be ready to lead civil disturbances. They were to form cells of ten volunteers as groups of the Kumpulan Istimewa (Special Group). Shamsuddin Nur would supply arms. Members sealed their oath by signing their names in a “Book of Blood” followed by their left thumb-print in their own blood. Twenty-eight took the oath, including seven from Singapore.

34. This scheme points back to the Parti Ra'ayat which played a major part in recruiting and selecting the volunteers and bringing them to Indonesia, as APREMA was derived from the same source, it must be seen as part of one scheme. In December 1961, Boestamam visited Indonesia at Indonesian expenses to attend a conference of the Partindo of which Ibrahim bin Haji Yaacob, leader of the KMM, was national treasurer. He stayed in Ibrahim's house. There he met Aidit, leader of the PKI who told him to oppose Malaysia to the hilt and to support all anti-Malaysia resolutions at the Socialist Parties' Conference to be held in Kuala Lumpur the following January. The Malayan Parti Ra'ayat leader Boestamam appointed two Parti Ra'ayat representatives in Indonesia – Baharuddin Tahir, a former member of the KMM and MNP who had been deported from Malaya for his communist activities, and Shamsuddin Nur bin Nurut, Malayan born, and a former member of the MNP. Shamsuddin is now a sergeant-major in the Indonesian Army which he joined in 1945 after escaping from Malaya, and had discussed with him as early as 1958 the creation of an underground movement. He came to Malaya in 1948 to join the nationalist forces but returned to Indonesia immediately after the emergency began to rejoin the Indonesian Army. He later took a one-year cadre course organised by the PKI in 1959. On this visit Boestamam also arranged to send four Parti Ra'ayat cadres for training by Partindo. One of these was Ruslan Shariff, who went to Indonesia in November 1962 for the course, and met Ibrahim and Yassim Effendi, the Brunei rebel leader. Shamsuddin Nur and Ruslan Shariff promoted the formation of APREMA through Salwi, a volunteer who was another member of Parti Ra'ayat and a close friend of Boestamam. Ruslan Shariff returned to Johore in February 1963 to organise APREMA cells. It is this group that was used by pro-communist and anti-Malaysian elements in Indonesia to carry out the anti-Malaysia policy of Indonesia and to become its chief instrument in subverting the present Malaysian Government and taking over on behalf of

Indonesia. Shamsuddin Nur now uses the title major-general of the so-called *Tentera Nasional Republik Malaya* (National Army of the Republic of Malaya) while Ruslan Shariff holds the rank of brigadier-general in charge of TRNM activities in Malaya and Singapore.

35. On 17th November 1962, thirty-two of the volunteers returned. The remainder were then sent to the *Sekolah Pasukan Komando Angkatan Darat* (Land Forces Commando Training School) for training in parachute jumping and operation in difficult countries. Of the 35 volunteers from Singapore eighteen were selected for further training. It had been the intention to keep the volunteers longer, but on 23rd December, the training of the 83 was abruptly stopped and all were flown back to Singapore the following day. The volunteers were told this step was made necessary because the Federation Government would suspect Indonesia of keeping them for service in North Borneo. They would have been used in this way if the Brunei rebellion had spread. But in the new situation, the Indonesian authorities feared that the value of the training would have been wasted if the Malayan Government forbade their return. There they would be in the field for action, and could be recalled for secret training when necessary, without loss of their right of residence in Malaya.

36. The experiment had been successfully made to recruit Malaysians for Indonesian purposes. Clearly it was never intended as a military exercise, but as an exercise in psychological warfare. It had gained the added publicity for Indonesia which helped to win the diplomatic battle at the United Nations. It had built up the impression that Malaya was behind Indonesia on the West Irian issue, and by implication accepted Soekarno as an anti-colonial leader whom Malaysians would follow. And it had pioneered a new path of political penetration into Malaya. After March 1963 the same tactic was to be employed against Malaysia itself in the name of "confrontation". At a tea-party given by Col. Soegih Arto, the consul-general, on their return to Singapore each was given \$25 on signing agreements to serve the Indonesian Government for three years at a salary of 750 rupiahs a month. This transfer of authority, if not, for all, of loyalty, made them look to the Indonesian consulate-general to give them employment, for outside employment was difficult to find. The responsibility for them was delegated to Lt. Bambang Partono, the Assistant Naval Attache. He had difficulty in finding jobs for them even in Indonesian firms and shipping companies in Singapore, such as the Aneka Shipping

Company (later re-titled the Malaysian Transport Company) with which he promised in March 1963 to find employment to keep them in touch with him on his imminent departure to set up his intelligence headquarters on Pulau Samboe. In March 1963, six, on Lt. Partono's instructions, applied for civil employment with the British services but without success. The attitude of authority over, and responsibility for them, was shown when twenty were called in June for training to prepare to take part in the Indonesian National Day celebration. They continued to grumble about the lack of promised jobs and inadequate allowance.

INDONESIA'S "CONFRONTATION" OF MALAYSIA THE UGLY FRONT OF "CONFRONTATION"

37. On 1st October 1962, an agreement was reached to place West Irian under U.N. control in preparation for the transfer of political and administrative control of the Indonesian Government on 1st May 1963, pending final democratic decision by a referendum which the Indonesian Government solemnly promised to hold in West Irian in 1967. On 8th December the Brunei revolt began. Had it succeeded the machinery which had been used against West Irian could have been turned immediately and effectively and in a favourable political climate to a new "liberation struggle". It was quickly defeated in Brunei and failed to fulfil Azahari's hope of an anti-Malaysia revolt in Sabah and Sarawak. The revolt was first and most strongly supported by the PKI as a focal point of violence against Malaysia to which they had declared their opposition even before the West Irian issue was settled. An article in an issue of the journal *Harianjan Rakyat* on 31st August 1961, under the title of *Apa Itu Malaysia Raya?* set the tone for their own, and later Indonesian, propaganda against Malaysia declaring that it is a "neo-colonialist" concept. This policy was adopted officially by the PKI in their conference at the end of 1961.

38. From communist sources too were to come the basic arguments against Malaysia. President Soekarno's argument that Malaysia encircles Indonesia is a straight borrowing from the communist argument of the "capitalist encirclement" of Indonesia as announced by Aidit in 1958.

39. When the defeat of the opposition to Malaysia before the United Nations Committee on colonialism and in the Singapore referendum was

followed by their defeat in Brunei and in the elections in Sabah in December 1962, the Indonesian Government fully backed by the PKI brought external pressure to bear on the peoples of Malaysia in default of an internal rising in the territories of the prospective Malaysia or of large scale political movements behind which they could operate. Had the Brunei revolt succeeded, the tactics and personnel which had been used against West Irian would have been turned immediately and effectively and in a favourable political climate to a new "liberation struggle". As we have seen, the West Irian volunteers from Malaya were kept in Java until the Brunei failure was certain. During December an Indonesian agent in Singapore who was also a member of the PKI had several meetings, on Azahari's introduction, with Said Zahari, editor of the *Barisan Sosialis* Malay paper, and a strong supporter of Indonesia Raya. He had to influence the discussions within the *Barisan Sosialis* on the action they should take in support of the Brunei revolt, in the direction of a major campaign. He welcomed the policy of *Siaran Partai*, the Malay journal of the *Parti Ra'ayat* of which Said Zahari was the major contributor, as being outspoken in support of Azahari and the Brunei revolt. On 12th December, officials of the *Barisan Sosialis* and *Parti Ra'ayat* met to plan the organisation of volunteers for Brunei, as a counter to the despatch of Malay Police to Brunei by the Federation of Malaya Government. The only public outcome however of these decisions was the setting up on 16th January 1963 of a Solidarity Committee which consisted of representatives of *Parti Ra'ayat*, the PMU, and the still unregistered *Gerakan Pemuda Melayu Raya* and the poorly attended rally which they organised outside the Hollywood Cinema, Tanjong Katong Road on 25th January and which passed a motion in support of *Melayu Raya*.

40. When therefore it was clear that there was no spontaneous or genuine "national rising" but merely the public exposure of the extremist parties and groups which Indonesia had already penetrated, the Indonesian Government early in 1963 launched under the name of "confrontation", a planned, long-term campaign of political subversion and economic boycott against the territories of Malaysia. Speaking in Jogjakarta on Sunday, 20th January 1963 to members of the new "Mahakarta" students' regiment formed to undertake development projects in remote parts of the Republic, Dr. Subandrio announced the policy of "confrontation" towards Malaysia: "We cannot but adopt a policy of confrontation towards Malaysia because at present they represent themselves as accomplices of neo-colonialist and neo-imperialist forces pursuing a policy hostile towards Indonesia." On

Tuesday, 22nd January an official Foreign Ministry spokesman in Djakarta said that Indonesia's policy of "confrontation" towards Malaysia amounted to a "direct offensive". It was being applied in economic and social relations between the two countries but would not be taken into the military sphere. When the spokesman was asked by a Press Agency representative to define the term "confrontation", he replied that except for military activity, the policy of "confrontation" was the same policy as that used by Indonesia to wrest West New Guinea from the Netherlands.

41. The policy of active "confrontation" was put into effect in all the Malaysian territories, as a new policy of active subversion, PKI-initiated and apparently PKI-operated, but adopted by the Indonesian Government however reluctantly and whatever the form of political pressure which was used. In the Borneo territories the members of the Clandestine Communist Organisation were called in from Sarawak to Indonesian training camps. Tebedu was attacked in April: the two new Indonesian consular officials in Jesselton began their approach to the Indonesian Associations of Sandakan and Tawau, in Eastern Borneo, where Indonesian immigrant labour was concentrated, to send recruits to Indonesia for training in subversion and sabotage and to begin the accumulation of stockpiles of armaments. In Malaya and Singapore some recruits from the West Irian volunteers of 1962 were brought back to Indonesia to complete training as volunteer subversives against their own country. In February 1963 Ibrahim bin Haji Yaacob issued the following statement through the Antara News Agency: "We have made preparations to overthrow the Tengku's Government in Malaya and to frustrate the Malaysia Plan." He had already told Azahari in July 1962 that after West Irian had been taken over, the Indonesian Government would concentrate on Malaysia as a "Duri dalam Daging - Thorn in the Flesh". From this time there was a policy of calculated subversion, as blatant as, though less efficient than, the policy by which Hitler crushed the spirit, and captured the body of Czechoslovakia, to revert to Hatta's comparison quoted in paragraph 3.

PUTTING IN THE TEETH TO CRUSH MALAYSIA

42. Clearly the higher strategists of "confrontation" in Djakarta thought of Malaysia in two parts. The campaign in Sabah and Sarawak came under

army control, while the campaign against Singapore and Peninsular Malaya came under navy control.

43. The tactics were clear, for Singapore and Malaya:

First, to use the returned West Irian volunteers and the fringe of members of Malay extremist anti-Malaysia elements in PMIP, PMU and Parti Ra'ayat as recruits for an Indonesian Fifth Column.

Second, to organise training for them in sabotage and subversion, and to build up a number of encircling front-line bases in the Rhio Islands and Sumatra overlooking Singapore and Malaya on which stores of explosives could accumulate and from which the attacks could be launched.

Third, to organise bogus commercial shipping companies as his communications links with Singapore and as employment agencies for his agents.

Fourth, to place agents in Singapore and Malaya to penetrate defence secrets to attack public utilities with explosives and to create alarm by sporadic explosions.

Fifth, to prepare for a naval landing in Singapore and Malaya. The agents were urged to join army units stationed near the sea coast, to find suitable landing places and to think in terms of the capture by political activity of a State which could be built up as an Indonesian "Yenan" in Malaya.

Sixth, to prepare a plan of subversion in Singapore and Malaya both to create present terror and to weaken Singapore and Malaya's power of resistance to a future attack.

Seventh, to encourage Malay political parties in deliberate subversive and repressive anti-Chinese policies, and in activity which would lead to the overthrow of the freely elected Government of Malaysia under the Prime Ministership of Tunku Abdul Rahman in Kuala Lumpur.

Eighth, in the long-term aim, to split Sabah and Sarawak from Malaysia to bring Singapore and the Federation of Malaya under a common Government subservient to the Soekarno-guided Java based "Democratic Centralism" of Djakarta. The policy was no pursuing expression of petulant pique, but a deliberate long-term plan over many years. Behind this in support of this sustained political warfare would be the army attacks on Sarawak and Sabah, the naval attacks on fishing boats, the stream of scurrilities from Radio Kemam, and

the reported variations by President Soekarno on the theme of "crushing" Malaysia.

44. The machinery of "confrontation" against Singapore and the Federation was operated by Naval Lt. Bambang Partono, the naval attache in the Indonesian consulate-general. The returned West Irian volunteers were the available and trained instruments for the operation of this policy, under the orders of Lt. Partono. But they required further training in methods of sabotage, and further indoctrination against Malaysia. Police supervision was too strict for this to be safe in Singapore and it therefore became necessary for Lt. Partono, already too conspicuous to be a good agent, and the new training to be withdrawn to the conveniently near Rhio Islands. Lt. Partono retained responsibility for recruiting, training, directing and financing the agents, who described themselves as "Orang Bambang Partono." At this stage, the West Irian volunteers were instructed in order to avoid identification and police supervision, not to wear their uniform in Singapore.

ORGANISATION OF CONFRONTATION

45. Soon after the outbreak of the Brunei rebellion, some 40 Indonesians, mainly civil servants, met in the house of the Resident of the Rhio Islands and under the patronage of Lt. Col. Suparman, a PKI leader and head of the Naval Department to study Malaysian developments and to give active encouragement to people in Indonesia, Malaya and Singapore to oppose Malaysia. Early in February, Col. Soegih Arto travelled to Tanjong Pinang. During his "unofficial" visit he was nevertheless the house guest of the Resident and later of Lt. Col. Suparman. With both he discussed the implementation of "confrontation". He instructed Lt. Col. Suparman to recruit into his service boatmen who plied between the Rhio Islands and Singapore. These would work with similar boatmen he would recruit in Singapore.

46. On 22nd February, at a second meeting in Lt. Col. Suparman's house in the Naval Headquarters was formed the Pembela Revolusi Kalimantan Utara Kepulauan Riau – the Rhio Islands Committee in support of the North Borneo Revolution. The chairman of the organisation was Bambang Dharsono, who was a captain of the TNKU (Tentera Nasional Kalimantan Utara) – the North Borneo National Army – who had been appointed to train West Irian volunteers. Similar groups were established on three other Rhio

Islands of the Rhio group. The four aims of the group were:

1. to incite the people to support the North Borneo Revolution;
2. to make note of the potential strength of Malayan/British armed forces;
3. to make every effort to foil the formation of Malaysia;
4. to give immediate report on whatever possible.

Immediately after this meeting eight agents were recruited and given a week's intensive training in unarmed combat (with knives) and propaganda in preparation for their infiltration into Singapore. Their task, they were told, was to carry out in Singapore the four tasks of the organisations. In addition they were to attend and report on public rallies, to recruit members, and to incite anti-Malaysia feelings. He was to set up in Singapore four branches of the organisation, each with six members and responsible for one of the tasks. The leaders of these groups would then move to the Federation of Malaya to form other groups.

47. The first agent of the eight, Amin Wijaya, left Tanjong Pinang early in March for Singapore to report to Col. Soegih Arto on the development of the plans he had discussed with Lt-Col. Suparman, to get information about what action had been taken by the agents. Col. Soegih Arto had promised to recruit and report it to Capt. Dharsono and to begin the formation of revolutionary groups in Singapore from previous contact. Amin carried bogus letters of introduction and a forged letter of invitation from Col. Soegih Arto and a false Malayan identity card. He was also given a letter from Capt. Dharsono authorising him to carry out underground action in Malaya and Singapore in fulfilment of the four aims of the revolutionary organisation. He travelled from Tanjong Pinang to Pulau Belakang Padang, and from there on 10th March to Singapore where he landed off the Yacht Club. When he was intercepted by some of the club staff he put his letter of authority in his sock. When it was discovered there, he attempted unsuccessfully to tear it up before the arrival of the police to put him under arrest. The external assault had begun.

48. On his return to Singapore, Col. Soegih Arto gave Lt. Partono the task of recruiting agents in Singapore.

49. Lt. Partono recruited agents in Singapore for training at Tanjong Sekupang and for directing their operations in Singapore. He gave the finances to an agent to open a coffee-stall at Tanjong Rhu as a rendezvous

for those illegally entering or leaving Singapore, and he rented a nearby room for use as a transit centre. His first two recruits were two former fellow "chuchi jaga kreta" from Katong Park.

50. Before June, six West Irian volunteers had left Singapore, four for Tanjong Pinang on their way to Djakarta. On 29th April, Lt. Partono moved his base, Pulau Samboe, adjacent to Pulau Belakang Padang, the forward naval post nearest to Singapore and under the control of Tanjong Pinang and Medan, the main naval centre for Indonesia's northern waters. He served as head of the Korps Komando Operasi under the commercial cover of the Sharikat Nelayan Semenanjung (Peninsula Fishing Company). From his new base Lt. Partono himself visited Singapore and sent his agents to collect information. In May 1963, General Djatikusumo, then Indonesian ambassador in Kuala Lumpur, came down to the consulate-general in Singapore to meet those who had agreed to return for further training. He asked for a complete list of the volunteers, thanked those he had seen and gave to each of them a gratuity of 6,000 rupiahs. Lt. Partono returned to Singapore on 31st May to instruct Noordin to select another ten ex-West Irian volunteers to go to Indonesia when the first group had returned.

THE PMU AS RECRUITING AGENT

51. Recruitment of trainees in the Federation was carried out from Singapore through the PMU which became the agent of the Indonesian consulate-general for this purpose. The link was first made through Bong Kahar, president of the Singapore PMU, vice president of the PMU Malaya and leader of the PMU Youth Section who had been detained by the police as an active member of PMU's secret underground organisation, the Tentera Hang Tuah and of ARTIS (Angkatan Revolusi Tentera Islam Singapura) in which he held the rank of "general". The favourable impression he made on the Indonesian consular officials who attended a rally organised in Singapore by the PMU under his chairmanship in October 1962 was not forgotten. And in March 1963 he was called to the Indonesian Association to meet Lt. Partono and seven West Irian volunteers including Noordin. Lt. Partono was interested in the readiness of Bong Kahar and the PMU to organise actively against Malaysia and to find recruits for training for that purpose. At a second meeting Bong Kahar then asked for \$40,000 as expenses and offered to select members of the PMU drawn from all the

58. When the thirteen arrived early in September, they found that fourteen former West Irian volunteers recruited through the Parti Ra'ayat by Noordin were already in residence. They formed Group A for training, which was more advanced because for them it was the second of such a course. Group B – the “freshies” – included ten from Kelantan and four from Singapore. The remainders of the 35 residents were two resident instructors and five resident cooks. Each group had its captain or commodore who was to be their source of instruction and order on their return to Singapore. The commandant of the camp was Lt. Partono who visited the island five times during the two months of this course.

MILITARY TRAINING

59. Instruction was military and political with a lecturer for each. Military training consisted of drill and weapons training, judo, jungle trekking and tactical exercises. During the second month of the course, the trainees in terror were taught the use of the explosive in sabotage. They took part in a mock landing to the sound of real explosives on a neighbouring island, Pulau Selayang, three miles away where there was a disused cemetery. The trainees were taught with the aid of diagrams, how to blow bridges, electrical power installations, railway lines, public buildings and water reservoirs. On another day on Pulau Selayang they were divided into five groups for practical experience in using explosives against a railway line, the wall of a house, a bridge, a public building and special targets. They used TNT charges of different weights, what one trainee described as a “long plastic bomb which looked like a piece of bamboo”, and an explosive in a ball-shaped container.

POLITICAL TRAINING

60. Political indoctrination was an essential part of the course. Lt. (Dr.) Andar Aziz of the Indonesian Army, referred to as “Pak Aziz”, lectured three times a week. He lauded Indonesia because all high Government posts were in Indonesian hands and there was no class distinction. His stammering Indonesian language was not however easily intelligible to his Malay audience. In subsequent lectures, he said that Malaya and Singapore were once part of an ancient Javanese empire, but were subsequently lost to

the British. Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun Abdul Razak were described as puppets of British imperialism, and Malaya as a land of "gagged ra'ayat". In one lecture he used a map of Malaya to test the trainees' knowledge of roads and rivers – but was disappointed in the trainees' lack of knowledge, as he had been earlier, at the poor response to his questions about political parties in Malaya. One of those who heard – and understood – gave a longer report, stating that the lecturer urged them to resort to armed revolution and that Indonesia would assist in supplying weapons and manpower.

61. On the third day before the end of their course on 15th November 1963, an Indonesian Army officer who visited the island reassured them of Indonesia's moral, political and military support. Lt. Partono, the commandant, advised them: "Balek dahulu," he said, "amankan diri, senjata akan dikirim baharulah bergerak" (Return first: lie low; arms will be sent; and only then will you move). One trainee quoted Lt. Partono as saying that he would be making arrangements for all the things to be sent to Singapore secretly, someone would then come to give the orders. Lt. Partono addressed the trainees as "Pasokan Kemerdekaan Malaya" – the Force to Free Malaya, or Persatuan Melayu Merdeka, and treated them as under his command which he claimed to be of three battalion strength. Four lessons were devoted to the importance of penetrating Malaysia's Defence Forces and installations. Lt. Partono also told them to try to join the armed forces and political parties with the aim in both cases of gathering information and facilitating the overthrow of the Government in Kuala Lumpur. Preferably the trainees were told they should try to join the Territorial Army and be stationed near the beaches where their units could be won over to assist in smuggling arms from Indonesia. The sites suggested as landing places were Tanjong Rhu and Pasir Panjang in Singapore, the Straits of Malacca and Pasir Puteh in Kelantan. Meanwhile they should use their time to find how best to destroy objectives such as the radar station, water supplies (no doubt suggested by Singapore's current water rationing) and railway lines.

SPECIALIST TRAINING IN JAVA

62. At the end of September, a Major Chintok visited the camp with Lt. Partono to select four trainees for a more secret and intensive course at Chibogor, eighteen miles from Bogor. When they arrived at Chibogor, there were already eight ex-West Irian volunteers from Malaya in the camp

including the four referred to earlier who had been sent from Singapore before June and who had been waiting for four months. Among four Indonesians who later joined them, were two who were due to land in Singapore in December 1963 to stiffen the Indonesian demolition squad before police arrests frustrated them. The introductory lecture by a Major Bandi consisted mainly of an attack on the position of the Chinese in Malaya, compared to their position in Indonesia.

63. The political overtones of the training were clearly spelled out from the beginning. One of the instructors told the trainees that Malays were not independent like Indonesians: they were "birds in a cage, well-looked after but not allowed to move about freely". Although sons of the soil, they were third class citizens. It was their duty to fight for their rights. The course was a more detailed and advanced course in guerilla sabotage, teaching the number of men required for different tasks and the exact position in which to place the explosives. A little economics was taught to underline the importance of cutting lines of communications e.g. bridges, roads, railways and telephones. They visited a concrete and a steel bridge for practical demonstrations of how and where to place the demolition charge. They had two practical exercises on the blowing up of a small dummy bridge, and in the laying of landmines. After five days of weapon training, an Air Force officer came to show, from seven aerial photographs of Singapore, the positions of the Radar Station, Paya Lebar Airport, Changi Airport, the Power Station and the Wireless Station. On a map of Malaya, Port Dickson and the Kuala Lumpur Airport were specially marked. On a visit to Bandoeng they visited an arms factory where Sten guns, revolvers, hand grenades and rifles were made. One trainee described it as "three times as big as the biggest Singapore Harbour Board godown", part of it underground. They then visited Djakarta where they visited a military airport, a radar station and a power station; and again the places where explosives should be placed for their demolition were demonstrated to them. Each student had specialist training. One of the trainees was taught security. Another was given the task of preparing posters with the slogan "Anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist, pro-Maphilindo". A group was sent back to Singapore to survey railway lines.

64. The special trainees then returned to Tanjong Sekupang. One of the trainees who was appointed a company commander was briefed by Noordin, now promoted to be camp commander in charge of future trainees, to

recruit, on his return to Malaya, a new intake of trainees who would form, on the east coast of Malaya, a resistance force of Fifth Columnists for the Indonesians. All the trainees returned to Singapore in December 1962. Meanwhile on 15th November, nineteen Malays including eleven from the Coronation Road area in Singapore and led by Parti Ra'ayat officials, left Singapore for Tanjong Pinang after an oath-taking ceremony of dedication to their cause. They were sent on to Medan. On 14th December another group of five Chinese West Irian volunteers, three of whom had served in the Committee of the Chinese Section of Panitia, after difficulty in getting Indonesian authority, left Singapore for Tanjong Pinang. Lt. Partono tried to stop them, because he said that as Chinese they could not be trusted and his organisation would be broken and because they would prove the falsity of his argument to the Malays that only they were oppressed and by the Chinese. As they had already left Singapore, they were allowed to continue to Tanjong Pinang where they were screened and detained. By the end of the year some 50 subversive saboteurs had been trained and most of them had returned to Singapore and Malaya though not all were ready to explode in spite of the efforts of their instructors.

COMMUNICATIONS LINK UNDER COMMERCIAL CAMOUFLAGE

65. Lt. Partono's next problem was to find a method of smuggling his men, about 25 in number, and explosives into Singapore from the base he was establishing as well as of breaking his own Government's confrontation policy by bringing supplies from Singapore and paying for them with smuggled goods. His method was the one used by the Indonesians since 1946 through the camouflaged commercial company.

66. The Gerakan Ekonomi Malaya Indonesia (GEMI) was therefore formed by the Indonesian consulate-general and registered on 29th May 1963 in the name of Captain Hassan, a resident agent as sole proprietor and managing director. Its nominal purpose was the import of fish from Tanjong Pinang in the Rhio Islands to Singapore, the ships to return from Singapore with general cargo. The real purpose was, however, to provide a communication and transport link between Lt. Partono's Naval Intelligence Centre at Pulau Samboe and Singapore to provide a source of employment for the West Irian volunteers, which would keep them under supervision and

available for assignments and to keep a watch on Singapore firms trading with Indonesia. In April, the company bought a Singapore registered boat: SMF 417, \$6,000 was agreed as its price. Because the boat was Singapore-registered, it could not operate in Indonesian waters without an Indonesian permit. By August this had not been granted, in spite of a request from Lt. Partono as "Commandant, Base Intelligence I" to the Resident at Tanjong Pinang, the administrative centre of the Rhio Islands. In September and October, it made one trip in each month taking supplies to Tanjong Sekupang returning with rubber and fish to Singapore. The first trainees had to travel to Tanjong Sekupang in hired boats. A branch of GEMI was opened in Johor Bahru as a transit and financing centre for those going from the Federation of Malaya to Tanjong Sekupang for training. After the Johor Bahru Branch was registered in August, Capt. Hassan toured the west coast of Johore between Kukup and Pontian in search of landing places. They found one stretch of fifteen miles where landing was possible at high tide. This was duly reported to officials of the Indonesian consulate-general at Singapore. The company closed in October 1963 because of inefficiency and major loss of funds, though Capt. Hassan continued to work for Partono, now promoted to captain.

67. A second company, the Duma Corporation, described as a firm of "Importers, Exporters and Commission Agents" and nominally for trade in fish from Pulau Samboe, was formed by the consulate-general in July 1963. The firm's smuggling trade with the Rhio Islands led to contact with a firm in Pulau Belakang Padang also run by Capt. Partono and known as C.V. Gurita which wanted a counterpart in Singapore. The manager of the Duma Company helped to form a new company, Malaysia Indonesia Corporation (MIC) in October for Capt. Partono to replace GEMI and supplant Capt. Hassan who was warned by Capt. Partono to keep away from the new company. Registered in Singapore on 1st November 1963, MIC acted as agent in Singapore for C.V. Gurita. It has four directors as an insurance against default. Its initial capital was limited by Capt. Partono to \$30,000. It took over the boat SMF 417. The MIC office in Beach Road became the centre of the Indonesian illegal trade, immigration, subversion and smuggling of arms euphemistically described as "goods" organised by Capt. Partono. It was the meeting place of his agents from Tanjong Sekupang and those residents in Singapore. It was to carry the growing import of explosives in December 1963. All its trade and its immigration of agents were illegal. In November 1963, an unemployed Indonesian (a

Singapore citizen by buying a forged identity card in Tanjong Pinang) was sent by a friend to the MIC. Then he was given a loaded camera with ten unexposed negatives and sent to take photographs of the Radar Station in Bukit Timah Road, from angles carefully explained to him. He was told this was being done on the instructions of Capt. Partono. He took ten photographs of the RAF station at Changi four days later. Other assignments mentioned to him were the RAF Base at Seletar and the Naval Base.

DEMOLITION AGENTS AND THEIR WORK

68. The training at Tanjong Sekupang was aimed at an immediate and urgent objective. Agents had received training in the use of explosives and weapons at the Indonesian consulate-general in Singapore before it closed down in September. From September onwards the trainees at Tanjong Sekupang had been sent with their kill-kits on Capt. Partono's personal explicit directives for assignments in Singapore. One agent was sent to Singapore on the eve of the delayed Malaysia Day, 16th September, to plant explosives with trip-wires near the Padang so that they would create panic and kill during the celebrations.

69. In September two of the Singapore trainees were sent to Singapore to blow up the Pasir Panjang Power Station. They carried with them, in an air company's carrier bag, twenty pieces of 175 gm TNT. Landing at Jardine steps they took a bus to the Power Station. One argued against carrying out the assignments as they had been cheated into going to Tanjong Sekupang by the promise of a job in Djakarta. They threw the fuses and detonators into the sea but were afraid to dispose of the explosives in the same way, and went to Kallang Airport and buried them there. They returned to Tanjong Sekupang the next day and reported in writing to Capt. Partono that they had been unable to carry out their task as they had been chased by the police, and had then thrown the explosives into the sea. Another group was given by Capt. Partono the assignment of blowing up the Britannia Club. They carried twenty pieces of 25 gm TNT explosives. They looked first at the Union Jack Club and then the Britannia Club but found the crowds near both clubs too great. They therefore went to Katong Park where one had been a "chuchi jaga kereta" and early the following morning

put the explosives under a car. They were "happy" on their return to Tanjong Sekupang to hear on the radio that evening the news of the destruction of the car. There had been two previous explosions destroying the fencing of Katong Park. Another agent was given training in the use of the compass and then sent to Singapore to get the compass bearing of the Radar Station opposite Gammons (Malaya). Taking fright he wrote down on a copy of Berita Harian any figures he could think of, and returned to give them to Capt. Partono. On 15th November, Capt. Partono detailed two more to go to Singapore to discover whether there were additional marine police or navy precautions. Another two were detailed to plant a bomb on the water mains near the pineapple factory just a few miles out of Johor Bahru. Their leader was sent on three missions, each time carrying twenty pieces of 200 gm TNT.

70. When their training was finished they were told to return to Singapore to await instructions. It was the role of Noordin bin Lemon to keep in touch with Capt. Partono while MIC and its agents brought the explosives and stored them in Singapore, some in Noordin's own house near the Chief Justice's house in Nassim Road, some in the grounds of a mosque, some in the house of Masri, who had been Koesto's driver and was now a main actor in the plot.

71. If explosives are dangerous in the hands of those who know what they are, they are no less dangerous in the hands of innocents. Some were given to a committee member of the Geylang Serai Branch of the Parti Ra'ayat. Let him tell his own story:

"From the bag he produced a bundle wrapped in brown paper. He opened the bundle and I saw a number of articles (round and square) wrapped in transparent plastic. K also produced a "Brylcreem" bottle containing a number of articles, made of cloth with metal caps at the end. They were round like the size of cigarettes but about 11 inches long. I did not know what the articles were. I asked what the articles were but he said he did not know what they were, then told me that the articles were dangerous. I did not know they were explosives. I have seen guns, bullets and hand grenades, but never seen the articles handed to me by K before. When leaving my house K told me that he would come to take those articles later when he was free."

He stored them on top of an almeirah in the house, until he was told they were too dangerous to keep in the house. He then buried them in adjacent ground. In November one agent collected explosives for use against Mr. Lee Kuan Yew during his tour of Kampong Chai Chu. He made for the Bukit Timah Railway Station to blow up the railway line, but finding six policemen on patrol, returned to the city. Capt. Partono wanted them exploded merely to show the world there was no peace in Singapore, and not necessarily to kill anyone. The agents were told that if they could not achieve their specified objectives they were to leave the explosives where their detonation would create alarm by their indiscriminate damage. The results were the three explosions at Kallang Park and the two lives lost and the car destroyed in Sennet Estate. In December, Noordin Lemon moved from Tanjong Sekupang to Singapore. It was planned that two Indonesian police personnel would follow Capt. Partono's instruction to stiffen the organisation.

72. From 8th December, the smuggling of explosives increased. A member of the crew of one of the boats which belonged to Capt. Partono's firm of Tojo Gurita, tells his own story:

"In early December 1963 S came alone to Singapore. Y gave him four hand grenades to be delivered to M. I was present when Y gave them to him at Belakang Padang. The next day at about 3.00 a.m. I was instructed by Y to come to Singapore with five sacks of charcoal. He instructed me to deliver the goods to M. Accordingly I left Belakang Padang. On the way I met Y who came to my boat in another boat. He was then alone. He brought with him three Sten guns, four bags of explosives, Sten gun ammunition and about 24 hand grenades. On his instruction, I put them in the sacks of charcoal. I arrived at Belakang Mati at about 4.00 a.m. and slept in the boat near the island for the night. At about 8.00 a.m. I came to Singapore. S called for a lorry and on his instruction I loaded the five sacks on the lorry and followed him in the lorry to M's house. M was still not at home and we handed the sacks to his wife. We returned to the boat and S returned to Belakang Padang in his own boat. At about 10.00 p.m., I visited M's house merely to see him and also to get a receipt from him to say that he had received the sacks. He told me that he had seen the sacks and accordingly he gave me a note stating that he had received the five sacks. The next

day at about 1.00 p.m., I returned to Belakang Padang and handed the note from M to Y. A week ago I again came to Singapore with scrap rubber and a sack of charcoal. I left Belakang Padang at about 11.00 p.m. On the way I met Y, who came to my boat in another boat. He carried two haver-sacks and a box of detonators. The two haver-sacks contained 30 boxes of explosives and there were about twenty detonators in the box. On his instruction I kept them in the sack of charcoal. I was also instructed to deliver them to M. He then returned to Belakang Padang and I proceeded to Singapore.

73. On his next trip with detonators this agent was arrested as were most engaged in the swelling conspiracy that had been closely linked with the Hang Tuah – ARTIS group in Singapore, and which was in close touch with officials of the Indonesian consulates in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. One PMU leaflet alleged that the Chinese had drawn up a long-term political plan to make Singapore a “small Chinese country”. Another compared Malays to “horrible fools” like “a baby waiting for the non-Muslim people to offer us sweets”. A third said: “Our nationalism symbolises our love for the country with a firm determination to re-unite all our 140 million people who are scattered all over the Malay Archipelago which spreads from Asia to Australia, including Singapore.”

INTENSIFICATION OF INTRUSIONS INTO SINGAPORE AND MALAYA

76. The attempts at creating terror in Singapore, crippling its public utilities and suborning its politics were only the immediate phase in the long-term strategy of mounting purpose. On 16th July 1963, Subjarwo, the Second Deputy Foreign Minister, during a visit to Singapore told a small group at the Indonesian Association that if Soekarno and Subandrio did not go to the Manila Conference action would be taken on 2nd August. “We’ve got everything in hand,” he said. “The Navy, the Air Force and the Army are standing ready and our new fast patrol boats are already in the waters around Singapore and Malaya. General Djatikusumo, our ambassador in Kuala Lumpur, is working there. He’s a tough man and is handling things for us; but he may not succeed. You must all be ready to go back to Indonesia at short notice.”

77. In November, one of Capt. Partono's intelligence agents came to Singapore with instructions to recruit agents in the Naval Base, and to bring back copies of the Singapore and Johor Bahru telephone directories. In November Capt. Partono wrote to Bong Kahar through one of his agents in Singapore asking for details of "trooping zones" i.e. landing zones for troops and to ask what further funds he needed. Bong Kahar, in his reply, named one in Kelantan, and asked for \$75,000 which he was later told would be given aid, at least in part. In December, Bong Kahar was approached by one of Capt. Partono's agents to select two young men from each state of Malaya for training in Indonesia in map reading and radio broadcast. He added that after training ended, the Indonesian Government would provide two transmitters to Malaya and Singapore for radio communication with Indonesia.

78. In September 1963, the KMM had declared in Indonesia a "Republic of Malaya" of which Shamsuddin, PKI cadre of 1959 and a sergeant in the Indonesian Army, was declared Vice President. From this group with which the Parti Ra'ayat is deeply involved comes the new phase of explosions in the name of the so-called "Republik of Malaya" - and its so-called "National Army", Tentera Nasional Republic Malaya (TNRM) - parallel to the tactic used in support of Azahari and the deployment of a so-called TNKU (Tentera Nasional Kalimantan Utara). They are moving from Tanjong Balai on Bantam Island where sabotage control now appears to lie. With the growing number of troops on the islands of Singapore, it may well be thought better that they should not be seen by trainees returning to Singapore and that therefore Tanjong Sekupang is no longer suitable for their training. Lt. Partono went to Djakarta and has returned to the Rhio Islands.

79. In March, 1963 "Brigadier-General" Ruslan Shariff of Parti Ra'ayat and APERMA was arrested after his landing at Tuas to organise cells for APERMA in Singapore. Three Indonesian members of an "underwater demolition team" accompanied him. In this new phase the groups are professional regulars and not haphazardly recruited and hastily trained, though politically enthusiastic amateurs. They included instructors to train agents in Singapore and wireless operators to keep the Indonesian Army authorities informed of opportunities for intervention.

80. Ruslan Shariff brought information which allowed the capture of the

new stores of sabotage material brought in to replace those captured by the Singapore police in December. Near Scudai, three Browning pistols, 193 rounds of 9 mm ammunition, 252 feet of safety fuse, 500 feet of detonator cords, and 53 × 1 lb slabs of TNT were found. On the Wing Loon Estate near the southwest coast of Singapore, four Sten guns with 689 rounds of ammunition, two Luger pistols and 47 × 1 lb blocks of TNT were found among other demolition equipment.

SARAWAK AND SABAH

81. It was in April 1963 that major Indonesian subversive activity began in Sarawak and Sabah. The PKI whose policy had always independently been against Malaysia had been in touch with the Sarawak Clandestine Communist Party (CCO) since February 1963 about the transfer of subversive training to Indonesian territory. Tebedu Village was attacked on 12th April. Indonesian consular officers in Jesselton for the first time approached Indonesian sympathisers in Sabah with invitations to undergo military and political training in Indonesia. On 30th April, Radio Pontianak issued an official communique by Col. Sudarno of Military Area XII with its Headquarters at Pontianak on the first raid to be the topic of an official communique, the attack on Gumbang on 23rd April by so-called TNKU guerillas. In the same month 20,000 rupiahs were seized in the house of a member near Kuching, along with notes on guerilla warfare in Cuba and China. The Publicity Officer in the Indonesian consulate in Jesselton who returned from Djakarta in April reported that while in Djakarta he had discussed military training with a high-ranking military officer and recruitment began in May. In May the decision was taken to carry out CCO training in Indonesia rather than in Sarawak and the CCO members first crossed over to Indonesia for training in significant numbers. This followed the decision of the Sarawak Government to recall shot-guns licensed to non-natives and allowed time for the completion of the training before Malaysia Day. Indonesian agents arrived in Sabah to foster anti-Malaysia feelings with the National Pasok Momogun Organisation (National True Sons of the Soil Association). In June all CCO training in Sarawak was suspended while their members went to Indonesia for training. Indonesian Ibans were instructed to receive and look after them until they were met by members of the PKI. By July over 750 had already crossed to Indonesia. General Nasution in July visited the training centres of the so-called TNKU in North Kalimantan.

82. While the CCO was the instrument of subjection through subversion in Sarawak, the instrument in Sabah was the Indonesian consulate working on the 25,000 Indonesian labourers employed there. The prime agent being the vice-consul, Major Moenardjo, who received his instructions direct from Col. Soegih Arto in Singapore, and used agents such as the recently surrendered Sunarto of the "Sabah People's Rebellion Front". Recruitment in Sabah for trainees to go to Djakarta began in May 1963. In June, Major Moenardjo recruited two Sabah citizens for military training in Indonesia, though two others whom he approached were arrested by the Sabah police soon after. Only Indonesians under 30 were given permits to return to Indonesia and they were designated for military training. His stall began recording anti-Malaysia speeches in different dialects for use by Azahari over radio. Photographs were taken of Kota Belud as a military centre. Major Moenardjo discussed with officials of the Indonesian Association in Sandakan and Tawau, the import of arms from Tarakan and fomenting of a rising (with tactics similar to those used in Brunei) during August, using the Prophet Muhammad's Birthday and Indonesia Day to attract crowds culminating in an attack on key points on 31st August. In the face of these activities, Major Moenardjo and Mr. Bambang Sumali, the two vice-consuls, on 26th July were asked by the North Borneo Government to leave, the consul asserting his ignorance of their activities. The two vice-consuls reported to the Military and Naval Attaches and Koesto in the Indonesian consulate-general during their five days in Singapore from 26th July to 1st August.

83. It is not proposed to repeat in this paper the lurid details of armed Indonesian intrusions to Sarawak and Sabah in which both regular Indonesian troops as well as irregular "volunteers" have taken part, because these have been fully publicised in the press, together with the events leading to Soekarno's declaration of the "ceasefire" under which armed Indonesian intrusions have continued to take place, hand in hand with atrocities upon Malaysian fishermen in the Straits of Malacca.

CONCLUSIONS

84. It is very clear that the following conclusions stand out distinctly from the details given in this paper:

(1) Indonesian Expansionism as a successor to Western Imperialism and

- Colonialism is a basic tenet of Soekarno's national policy right from the beginning.
- (2) Indonesia's "confrontation" policy against Malaysia is the natural result of the above long-term Indonesian policy and not the result of the formation of Malaysia which is only an excuse made use of by Indonesia to launch her present campaign of aggression.
 - (3) In addition to the political, economic and cultural aspects of Indonesia's "confrontation" policy, there are also its military and subversive aspects.
 - (4) The military aspect lies in military intrusions into Sarawak and Sabah, as well as attempts to land and infiltrate military groups into Singapore and the peninsula hand in hand with the setting up of the Fifth Column to assist such landings and to establish pockets of military intruders in the country.
 - (5) The subversive aspect lies in penetrating local political and other organisations and to subvert them into becoming traitors to their country and Indonesian agents and Fifth Columnists for the purpose of overthrowing the present Government in Malaysia and replacing it with a pro-Indonesian Government that will accept Indonesian orders.
 - (6) An important task of these agents is to sabotage and destroy important installations and public utilities like power stations, bridges, military installations, etc., in order to disrupt the economic life and administration as well as the defence of the country and cause chaos and disorder.
 - (7) Failing to cause major sabotage as a result of effective preventive measures by the Government, they hope to be able to carry out minor sabotage activities, such as are now taking place in Singapore and have already killed four people, in order to cause alarm and despondency among the people as part and parcel of their psychological warfare campaign.
 - (8) The number of these Indonesian agents and extremist local supporters

is small, but they are being intensively backed up by Indonesia with money, arms and explosives.

KUALA LUMPUR,
23rd April 1964.